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"were prepared to walk through fire for freedom". 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the relationship between rural 
struggles and popular organisation in the Cape between 1928 
and 1933. It focuses on the attempts by militants in the 
ANC(Western Province) and later the Independent ANC to 
organise in the rural areas during a period of crisis for 
agriculture. 
In the first chapter the history and trends in the 
nationalist movement before 1930 is discussed. It is argued 
that the conservative petty bourgeoisie dominated the 
organisation for much of the time, but that more militant 
positions were adopted on a few rare occasions. 
The second chapter endeavours to show that.the transition to 
capitalist agriculture had been completed in the Western 
Cape. ·It then examines the specificity of the crisis in 
agriculture during the Depression: a crisis which was 
manifested in the form of an acute labour shortage on the 
farms, combined with unemployment in the towns. This, it is 
argued, provided a fertile ground for organisation. 
The third chapter examines the rural struggles in the 
Western Cape. It analyses the alliance in the ANC(WP) 
between the moderate Garveyists and the militants linked to 
the Communist Party, and the reasons for the subsequent 
breakdown of this alliance. It discusses both the success 
of the organisation in coping with violent repression, and 
its failure to cope with the stat.e's more subtle strategies. 
The militants were eventually expelled from the ANC. Most 
rural branches then broke away to form the Independent ANC. 
Chapter 4 discusses the formation of the IANC and raises 
some questions about the nature of its political programme. 
It then proceeds to focus on organisation in the Southern 
Cape where all the branches had joined the IANC. 
The fifth chapter discusses the organisation in the Midlands 
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area of the Eastern Cape. It attempts to explain the lack 
of success in Graaff-Reinett. It then proceeds to examine 
the organisation in Middelburg where is appears that it had 
learnt to cope with at least some of the problems 
experienced in the Western Cape. 
The sixth chapter analyses in some detail the issues that 
were taken up by the IANC in the Midlands, and how these 
were reflected in its discourse. Among the issues raised 
are unemployment, resistance to passes and local control 
measures, the problem of women's participation and the 
struggle that was waged against the conservative petty 
bourgeoisie in the ANC. 
The seventh chapter first discusses organisation in Cradock. 
It then proceeds to describe how the struggle in the 
Midlands built up to a climax at the end of 1931, until 
massive repression smashed the organisation. Thereafter the 
organisation continued only at a low level. 
The conclusion attempts to draw together some of the themes 
raised above. First, it discusses the relationship between 
the petty bourgeoisie and the militants. Second, it argues 
that the organisation's approach was essentially 
"agitational", and that this accounts partly for its 
effectiveness, as well as many of its weaknesses. Lastly an 
attempt is made to evaluate the significance of the 
organisation. 
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PREFACE 
This work has been many years in the making and there are a 
vast number of people who have contributed in some way to 
its completion. Here I can obviously only thank a few of 
them. 
My greatest debt is due to Debbie Budlender for many years 
of encouragement and support, for many valuable comments on 
innumerable drafts, and for typing most of those drafts! I 
am also indebted to my supervisor, Dave Kaplan, for many 
years of pushing, prodding and patience. I have learnt a 
great deal from his help and incisive comments. Thanks also 
to Ian Phimister who supervised the early stages of my 
thesis, and to William Beinart for some very useful 
comments. 
This thesis would obviously never have seen the light of day 
were it not for the many helpful and patient librarians 
scattered all over the country, especially the staff at the 
South Africa Public Library, the African Studies Division 
and Manuscript section of the Jagger library at U.C.T., and 
the Archives in Pretoria. 
Lastly, I would like to thank all my friends who have been 
very supportive over the years, and especially so over the 
last few days when the inevitable last-minute proofreading 
had to be done. Thanks also to Kathy Gurney who turned a 
chaos of drafts into an immaculately typed thesis. 
* * * 
I have tried, wherever possible, to avoid "racial" 
categorisation in this work but unfortunately we live in an 
extremely divided and stratified society. The various 
groups in society often· have widely divergent traditions, 
backgrounds or interests, and it is sometimes important to 
give an indication of the background of a particular person 
or group of people when discussing some or other feature of 
the organisation that is the subject of this study. When 
this was necessary I have, for the sake of convenience, 
opted for the use of those terms .commonly used in our 
society, without, I hope, bestowing on them any intrinsic 
validity. I also make use of the term "black" to indicate 
all those groupings that are not classified as "white" by 
the state. 
This work traces the emergence and development of a militant 
popular organisation in the rural areas of the Cape between 
1929 and 1933. 
Initially organisation was established in the Western 
Province and Southern Cape under the auspices of the Cape 
Town based AN9(Western Province). But the militants who 
spearheaded the organisation in the rural areas, soon 
clashed with both the local and national leadership of the 
ANC. This eventually resulted in their expulsion. Almost 
all the rural branches of the ANC(WP) then broke away to 
form the Independent ANC which organised in the Southern 
Cape, and especially in the Midlands area of the Eastern 
Cape. 
This.study is essentially a history of a rural organisation 
which has been much neglected in South African histor-
iography. The struggles in the Western Cape are at least 
mentioned in most histories of the liberation movement, but 
the organisation by the IANC in the Southern cape and 
Midlands at present languishes in almost total obscurity. 
(1) I have been able to find remarkably rich sources on the 
activities of the ANC(WP) and the IANC, most notably in the 
archives of the Department of Justice in Pretoria. 
They contain a great number of reports by the police and 
local magistrates on the meetings and activities of the 
militants. In addition the local newspapers in some of the 
rural towns gave relatively generous coverage of the IANC, 
and they contain a wealth of information. 
Unfortunately, though, this material gives a view almost 
exclusively from the "outside" and at present no substantial 
sources exist which provide one with an "insider" view. The 
only possible exception is the newspaper Umsebenzi which 
functioned for a while as the informal mouthpiece of the 
militants in the ANC(WP). However, this paper covered only 
the later period of the ANC(WP) organisation, and its . 
coverage of the IANC and events in the Midlands was very 
poor. Thus the emphasis in this study is inevitably on the 
public activities of the ANC(WP) and IANC, rather than on 
the internal dynamics of the organisations - though when an 
examination of the available evidence does yield new and 
important insights, these are discussed in some detail. 
The struggles that emerged in the rural areas of the Cape 
raise a number of important issues which will be addressed 
in this study. 
Firstly, there is the issue of the extent to which the rural 
protests and forms of organisation were structured by the 
nature of capitalist development in the rural areas. There 
are two factors to be considered here. First at a general 
level there.is a question as to the extent to which 
capitalist relations of production prevailed in these areas. 
Second, and more particular to the period under consider-
ation, one needs to consider the effects of the Great 
Depression on agriculture and the rural working class. How 
the popular struggles intersected with these factors and the 
extent to which the specificity of agriculture in these· 
areas determined the nature and form of these struggles, 
form the first focus of this study. 
Secondly, it is clear that the organisation by the militants 
generated a great surge of popular excitement and support, 
and was successful in many ways. This raises a whole series 
of issues concerning the nature and form of the 
organisation, for example the strategies and organisational 
methods that were employed, the issues that were taken up, 
and the discourse and ideology of the ANC(WP) and IANC. 
These issues will be addressed throughout the main body of 
this study, and in the conclusion an attempt will be made to 
evaluate the effectiveness and weaknesses in the approach 
adopted by the organisation. 
A third, and less central issue, concerns the nature of the 
nationalist movement at the time. The interaction between 
the mi li tan ts and the ma in nationalist movement, the ANC, 
makes clear the necessity of a conception of the ANC which 
stresses the existence of different tendencies within the 
movement. 
Lastly, there are questions as to the significance of these 
struggles. This study will explore the extent to which the 
militants organised within prevailing conceptions of popular 
organisation, and in what respects they advanced such 
conceptions in a more progressive direction. The fact that 
the organisation was based in the rural areas is also of 
crucial importance. The liberation movement in South Africa 
has, with few exceptions, been characterised by an overt 
lack of attention to the question of rural organisation, 
both in practice and in theory. Though this situation has 
been remedied somewhat in the last few years, there are 
still large gaps in our knowledge of the dynamic of rural 
struggles. I hope that this study will make a small 
contribution towards increasing our knowledge of the 
potentialities and limits of rural organisation. 
NOTES 
1. For accounts of the struggles in the Western Cape, 
see eg Roux 1978, p231 ff; 1972, plOl ff; 1944, 
pll8; Simons and Simons 1969, p431 ff; Benson 
1966, p56 ff; Walshe 1971, pl82-3; Lodge 1983, 
p8-9; Bundy 1984, pl9. Most authors mention only 
the formation of the IANC, and the fact that it 
was "shortlived". The only reference I have found 
to the IANC's organisation in the Midlands is two 
sentences in Bundy 1984, pl9. 
CHAPTER 1 
CONSERVATIVES, MODERATES AND MILITANTS: 
THE ANC AND POPULAR STRUGGLES BEFORE 1930 
Before examining the campaigns of the ANC (Western 
Province), to organise in the rural areas of the Cape, it is 
important to situate these campaigns in the context of the 
history and development of the national movement, and the 
ANC in particular. 
This chapter attempts to draw out three distinct tendencies 
in the development of the early ANC and the provincial 
organisations that preceded it. The tendencies are 
characterised fairly broadly in relation to their attitude 
towards popular struggles. 
The first tendency favoured only moderate methods of 
struggle and actively opposed any mass popular struggles. A 
second tendency also favoured moderate means, but was 
sympathetic and willing to lend some support to mass 
struggles, although it was not in favour of active 
participation in such struggles. The third tendency 
favoured the active involvement of the ANC in popular 
struggles, both in a supportive and organising role. These 
tendencies can broadly be labelled as conservative, moderate 
and militant. 
The development of the ANC can be periodised, to some 
extent, in terms of the emergence and dominance of these 
tendencies. It must be emphasised, however, that this was 
not a simple linear process and no tendency ever completely 
superceded a previous one. Rather these tendencies 
co-existed uneasily within the ANC, and their relative 
degrees of dominance were often determined by class 
struggles outside the organisation. 
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I 'CONSTITUTIONAL OPPOSITION': CONSERVATIVE DOMINANCE IN 
THE PERIOD UP TO 1914 
The ANC was founded on 8 January 1912 at a conference in 
Bloemfontein. This conference was attended by nearly a 
hundred delegates from various African organisations, as 
well as by most of the influential chiefs in the Union and 
the "Territories" (the BLS countries). (1) 
The formation of the ANC was not a sudden and unexpected 
event - rather it was the culmination of years of struggle 
by the African petty bourgeoisie who were "striving for 
personal as well as national advancement," (2) but found 
their way increasingly blocked. 
Before 1909, there were "Native" congresses in all the 
provinces, but there was very little co-operation or even 
communication between these organisations. The main reason 
was the fact that the differences in "native" policies, 
especially between the Cape and elsewhere, tended to divide 
the largest section of the African petty bourgeoisie, the 
enfranchised Africans in the Cape, from the masses in the 
Cape and from all Africans elsewhere. This isolation was 
overcome to some extent in 1909 when most of these 
organisations united to protest against the content of the 
proposed Union of South Africa, especially against the 
failure to extend the Cape franchise to the other provinces. 
All the provincial congresses held well-attended conferences 
to protest against the Union and this was followed by the 
meeting of the South African Native Convention in 
Bloemfontein in March 1909. Virtually all important leaders 
attended this conference, with the notable exception of John 
Tengo Jabavu who had become increasingly afraid of any 
effort to organise a political movement which might 
ant~~~:nise the white population. (3) 
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The conference itself remained bound by a tradition of 
constitutional opposition and protest. This was partly a 
result of its almost exclusively petty bourgeois compo-
sition and partly a conscious reaction to the failure of the 
last traditional armed uprising, the Bambatha rebel lion in 
1906. (4} It is reflected in the fact that the only 
challenge it offered to the proposed Union was a delegation 
to London to appeal to the British Crown, a body which no 
longer had either the political will or the right to inter-
vene in the internal affairs of the "advanced colonies:' (5) 
Thus, at a time when the Indian community under the leader-
ship of Gandhi was already exploring new ways of mass 
opposition through passive resistance and defiance (6), the 
African petty bourgeoisie failed to take any note of the 
this and remained within a sterile tradition of constitu-
tional opposition. Needless to say, the delegation was a 
total failure, although the conference remained an important 
landmark in the development of a national movement in South 
Africa .. 
After the establishment of the Union, the African petty 
bourgeoisie was further alarmed at the amount of discrimina-
tory measures passed or proposed by the new government. 
These included the Native Labour Regulation Act {1911) which 
changed a breach of contract by African workers into a 
criminal offense, the Mines and Works Act {1911) which 
allowed job reservation by regulation, and the proposed Land 
Bill {1910). (7) Not all of these measures affected the 
petty bourgeoisie directly; but a large section of the petty 
bourgeoisie was astute enough to realise that increased 
national oppression of Africans at any level would also 
affect the petty bourgeoisie. 
In the course of 1911, a group of young lawyers, recently 
returned from overseas studies, started to organise a 
conference. They planned to form a South African Native 
Congress to give a focus to this diffuse unease and to 
consolidate the gains of the National Convention. Pixley ka 
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I Seme was especially prominent in this group, and was 
supported by Alfred Mang~[!,g,/and Richard Msirnang. According 
to Simons and Simons, it soon became clear that 
Nearly all the leaders and greater 
chiefs supported the movement for a 
congress that would give them an 
effective means of making their 
grievances known to the government and 
South Africa at large. (8) 
Thus it was not long before the group's efforts culminated 
in the founding congress of the ANC described above. 
Initially the ANC was an almost exclusively urban petty 
bourgeois movement. But there were concerted attempts to 
dra~ in the rural petty bourgeoisie, especially the chiefs, 
by granting them special privileges within the ANC, and by 
acknowledging their traditional leadership position in the 
rural areas. The composition of the first congress is an 
indication of the domination of the petty bourgeoisie, and 
especially the urban petty bourgeoisie - those who attended 
were chiefs, 
ministers, teachers , clerks, inter-
preters a few successful farmers, small 
scale traders, compound managers, estate 
and labour agents - they were not trade 
unionists, nor were they socially 
radical. (9) 
Walshe is perhaps overcritical on the issue of working class 
representation as, firstly, there probably were no African 
trade unionists at the time, as the working class was still 
relatively undeveloped and consequently very weak and dis-
organised; and secondly some prominent members of the ANC 
had been involved in the limited working class struggles 
that had taken place. In Cape Town, for example, Mangena 
was prominent as an adviser and "secretary" to the 
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stevedores when they fought a series of bitter struggles 
over wages, living conditions and control over the labour 
process at the turn of the century. He was also involved in 
the struggle against the imposition of a location in Cape 
Town in the 1900's. (10) 
Initially the ANC was almost exclusively petty bourgeois 
in composition and essentially conservative in character. 
The early ANC continued the traditional methods of 
'constitutional' opposition: the 
approved methods of struggle were to 
ventilate grievances at public meetings 
and through the press, and make 
representations for redress by means of 
resolutions and deputations. (11) 
Typically then, the first action of the newly formed ANC was 
to send a delegation to Cape Town to protest against the 
Squatters Bill. Like many, if not all, subsequent 
delegations, this effort ended in total failure. {12) 
The first major issue that the ANC had to face was the Land 
Act of 1913, which provided for the segregation of rural 
landholding and attempted to prevent the independent 
reproduction of the African peasantry. (13) The drastic 
effects of this Act aroused mass opposition and the ANC 
grasped the opportunity to consolidate its support, and its 
leadership of the national struggle. (14) 
It leJ> much of the opposition against the Land Act, a 
struggle that elicited much wider support from Africans than 
any previous political campaign launched in South Africa. 
This is clear, inter alia, from the fact that the ANC 
membership expanded considerably, even to include numbers of 
poorer peasants, and from the amount of money it was able to 
collect. ( 15) 
In the opposition to the Land Act, moderate methods again 
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prevailed. At the July 1913 conference a proposal to send a 
delegation to Britain to protest against the Act and to 
request the British parliament to veto it, was received 
enthusiastically and confirmed at the next conference. Much 
of the ANC's subsequent efforts were directed towards 
organising this delegation. It did in fact travel to London 
- at vast expense - but the mission was as futile as the 
1909 delegation. The British Crown was no longer willing to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of the Union. (16) 
The opposition of the Land Act was further conditioned by 
the fact that some ANC leaders were prepared to accept some 
segregation, provided that it was "fair" and restricted to 
the rural areas. (17) This dithering on a fundamental issue 
in the national struggle was only decisively defeated at the 
1916 conference and shows the lengths to which sections of 
the petty bourgeoisie were prepared to go to avoid any 
confrontation with the bourgeoisie. It is also, however, a 
reflection of the very different material conditions in the 
reserves, as Beinart has shown in the case of Pondoland. 
There a relatively high degree of independence had been 
preserved from the capitalist sector and there was 
substantial support for the Land Act as it would prevent the 
further encroachment of the white farmers onto the Reserves. 
( 18) 
II 'GUARDED SUPPORT': MODERATES SUPPORT MASS STRUGGLES 
FROM 1914 ONWARDS 
It is in the influx of new members into the ANC that we find 
the emergence of a challenge to the conservatives' total 
hegemony within the ANC. As the ANC and its influence 
expanded, it became less exclusively petty bourgeoisie, both 
in composition and character. Furthermore, the very logic 
of a mass organisation required the petty bourgeoisie 
leadership to at least support popular struggles in order to 
retain their leadership of the national movement. This 
strengthened the moderates within the ANC. 
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For most of the period up to 1940 there was little conflict 
between the conservatives and the moderates as both 
groupings were in favour of moderate means of struggle, of 
constitutional opposition. There was conflict though, when 
popular mass struggles erupted and the ANC had to define its 
position vis-a-vis such struggles. These tensions 
surfaced for the first time at the July 1913 conference when 
there was considerable support for a motion "associating" 
the ANC with the strikes of the African mine workers, and it 
was only after determined intervention by Sol Plaaije that 
it was rejected and the ANC "dissociated" itself from the 
strike. (19) 
For the conservatives there could be no question of any 
involvement in mass struggles. As Seme argued in 1912, the 
ANC was formed precisely 
to provide a representative and 
responsible outlet for African opinion, 
and to so avoid the exploitation of 
Native fears and grievances by 
irresponsible agitators. (20) 
The conservatives realised that the petty bourgeoisie had 
specific class interests that could not be conflated to 
those of the working class. In particular it was vital for 
the petty bourgeoisie to retain control of the national 
movement. Losing control would probably mean that a more 
militant national struggle would be launched, which would 
ultimately force the petty bourgeoisie to make an open 
choice between an alliance with the bourgeoisie or the 
working class. 
During the post-war upheavals this perspective found a clear 
and conscious expression in Sol Plaatje's dealings with De 
Beers, which were underpinned by 
a distinct note of concern on Plaatje's 
part about.the threat that the strength 
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of the 'black Bolsheviks' ... posed to 
his own class position and credibility. 
(21) 
The moderates, on the other hand, were more inclined to 
support popular struggles. They argued, somewhat 
simplistically, that the national movement was an undivided 
whole, and that there was no conflict amongst the various 
classes constituting the national movement. This group 
stated that the ANC' s task was merely to establish "a 
mandate from the people" (22) - in other words they wished 
to draw the working class into the national movement, but 
assumed implicitly that the petty bourgeoisie would continue 
to exercise their "natural" leadership of the movement. 
( 23) 
There was, however, a contradiction in the moderate position 
which would become more significant later. Once popular 
struggle built up to a certain level, the moderates were in 
fact forced to 1~ke the choice that the conservatives sought 
to avoid: they had to participate in the struggles or join 
the conservatives in opposing them. 
At the same time as these developments in the ANC, there 
were signs outside the organisation of the emergence of new 
methods of popular struggle, although the ANC did not (or 
would not) directly participate in these struggles. 
As early as 1911 African mineworkers on the Rand went on 
strike, and this was followed by a series of strikes in July 
1913 and January 1914 , during the white miners' strikes. 
(24). As described above, there was a considerable amount 
of sympathy for the strikers within the ANC. 
New methods of struggle also emerged in the struggle against 
passes in the Orange Free State. In the early part of the 
century, the Orange Free State was the only province where 
African women were legally required to carry passes. It was 
only after Union that the local government tried to enforce 
0 
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these regulations. Both the ANC and the African Political 
Organisation protested against these laws through their 
usual channels of deputations and petitions. In about 1912, 
a Native and Coloured Womens Association was formed in 
Bloemfontein. This body played a crucial role in organising 
the anti-pass campaign and in devising new methods of mass 
resistance to the pass laws. In addition, it was also a 
significant advance on earlier forms of organisation both in 
the sense that it was not restricted to one ethnic group, 
and in that most earlier organisation had totally excluded 
women. In fact, according to Walker, there was some degree 
of resentment by the ANC and APO at the degree of 
independence of the NCWA. ( 25) 
The NCWA utilised the old methods of delegations and 
petitions, but these were eventually exhausted and the 
women lost their patience. In June 1913 several women were 
arrested while handling a petition to the Bloemfontein 
mayor. Up to that time there had been some unorganised mass 
resistance in the form of a refusal to take the new passes. 
Now, however, the struggle against passes became much more 
militant. 600 women marched on the Magistrates Court and 
Town Hall to protest against the arrests, brea~ing through 
a police cordon on the way. This 
was the beginning of a widespread 
campaign of passive resistance which 
spread to all the major Free State 
towns. ( 26) 
Hundreds Of women ·went to gaol for refusing to carry passes, 
and in a number of towns the gaols were reported to be over-
flowing. 
Widespread evictions under the 1913 Land Act were taking 
place at the same time and were a further factor 
contributing to the militant nature of the 
anti-pass campaign. Walker describes the campaign, but is 
not very clear on its duration. It seems that it stopped at 
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some stage during the war, although there were still 
sporadic incidents in 1920. 
The campaign was extremely successful and the atte1~t to 
introduce passes was eventually defeated. In fact 
opposition was so strong that it made the state extremely 
wary of any attempt to extend the system to other 
provinces. (27) It was only in the 1950's that the state 
again attempted to extend the pass system to women. 
Although the ANC did not take any direct part in the rnass 
campaign, its impact had a profound influence on some 
sections of the ANC leadership, strengthened by the relative 
success of the campaign. This contributed further to the 
dilution of the dominance of the conservatives in the ANC. 
In contrast to its attitude during the 1913 miners' strike, 
the majority in the ANC was now prepared to lend support to 
popular struggles, although it was still wary of direct 
participation in such struggles. 
The outbreak of the war in 1914, however, negated much of 
the progress that the ANC had made towards becoming a more 
mi 1 i tant mass movement. For the next few years, much of the 
ANC's actions were tempered by the need to assure the 
government of the loyalty and support of the African 
population - a need which obviously precluded the organis-
ation of any resistance to government measures. It was one 
of the essential elements of the African petty bourgeoisie 
ideology that they would be duly rewarded, .if only they 
could convince the government of their loyalty and the war 
presented them with a golden opportunity. The ANC gave its 
unconditional support to the war effort, helping, inter 
alia, to recruit Africans to serve in the labour corps 
attached to the army, despite the fact that the government 
steadfastly refused to even consider recruiting black 
soldiers. (28) Thus it was not surprising that by 1917 
many people regarded the ANC as a purely elitist 
organisation consisting of 
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Exempted natives, shareholders, and a 
couple of lawyers •.• {who} organise 
themselves so as not to have their lands 
and exemption certificates taken away 
from them. ( 29) 
This trend was only reversed towards the end of the war, 
under pressure from a series of mass struggles. 
III 'INVOLVEMENT IN POPULAR STRUGGLES' - MILITANTS 
AND THE POST-WAR PERIOD ON THE RAND 
Prelude 
Initially the left wing movements in South Africa were only 
interested in organising white workers, but gradually a 
realisation took root amongst the most progressive sections 
of the left that 
craft unionism and prejudice, in 
perpetuating the exclusion of African 
labour from organisation encouraged the 
sacrifice of the most revolutionary 
workers. This removed the motive force 
of the revolution. The revolution then 
no longer depended on the white workers, 
but on the black workers joined by the 
white workers. (30) 
Led by Sidney Bunting and David Ivon Jones, the Inter-
national Socialist League broke with the Labour Party's 
segregationist 'native' policy and became actively involved 
in organising African workers and co-operating with black 
organisations. Although there were still important elements 
in the ISL that had doubts about this course, (31) the more 
progressive wing had a clear majority by 1916 and began to 
take the first tentative steps towards co-operating with 
Africans. The ANC and ISL held a joint protest meeting 
against the Native Administration Bill, while the ISL began 
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to lay the groundwork for a black trade union. In 1917 it 
organised regular weekly meetings with African workers to 
instruct ther.1 in socialism in semi-secret conditions. (32) 
The core of the Industrial Workers of Africa, the first 
African trade union in South Africa, emerged from these 
meetings. 
From the end of 1917, there were a number of joint meetings 
between the IWA/ISL, the Transvaal Native Congress and the 
APO. At these meetings the TNC stated that they 
would remain independent of the labour 
movement since their business was to get 
the rights of black people and 'to unite 
the native chiefs' but the TNC was 
'heartily willing to join and assist the 
working movement as best they can'. 
(33) 
Although there was still a lot of mistrust of the ANC in the 
IWA/ISL, especially given some of the extremely reactionary 
statements made by some of the TNC leaders (34), a certain 
amount of co-operation continued to take place. 
The mass struggles on the Rand between mid-1918 and 1920 
were an extremely significant turning point in the 
development of the national liberation struggle in South 
Africa. For the first time a whole series of mass struggles 
erupted on a scale which forced the ANC to become actively 
involved in popular struggles, or to be left behind. As 
will become clear below there were some within the TNC 
leadership who preferred the latter course, but for a period 
at least, the TNC committed itself to active participation 
in popular struggle. For the purposes of this work, it is 
extremely important to look at this period in some detail, 
as it was the. only other time before the Second World War 
that a section of the ANC was directly involved in mass 
struggles. 
13 
As early as 1911 African mineworkers had gone on strike 
demanding better wages and working conditions, while in 1913 
more than 1.3 000 black mineworkers struck during the white 
miners strike. Although all the strikes were severely 
repressed, significant improvements in working conditions 
were won as'the state and capital attempted to defuse the 
situation. (35) There were also a few smaller strikes in 
January 1914 and towards the end of 1915, but as argued 
earlier, mass struggle was at a low ebb during the war. (36) 
The 'Bucket' strike 
The first indication of an upsurge in the level of popular 
struggle came in January 1918. The increasing level of 
prices in mines stores, led to an organised boycott of these 
stores which 
quickly spread, and soon developed into 
an organised and disciplined campaign 
... along the entire eastern Rand .. 
{but} police action and the promise of a 
Commission of Enquiry brought the 
movement to a halt. (37) 
In May there was a successful strike by some black Railway 
workers, which won them a 3d per day increase. Shortly 
afterwards followed a strike and a number of demands for 
increased wages by municipal workers. The Council's refusal 
to grant any increases led to the famous 'bucket' strike 
after 50 night soilmen had been arrested when they refused 
to work. The other workers refused to scab and eventually 
152 workers were arrested and callously sentenced to 
continue doing their own work under armed guard. (38) 
The black community was outraged at these sent enc es and a 
series of mass protest meetings were held all over the Rand. 
The TNC were in the forefront of organising the protests, 
al though the IWA and APO also played a pro mi nen t role and 
co-operated closely with the TNC. (39) Although several 
members of the IWA and ISL were charged with organising the 
14 
bucket strike, they were all found not guilty and it is not 
clear to what extent the IWA was involved in the strike 
itself. In fact a joint IWA/TNC Committee of Five was set 
up 
to find ways how we are going to get our 
rights, and if we do not get them, what 
shall we do to starve the white men. 
(40) 
Almost immediately it became clear that there were two 
distinct strategies in the TNC for dealing with the crisis. 
On the one hand, there was the traditional ANC view which 
repudiated any mass action and wanted to continue assuring 
whites of the loyalty of blacks. Isaac Bud Mbelle argued 
that 
We must extinguish the fire when we see 
it burning outside the Congress at 
Bloemfontein decided that its sentiments 
were against any form of strike. We 
have therefore also to be careful about 
what we do and must avoid putting our 
people in trouble •.• If we do not stop 
the strike the whole of Johannesburg 
will be in flames. (41) 
On the other hand, there emerged a new militant line, not 
clearly defined or articulated as yet, which realised the 
importance of mass action and was willing to support or even 
advocate such action. This line was most consistently 
espoused by the IWA, but even in the TNC there was a growing 
group of moderates who were under severe pressure to support 
this line. At times this line even had majority support 
within the TNC. Thus Maghato, president of the TNC, replied 
to Bud Mbelle by advocating mass action: if 
the blacks just folded up their arms and 
stopped work, they would surely hurt the 
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white man! (42) 
It seems that this group of militants almost immediately 
started to make preparations for a general strike and in the 
series of mass meetings in June they were almost totally 
dominant. (43) Certainly the conservatives were 
sufficiently worried about their position to appeal to the 
state for help. Bud Mbelle telegraphed to the Minister of 
Justice in regard to those who had been arrested, that 
the government would strengthen our 
hands considerably by extending its 
clemency to the prisoners, and by 
altering Mr McFie's {the chief 
magistrate - WH} decision before the 
weekend. ( 44) 
The most significant protest meeting took place on 19 June 
when over a thousand Africans from all parts of the Rand 
gathered and a demand for a ls a day increase was 
formulated. According to Bonner, it appears 
that no decision was actually taken on 
the question of a strike, although this 
was clearly the sanction that was at the 
back of the people's minds if the 1/-
request was rejected. (45) 
At any rate, many people came away from the meeting thinking 
that a strike had been decided on. Even before the end of 
June a number of strikes took place, although it is not 
clear to what extent these were organised or spontaneous 
reactions to the new militant atmosphere on the Rand. 
The leaders were, however, still lagging behind their 
followers. The committee of five did very little by way of 
active organisation. As 1 July drew closer, and it became 
clear that there might well be a general strike, inany 
leaders began to express doubts, arguing for example, that 
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employers· should be given time to respond to the demands 
before the strike began. (46) The tremendous impact of the 
working class struggles on the TNC leadership, is however, 
evident from the fact that very few of the latter argued 
that there should not be a strike at all - the debate was 
primarily about questions of timing and strength. 
At the same time, the state, which had initially taken and 
extremely hard line on the strike, began to feel 
sufficiently threatened to change its line and make some 
concessions as part of a more co-optive strategy aimed at 
the petty bourgeoisie. Firstly, Bud Mbelle's appeal to 
release the municipal workers was heeded and they were 
released pending a review of the case by the Supreme Court. 
Like almost all the other concessions, it was arranged in a 
way that would strengthen the position of the conservatives 
to the greatest extent possible. (47) 
Secondly, it was announced that prime minister Botha had 
agreed to receive a delegation from the TNC to air the 
grievances of blacks, and it was promised that a Commission 
of Enquiry would be held. At a TNC meeting of thousands of 
people on 30 June it was announced that the Moffat 
Commission had been appointed and that the strike had been 
called off. 
Despite these concessions and the advice of both TNC and 
IWA/ISL leaders, there, were a number of strikes on 1 July, 
most notably on the mines. According to the Johannesburg 
Town Inspector, 
Practically all the natives employed by 
the various firms ..• put forward an 
application for an increase of wages at 
a rate of 1/- a day and were waiting for 
a reply. all disclaimed any 
intention of striking, but I very much 
doubt whether they will continue that 
attitude were they to meet a general 
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refusal. ( 48) 
The strike was brutally put down on the mines and elsewhere 
the movement temporarily fizzled out as the TNC leaders fell 
back on their more comfortable and conventional role of 
preparing memoranda and evidence for their meetings with 
Botha and the Moffat commission. (49) 
The Anti-Pass Campaign 
When the road of moderation and deputations once again 
proved to be a dead end when the Moffat Commission announced 
only minor concessions, pressure again began to build up for 
more militant mass action. Despite the absence of an 
immediate victory in July 1918, the 1/- a day demand 
continued to be made. After a lull caused by the 1918 
influenza epidemic and the negotiations with the government, 
a new wave of mass struggles swept the Rand in March/April 
1919. 
Increasingly the link was drawn between the pass system and 
low wages. Passes were increasingly seen as an essential 
element in the repressive labour system in South Africa 
particularly insofar as they could be used to crush strikes 
and victimise strikers. 
It seems that the campaign started on 31 March, when a large 
crowd gattered at the off ice of the Acting Chief Pass 
officer. A delegation told him that they would refuse to 
carry passes and cease work on there had been no wage 
increases. At a mass meeting afterwards, hundreds of passes 
were collected.· Pickets collected about 2 000 more passes 
in the afternoon. The next morning 3 000 blacks met in 
Johannesburg, all without passes, and decided on a variety 
of steps to spread the campaign and strike to the mines and 
the rest of the Southern Transvaal. At that stage the 
police did not have enough men to intervene in the 
proceedings, but when reinforcements arrived the next day, 
the police arrested the strike leaders at a meeting. A 
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large crowd followed the arrested to the 
charge office. Here further 
· demonstrations took place and further 
arrests were made. (50) 
Another big demonstration took place the next day outside 
the courtroom, but this time the police were even better 
prepared and mounted police charged into the crowd, injuring 
dozens of people. Sporadic incidents continued throughout 
the Rand for much of April and in Johannesburg alone, more 
than 700 people were arrested. (51) 
Soon after the protest started, a new element was introduced 
into the working class/petty bourgeoisie alliance, viz the 
lumpenproletariat. The latter had even greater grievances 
against the pass laws and joined wholeheartedly in the 
demonstrations. They introduced an element of instability 
and violence into the struggles, which up to then had been 
almost totally non-violent. 
The petty bourgeoisie were frightened at this increasing 
level of violence in the campaign. Simultaneously, the 
state again made a determined attempt to defuse the 
situation by offering more (minor) concessions, and 
promising to consider others. Once again a substantial 
section of the TNC leadership was enticed into negotiations. 
At a meeting on 1 July they even agreed with the Director of 
Native Labour, Colonel Pritchard, that 
A great blunder had been made by them in 
starting the 'Throw away passes' 
agitation. (52) 
This time, however, they had a hard time convincing the rank 
and file, and in a series of stormy reportback meetings the 
leaders were forced to backtrack to some extent, after being 
accused of selling out. (53) 
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Although there is evidence of the continued militancy in the 
middle ranks of the TNC, the leadership continued to drift 
to the right in the period that followed, especially when 
the TNC tried to enter into a closer alliance with the 
chiefs. ( 54) 
The 1920 Miners' strike 
The last big manifestation of the militancy in the ranks of 
the TNC was the African mineworkers strike of 1920. After 
the events of 1919, Bonner argues, "the growing militancy of 
black workers" had forced the Chamber of Mines to grant wage 
increases in November 1919 and February 1920. 
These increases were, however, too late or too unevenly 
implemented to defuse the growing militancy of the 
mineworkers. From November 1919 to February 1920 a series 
of struggles took place on various mines, ranging from 
protest marches about food and boycotts of mine stores, to 
actual strikes and armed clashes with the police. (55) 
These struggles reached a climax after 16 February when a 
wave of strikes swept through the mines in the second half 
of the month: 
By Saturday, 28 February, when the 
strike finally ended some 71 000 workers 
had taken part in the stoppage, with 
over 30 000 being out on 6 consecutive 
days - and a further 25 651 on Wednesday 
the 25th •.• Of a total of thirty-five 
mines, twenty-one had been affected, and 
not far off a half of the black work 
force had participated. (56) 
In fact, when one includes the preceding struggles, it 
emerges that the majority of mineworkers participated at 
some stage and "that there was scarcely a mine that emerged 
completely untouched." ( 57) 
tJ 
20 
The extent of TNC involvement in the strike is not clear. 
What is certain is that elements in the leadership were very 
much against the strike, while other individuals were 
extremely active in organising the struggles. There was 
also a lot of sympathy for the strikers amongst the TNC rank 
and f i 1 e . ( 5 8 ) 
IV THE STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE 
The ANC and the ICU 
The struggles on the Rand mark a decisive turning point in 
the history of the national movement in South Africa. For 
the first time there was the emergence of the third tendency 
identified above, viz for the national movement to identify 
with and participate in popular struggles. As Bonner 
cone ludes: 
•.• for the Congress leadership at 
least, and probably also for the mass of 
the African working population, these 
events provided the first full 
realisation of the strength of the 
organised working class •• {and} there 
were those {in the TNC - WH} whose 
outlook was profoundly transformed by 
this period of working class 
mobilisation. (59) 
For a considerable time the militants attained a position of 
dominance within the TNC. The participation of the TNC in 
the struggles demonstrated the importance of the existence 
of a wider organisation. Despite the vacillations of the 
TNC leadership, its participation strengthened the fairly 
disparate popular struggles by giving them a greater 
coherence and sense of direction. 
Of course, this is not to argue that the third tendency can 
be used to characterise the ANC at that time. Although it 
' 
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was undoubtedly a force within the TNC at that time, in the 
ANC as a whole the other tendencies were still dominant. 
Even in the TNC the more militant tendency almost 
disappeared after the defeat of the popular struggles of 
1917 to 1920 removed the radical impulse pushing the petty 
bourgeoisie into a more militant position. At the same time 
the state and capital launched a concerted campaign aimed at 
the co-option of the petty bourgeoisie. The combination of 
these two factors, in Bonner's words, left the petty 
bourgeoisie 
to sink into the cosy complacency of the 
19 2 0 I s ANC • . ( 6 0 ) 
There is some evidence of continued organisation by the ANC, 
notably by the TNC in the Transvaal rural areas, but the 
available evidence is so scanty that it is difficult to draw 
any conclusions. (61) Bonner suggests that the movement 
was fairly conservative and that it came increasingly under 
the influence of the chiefs. In any event, it did not last 
for very long and left behind a legacy of bitter disillusion-
ment. 
The only other case of some active organisation by the ANC 
during the next decade was in the Western Cape in the late 
1920's, which will be examined in Chapter 3. 
For the greater part of the 1920's the popular organisation 
that took place was under the banner of the ICU. This 
movement, up to 1925-26, was largely working class in 
leadership and composition. (62) Thereafter it rapidly 
changed into a mass based popular movement operating 
primarily in the rural areas of Transvaal and Natal. (63) 
Bradford has shown that this process was again accompanied 
by the radicalisation of a section of the urban petty 
bourgeoisie. Apart from the long term process of 
undermining the position of the African petty bourgeoisie, 
there was, after 1922, a re-assessment by the state and 
, 
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capital of the costs attached to the strategy of 
incorporation that followed the post-war struggles on the 
Rand. (64) Especially under the Pact government, this 
re-assessment lead to 
a direct attack on the economic base, 
the political rights and the ideological 
role of the African middle class. (65) 
The lower sections of the petty bourgeoisie were atfected 
particularly harshly and responded to the ICU to such an 
extent that its leadership soon became dominated by these 
strata. There developed a polarisation of the petty 
bourgeoisie similar to that described by Bonner, except that 
this time the two sections were in separate organisations. 
While the marginalised sections of the petty bourgeoisie 
came to dominate the ICU, the ANC remained firmly in the 
hands of the more prosperous section of the petty 
bourgeoisie. ( 66) 
The Conservatives Organise - A Case Study 
It is necessary to examine in some detail an important 
article by Willan (67) as it sheds much light on the 
struggles that were taking place in the ANC and TNC at the 
time, and particularly on the conscious way in which 
conservatives tried to combat the influence of the militant 
tendency in the ANC. 
Both Bonner and Bradford analyse the cleavages that develop 
within the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie when mass 
struggles erupt around it and they trace the polarisation of 
the petty bourgeoisie as a result of such struggles. 
Willan's focus on the other hand, is slightly different 
the conservative leadership of the petty bourgeoisie in 
Kimberley was not threatened by the eruption of mass 
struggles in Kimberley itself but rather by the more 
militant form of organisation that had developed in the 
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Transvaal. He shows that in the absence of a radical 
impulse from below, the petty bourgeoisie is particularly 
susceptible to liberal bourgeois ideology and that there is 
much scope for a fruitful alliance between them and the 
liberal bourgeoisie to avert the perceived challenge to the 
leadership of the petty bourgeoisie. 
In Kimberley there was already a long history of colla-
boration between De Beers and a section of the African petty 
bourgeoisie, although it was on a fairly limited scale. 
(68) The key figure in Kimberley was Sol Plaatje - the 
first secretary-general of the ANC and one of the most 
senior leaders within the organisation. In fact he was 
offered the presidency of the ANC in 1917, but declined the 
position. 
During the course of World War I two developments occurred 
that were to cement the alliance. Firstly, Plaatje_ became 
converted to the Brotherhood Movement - a movement founded 
in England by a section of big capital with the explicit aim 
of introducing the "spirit of Brotherhood" into the conflict 
between capital and labour. 
The second, and more pressing development, was the eruption 
of the series of mass struggles on the Rand that was 
examined above. De Beers felt especially threatened by the 
potential industrial unrest as it could not rely on the 
coercive support of the state to the same extent as the gold 
mines. It had to rely more on wages and "ideological" 
measures to attract sufficient labour. This paved the way 
for a much closer alliance with the African petty 
bourgeoisie, exemplified by the frank appeal from De Beers 
to Plaat je: 
For God's sake keep them (natives) off 
the labour agitators. (69) 
Plaatje was also concerned about the increased level of mass 
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struggles as he realised that it would threaten the 
dominance and leadership of the petty bourgeoisie in ANC. 
In his account of the struggles in the Transvaal, there is a 
clear realisation that the conservative petty bourgeoisie 
might lose its leadership of the ANC if it did not ally 
itself much more closely with the working class and its 
demands: 
During the past year or so Mr Msane 
became very unpopular among the younger 
native workers on the Reef. The cause 
was extraordinary. A small band of 
white men, the Industrial Workers of the 
World, boldly and openly sympathised 
with the natives in the long hours they 
had to work and on the niggardly pay as 
well as the bad housing conditions on 
the Witwatersrand. Naturally their 
programme appealed to the native 
labourers. But, rightly or wrongly, Mr 
Msane held that it would be suicidal for 
the helpless natives to ally themselves 
with an. insignificant body of white 
extremists who are in the bad books of 
the government and very unpopular with 
Boers and English alike, and each time 
there was a clash Mr Msane threw the 
whole weight of his influence on the 
side of the authorities, and earned 
thereby the name among the labourers of 
'Isita-sa Bantu' (Enemy of the Natives). 
(70) 
Although the threat was less severe in Kimberley, Plaatjie 
was concerned enough about it to write to De Beers that 
'there is a belief among some of the 
population here that I am in the employ 
of De Beers - employed to keep them 
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quiet. ( 71) 
Plaat je was caught in a dilemma - on the one hand he wanted 
a closer alliance with De Beers - on the other hand, to 
retain his leadership role he needed to be seen to put 
pressure on De Beers and to win concessions from them. 
Willan argues that there was 
a conscious attempt on his {Plaatje's -
WH} part to respond to such changes by 
allying himself more closely with De 
Beers, and in so doing making clear to 
the company the advantages that due 
recognition of the special role that he 
could play offered to the company itself 
and to suggest to them the 
consequences that would follow from an 
eclipse of his position of influence and 
that of the moderate natives in general. 
(72) 
Under the particular conditions in Kimberley, such a 
solution was actually feasible as De Beers was willing to 
make so1ne concessions and to let these be used to strengthen 
the hands of the "moderates" in the ANC. 
It was with the deliberate intention of 
helping to prevent the spread of 
industrial unrest that De Beers took the 
decision to enlist the support of 
influential 'moderate natives' De 
Beers was at the same time conscious of 
the ideological investment they were 
making in the future because the 
Brotherhood Movement, as outlined to 
them by Plaatje, promised much for the 
future in the way of diverting the 
aspirations of their work force from 
immediate, militant demands, and in 
substituting an alternative ideology, 
·' 
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which, if pervasive, could do much to 
prevent their effective organisation 
along class lines in the way that had 
caused so much concern on the Rand. 
(73) 
Thus De Beers decided to grant a request by Plaatje to use a 
disused tram shed as a hall for the Brotherhood Movement and 
more general meetings, and even decided to contribute £100 
to the costs of renovation. There were immediate benefits 
to both sides as a result of this gift - both sides managed 
to extract the maximum publicity out of the ceremony to hand 
over the hall, even to the extent that the Governor General 
was present at the personal insistence of the Prime 
Minister. On the whole, however, Plaatje was the main 
beneficiary of the closer alliance. His position within the 
ANC both in Kimberley and at a national level was immensely 
strengthened - a flood of letters and telegrams from other 
leaders congratulated him and many of these saw in the 
Kimberley even ts new hope for a moder ate solution to the 
"native problem". Plaatje did try though., to mobilise this 
support on issues that were very much in the interest of De 
Beers. At a national level, he tried to counter the demands 
for a more militant national struggle, especially from the 
TNC, as is clear from the following letter he wrote to De 
Beers in August 1918. 
I had to attend the Native Congress at 
Bloemfontein to prevent the spread 
among our people of the Johannesburg 
Socialist propaganda .•.. The ten 
Transvaal delegates came to the Congress 
with a concord and determination that 
was perfectly astounding to our 
customary native demeanour at 
conferences. They spoke almost in 
unison, in short sentences, nearly all 
of which began and ended with the word 
'strike'. It was not difficult to 
27 
understand the source of their backing, 
for they even preceded the Congress and 
endeavoured to poison the minds of 
delegates from other parts. It was only 
late in the second day that we succeeded 
in satisfying the delegates to report, 
on getting to their homes, that the 
Socialist method of pitting up black 
against white will land our people in 
serious disaster, while the most that 
could happen to the whiteman would be 
but a temporary inconvenience. When 
they took the train for Johannesburg, 
at Bloemfontein staion, I am told that 
one of them remarked that they would 
have 'converted Congress had not De 
Beers given Plaatje a Hall'. This seems 
intensely re-assuring as indicating that 
Kimberley will be about the last place 
that these black Bolsheviks of 
Johannesburg will pay attention to, thus 
leaving us free to combat their 
activities in other parts of the Union. 
(74) 
At the local level the stronger position of the 
conservatives and their closer alliance to De Beers, is 
demonstrated by a meeting held in the tram shed, 
convened by the more moderate natives 
with the object of forstalling a 
movement which is on foot amongst the 
natives to secure an increase by means 
of a general strike. (75) 
In Kimberley, this alliance proved to be a lasting 
one, and by 1929 it was reported that Plaatje was 




The concluding chapter attempts to draw together the 
differing responses of the conservative petty bourgeoisie in 
the various areas, and to come to some conclusions about its 
significance. Here it is only necessary to mention some of 
the trends and issues which also proved to be important in 
the campaigns in the Cape. 
In the first place there was a significant amount of 
co-operation between African and coloured people. On the 
Rand APO co-operated fairly closely wit~ the TNC and !WA as 
is evident from their joint meetings. In addition the !WA 
also had a number of coloured members and organisers that 
played an important role in the campaigns. Thus this 
co-operation, especially in the IWA, was an important 
beginning to efforts to unite all the oppressed into one 
organisation over the next decade, notably in the ICU and 
especially in the ANC(WP) and IANC. 
A second point to emerge was the ability of the ANC as a 
nationali~t and political movement to cohere and give added 
impetus to relatively diffuse popular struggles. The ANC 
played a vital role in uniting various struggles, in giving 
overall direction. Later the ICU, ANC(WP) and IANC would 
again demonstrate the importance of having a political 
movement to strengthen and broaden popular struggles. In 
turn, of course, these movements would themselves be 
strengthened by their participation in these struggles. 
In the third place, though, these struggles also showed the 
strength of the conservative and moderate elements within 
the ANC. Although they lost their earlier unquestioned 
dominance within the organisation, they were still able to 
regain hegemony within a relatively short time when 
conditions became more favourable. As happened later in the 
Western Cape, the reassertion of conservative dominance was 
achieved only at the expense of the almost total abandonment 
29 
of involvement in popular struggles, leading to the total 
inactivity by the ANC in, respectively, the early 1920's and 
1930's. 
Fourthly, there was the high level of state repression and 
violence during the struggles. This frightened many members 
of the petty bourgeoisie who were concerned to be seen as 
'respectable citizens'. Although the participation of the 
lumpenproletariat served to broaden the movement in general, 
it exacerbated these tensions by its almost casual 
acceptance of violence. Many people also had doubts about 
even a loose alliance with the lumpenproletariat. 
In the Cape this phenomenon would be repeated, albeit in a 
more ameliorated form. There the lumpenproletariat was much 
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CHAPTER 2 
CAPITALIST FARMERS IN A RECESSION: 
THE SPECIFICITY O~, WESTERN CAPE FARMING 
The next chapter will examine the involvement of the ANC(WP) 
in the rural struggles that emerged in the Western Cape 
after 1928. It is necessary, though, to place these 
struggles within the broader context of the development of 
capitalist agriculture in the Western Cape. More 
specifically, it is necessary to examine the effects on 
agricult~re of the great international capitalist crisis in 
the early 1930s. 
The evolution of the productive forces has always been one 
of the key factors in a historical materialist understanding 
of the process of history. Meiskins Wood has stressed that 
this does not mean that one accepts a "mechanically 
determined and unilinear history" - the level of development 
of the productive forces only serves to establish the "limits 
of the possible" within a specific social formation. (1) 
Thus, while 
the outcome of class struggle is not 
predetermined, the specific nature, 
conditions, and terrain of struggle, and 
the range of possible outcomes, certainly 
are historically determinate: struggles 
between wage labourers and industrial 
capitalists over the extraction of 
surplus value are, needless to say, 
necessarily different from struggles 
between peasants and feudal landlords 
over the appropriation of rent. (2) 
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This chapter traces the development of capitalist 
agriculture in the Western Cape and stresses the relatively 
high level of development of the productive forces. It 
also argues for th~ specificity of the set of productive 
relations that evolved in the area. 
More specifically, the chapter goes on to examine the 
effects on Western Cape agriculture of the great 
international capitalist crisis of the early 1930s. An 
attempt is made to draw out the specific effects which had a 
material influence on the conditions of class struggle in 
the area. 
I THE TRANSITION TO CAPITALISM 
It has been argued, that in general, it is necessary to 
emphasize the specificity of capitalist development in the 
Western Cape. (3) Unfortunately there has been no analysis 
of the specificity of the development of capitalism in 
agriculture - even Morris' seminal work on the transition to 
capitalism in agriculture is focused almost exclusively on 
the developments in the rest of the country. (4) His few 
comments on the Western Cape are, as will be shown below, 
not an adequate basis for the conceptualisation of the 
development of capitalist agriculture in the Western Cape. 
The following are some of the features that distinguish 
agriculture in the Western Cape and even in the Cape in 
general, from the rest of the country. 
One of the central features of the proces$ of colonisation 
in the Cape was the almost total displacement and/or 
extermination of the indigenous population consisting of 
Khoi and San. (5) In the northern areas, on the other 
hand, the indigenous population was much stronger and was 
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merely conquered and deprived of ownership of their land. 
On the vast majority of farms the original inhabitants 
simply stayed on as squatters and labour tenants. Until the 
rise of the Witwatersrand market, the northern farmers were 
~ 
not powerful enough to deprive the indigenous producers of 
their possession of the land. This fact, coupled with the 
massive intervention of the state on behalf of the settlers, 
was one of the central determinants in the transition to 
capitalist agriculture along the Junker road in the north. 
( 6) 
A second, related feature was the relative absence of large 
land companies, which in both Natal and Transvaal had bought 
up extensive areas of the country. (7) These often rented 
out their lands to tenants. In the Cape, and especially the 
Western Cape, farms were largely occupied directly by the 
farmer. 
The third important feature of agriculture in the Western 
Cape was that it had almost right from the beginning access 
to a home market. Lenin, in the Development of Capitalism 
in Russia, stresses the vital role that commodity production 
and the home market plays in the development of capitalism 
both in industry and in agriculture. Indeed he went so far 
as to subtitle his study "The PFocess of the Formation of a 
Home Market for Large-Scale Industry". (8) Lenin argued 
that the 
home market appears when commodity 
production appears; it is created by the 
deve1opment of this commodity economy, 
and the degree to which the social 
division of labour is ramified determines 
the level of its development; it spreads 
with the extension of commodity . 
productions from products to labour 
\ 
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power, and only in proportion as the 
latter is transformed into a commodity 
does capitalism embrace the entire 
production of the country .•• the 'home 
market• for capitalism is created by 
developing capitalism itself, which 
deepens the social division of labour and 
resolves the direct producers into 
capitalists and workers. ( 9) 
This dialectical process was somewhat disarticulated in the 
Cape. The initial spur to commodity production came as much 
from an external market as from the home market. A market 
was created before the transformation of labour power into a 
commodity had proceeded far enough to satisfy the demands of 
the commodity producers. The shortage of labour was 
aggravated by the almost total displacement of the Khoi and 
San. An external solution to this crisis was available, 
however, in the form of the importation of slaves. 
In fact, external factors have had a profound influence on 
the development of capitalism in the Western Cape in general, 
and the trajectory of capitalist development was often 
shaped decisively by the precise way in which these 
"externalities 11 were internalised. (10) 
Initially the Cape market was fairly sma~l and limited to 
supplying the needs of the inhabitants of Cape Town and of 
passing ships. (11) By 1800 Cape Town had a population of 
about 15 000 which represented a fairly substantial market. 
(12) 
The importation of slaves on a fairly large scale up to 1807 
reflected both the absence of an indigenous squatter/tenant 
group which could be coerced into labour, and the relatively 
high level of commodity production. In turn, the capital 
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investment represented by slaves acted as a further spur to 
the production of marketable commodities. By 1800 there 
were about 18 000 slaves in the Cape, the vast bulk of them 
in the Cape Town and Stellenbosch districts. (13) 
The home market continued to grow during the nineteenth 
century, and its extent is illustrated, for example, by the 
fact that during the 5 years of drought ending in 1868, 
wheat and flour to the value of £560 000 had to be imported. 
This was some £400 000 greater than in the following 5 
years. It was estimated that grain production in the 
Western Province alone was some 815 000 bushels in 1865. 
( 14) 
Despite the importance of the local market, the external 
markets were still of crucial importance. Firstly, there 
was the overseas market. Although, by 1800, the 
farmers of the west were still closely 
tied to the markets of Cape ·Town, (15) 
the lifting of trade restrictions by the British led to the 
creation of an export market. During and after the 
Napoleonic wars Cape wines enjoyed favourable duties in the 
British market and exports grew rapidly, until by 1859, 
almost a million gallons of wine was exported yearly. (16) 
The resilience of commodity production was shown two years 
later when exports virtually came to a halt due to a change 
in British duties. Most exports were disposed of locally 
and it seemed that the industry suffered little more than a 
temporary hiccup. (17) 
From the 1840's the Cape had also built up a big export 
trade in wool and by 1862 wool and skins accounted for £1,4m 
of the Cape exports. The next largest export was copper 
with a value of only £94 000. (18) The wool boom also 
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strengthened the home market significantly by increasing the 
wealth of farmers and consequently, the demand for local 
products. 
The major "external" factor in the expansion of the home 
market was, of course, the discovery of minerals in the 
interior. In the case of fruit the home market was some 
1 300 tons in the Western Cape. When the railway reached 
Kimberley in 1885, it became possible to rail fruit there. 
In 1886 nearly 1 300 tons of Cape fruit were railed to 
Kimberley virtually doubling the size of the home market. 
( 19) 
The rapid development of the fruit industry is epitomized by 
the formation of Rhodes Fruit Farms in 1895. The diamond 
monopoly spent £250 000 to buy up 29 farms and planted 
200 000 fruit trees within 2 years. Partly in response to 
this, local capitalist farmers launched the Cape Orchard 
Company which owned about 150 000 trees in the Hex River 
valley by 1899. (20) 
The wine industry benefitted even before the railways were 
opened, as its products were less perishable. Wine and 
brandy prices increased and production increased to new 
heights. (21) 
Wheat benef itted similarly from the expansion of railways, 
and by 1900, total production was about 750 000 bags each of 
wheat and oats, and about 400 ooo bags of rye and barley. 
The vast bulk was produced in the Western Cape. (22) 
In summary, one cannot but agree with.Morris that 
the Western Cape was already a well 
established commercial agricultural 
district by the early decades of the 19th 
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century ••• {and that the} existence of 
production primarily for exchange was 
already well rooted in parts of the Cape 
Colony in the mid-nineteenth century. 
( 23) 
But Morris is on more shaky ground when he describes the 
capitalist farmers in the Western Cape as "Junkers". (24) 
An extensive analysis of the path of transition is beyond 
the scope of this work and the data presented is anyway too 
sketchy to be able to present a detailed examination of the 
precise path of the transition of capitalist agriculture. 
Despite these shortcomings, it is necessary to attempt to 
draw some preliminary conclusions about the nature of the 
transition to capitalism in the Western Cape. 
The· farmers in this area do have some of the characteristics 
of landlords, for example ownership of slaves in the early 
period. But overall there is also a fair amount of 
correspondence with the "farmer" or "American" road analysed 
by Marx and Lenin, and described by De Janvry as follows: 
This road originates from a proliferation 
of small farmers who constitute a petty 
bourgeoisie. These small farmers or free 
peasants are created either by a violent 
elimination of the feudal landowning 
class through revolution or land reform 
or through the colonization and 
homesteading of new lands. Thus on the 
farmer road, 'the peasant predominates, 
becomes the exclusive agent of 
agriculture and evolves into capitalist 
farmers' 
Since the emerging rural bourge<>isie 
cannot gain hegemonic control of the 
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state, this road of development prevents 
the existence of absolute rent and thus 
cheapens food prices. By formenting the 
emergence of a national bourgeoisie it 
favors, but in no way ensures, 
articulated and democratic forms of 
government. ( 2 5) 
One can argue that many of these characteristics were in 
fact present in the Western Cape. This is, however, 
contrary to Morris' conclusion that, by the 1880's 
Boer junkers in the Cape, where the 
process was most clear, were therefore 
pressing for the capitalisation of 
agriculture from above along the Prussian 
path. (26) 
Morris does not, however, analyse the transition in the Cape 
in the same depth as in the rest of the country and often 
tends to conflate developments in the Western and Eastern 
Cape. This is paricularly evident in the main argument 
advanced, namely the efforts by Cape farmers, and especially 
the Afrikaner Bond, to accelerate 
the transformation of the feudal 
landlordism into landlord capitalism 
through the intervention of the State 
against the African squatter peasantry. 
(27) 
It is beyond the scope of this work to investigate to what 
extent such measures were implemented, and what their 
effects were, but it is certain that the Western Cape 
farmers had very little interest in the question. From the 
previous discussion it is clear that the farmers did not 
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need to fear competition from such peasants, and Morris does 
not suggest this either. His argument is rather that 
farmers needed labour, but as the. table below indicates, the 
issue of African labour, and particularly African tenants, 
could not have been very immediate in the Western Cape: 
TABLE 1: AFRICAN POPULATION IN WESTERN CAPE - 1890 (28) 
District Male Female % Total Population 
Caledon 15 9 .20 
Cape 1030 302 1.37 
Mal mes bury 159 32 .82 
Paarl 203 72 1.29 
Robertson 91 18 .96 
Stellenbosch 164 66 1.82 
Tulbagh 28 6 .61 
Worcester 201 44 1.94 
TOTAL 1891 549 
The total number of African people in the Western Cape was 
only just more than 2000 of which the majority were resident 
in Cape Town and thus unlikely to be farm workers. The low 
proportion of females, 22.5%, makes it clear that these 
people were mostly contract workers. One can safely 
conclude that there was no significant African squatter 
peasantry in the Western Cape. 
Thus -0ne can draw the following, rather tentative, 
conclusions. Firstly, one can support Morris' conclusion 
that the transition to capitalist farming in the Western 
Cape was already well under way by the mid-nineteenth 
century, and that this process was merely accelerated by 
the dramatic increase in the size of the home market after 
the discovery of diamonds and gold. 
43 
Secondly, while the Western Cape farmers had some 
similarities with landlords, the transition to capitalist 
agriculture had important features of the American path. 
Certainly, there is a correspondence with many of the 
characteristics outlined by Lenin and De Janvry: there is an 
initial "proliferation of small farmers", created through 
"colonisation and homesteading of new lands". Furthermore, 
it is also clear that this "emerging rural bourgeoisie {did} 
not gain hegemonic control of the state". For example, 
Cooper shows that mining capital had extremely close links 
with the pro-imperialist Cape government, exemplified by 
Rhodes' position as prime minister of the Cape. In fact, 
she goes as far as ito argue that mining capital was 
hegemonic within the Cape state, although agricultural 
capital 
had become a sufficient economic and 
Political force to necessitate the 
accomodation of its interests. (29) 
Up to 1900 there does not appear to have been any massive 
intervention of the state on behalf of capitalist farmers in 
the Western Cape. 
Thus it would appear to be incorrect to characterise the 
Western Cape farmers as Junkers as suggested by Morris. 
Futhermore, to describe them in the same terms as farmers in 
the rest of the country also obscures the very different 
nature of capitalist agriculture in the Western Cape. It is 
necessary to stress, rather than de-emphasize, these 
differences if one is to understand the very different way in 
which agriculture developed in the Cape. 
II SOUTH AFRICA AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
As outlined above, agriculture in the Western Cape had 
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completed~its transition to capitalism relatively early. 
Wine, fruit and wool farming were all characterised by 
production for the market, and to differing degrees, by 
production for the world market. Thus those farmers were 
particularly vulnerable when the international capitalist 
system was struck by a severe depression in the late 1920s. 
Some indication of the impact of the Depression can be 
gauged from the fact that National Income dropped nearly 12% 
below its average level for the five years from 1924 to 
1928. The biggest decline was from £274,1 m1llion in 1928 
to only £217,1 million four years later, a decrease of more 
than 20%. (30) But, as Kaplan has convincingly argued: 
the Depression in South Africa was not a 
'genera1ised crisis of Capita1isrn' - its 
uneven impact was its centra1 feature. 
The Great Depression had ended a 1ong 
period of steady growth ••• particu1arly 
in respect of secondary industry and 
agriculture ••• 
The Depression was thus very much an 
'externa1' phenomenon, not an 
'indigenous', crisis and as such it had 
effects which reflected South Africa's 
particu1ar incorporation into the wor1d 
economy ••• {a} s a primary production 
exporter ••• {with} exports averaging 
a1most 30% of her national income in the 
years before the Depression. ( 31 ) 
It was above all those sectors that were closely 
incorporated into the world market that suffered the worst 
decline. 
The manufacturing industry was relatively shielded from the 
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effects because it was not export-orientated1 and it 
accounted for only 1% of exports in 1932 and 2% in 1933. 
(32) Kaplan calculates that net output declined by about 
18% and employment by about 12% between 1930 and 1933. {33) 
These declines were, however, relatively minor and both Net 
Output and manufacturing's contribution to Geographical 
Income never fell below the average for the five years from 
1924 to 1928. {34) 
Mining was probably the sector of the economy that was most 
completely integrated with, and dependent on, the 
imperialist world market. Gold mining was, of course, not 
affected by the Depression at all as it had a_ stable market 
and a fixed price, while it enjoyed some of the fruits of 
lower price levels. In fact there was a slight expansion in 
gold mining during the Depression. {35) 
The rest of the mining sector was less fortunate, though, 
and overall the contribution of mining to National Income 
fell significantly. The devastation that resulted in the 
mining industry as a result of its close integration within 
the world economy is especially clear once one removes the 
stabilising effects of gold and coal. The Total Sales Value 
of other minerals decreased by no less than 72,6% between 
1929 and 1932. {36) 
The commercial sector was the worst hit of the non-
agricultural sectors and its contribution to Geographical 
Income declined by 41% between 1929 and 1932. Its fate was 
closely linked with that of agriculture and external trade, 
both of which declined precipitously, the latter by more 
than 60% between 1929 and 1932. {37) 
After mining, agriculture was the economic sector most 
closely dependent on the world market, either through 
production for export, or through competition with imported 
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foodstuffs. 
On the world market, the value of agricultural exports fell 
by no less than 64% between 1926 and 1933, while in South 
Africa demand was virtually stagnant and prices fell by 30% 
to 40%. (38) The overall effect on agriculture is 
summarised below. 
TABLE 2: AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION (39) 
Year Geographical Income Gross Value Volume Price 
£m Index % Tot £m Index Index Index 
1924-28 47,3 100 19,3 57,598 100 100 
1929 46,4 98,l 17,2 61,848 107, 4 113 
1930 35,2 74,4 13,9 51,143 88,8 127 
1931 30,5 64,5 13,0 42,534 73,8 118 
1932 28,9 61,1 13,3 38,128 66,2 125 
1933 30,6 64,7 12,3 37,425 65,0 113 
% Change -42,3 (1928-32) -42,2 (1929-33) 
Net income for farming fell by about 35-40% below pre-
Depression leiels while the gross value of production fell 
by about 35%. Even these figures do not give the full 
effect of the Depression. As Wilson (40) has pointed out, 
small and competitive capitals almost invariablrtry to 
mediate the effects of a fall in prices by producing even 
more. Thus during the Depression agricultural production 
was on average about 20% higher than in the preceding five 
years. 
It is only w.hen one looks at the index of prices that the 
full extent of the crisis in agriculture becomes apparent. 
During 1931 and 1932 agricultural prices were just over half 








The crisis of overproduction induced by the Depression was 
mediated to some extent by the worst drought of the century 
in South Africa, but only at the cost of burdening the 
stricken farmers even further with financial losses. (41) 
The Secretary for Agriculture described the period as 'the 
darkest and most difficult experienced .for the last 30 
years', while 0 1Meara's assessment is probably not too 
strong: 
••. these were years of desperate 
struggle for economic survival against 
the seeming merciless attempts of both 
the market and nature to drive farmers 
off their land. (42) 
But O'Meara has pointed out that even within agriculture, 
the impact of the Depression was 
extremely uneven. Farmers producing for 
export were generally worse off than 
those producing for the internal market. 
(43) 
This is clear from the table below. 
TABLE 3: AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS (44) 
Year Volume Price 
Index Index 
1925-28 100 100 
1929 112,9 84,6 
1930 123,8 58,2 
1931 96,7 48,l 
1932 132,8 36,5 
1933 113,5 54,0 
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By 1932 export prices had fallen by 63,5% from their 
relatively stable level between 1925 and 1928. 
Before examining the impact of the Depression on the specific 
sectors of capitalist agriculture in the Western Cape, it is 
necess~ry to place it within a wider political context and 
to examine some of the development at the level of the 
state. 
Kaplan and others have argued that the Pact government 
represented a shift in hegemony from 'foreign• capital to 
national capital. (45) Previously the Botha/Smuts 
government had been unwilling to intervene decisively to aid 
farmers. Although it encouraged capitalist agriculture in 
general through measures such as the Land Act of 1913 and 
the formation of the Land Bank in 1912, its overall policy 
was "operative within the context of the hegemony of mining 
capital". (46) Thus its policies often adversely affected 
agriculture and in no case was effective protection given 
against "unfair" competition from outside. (47) 
This position, it is argued, changed with the establishment 
of the hegemony of national capital. Henceforth 
agricultural capi-tal benefited much more directly from state 
intervention and the process of intervention was 
intensified. (48) Kaplan gives a number of examples of this 
process and stresses the qualitative changes in respect of 
the new types of intervention, viz. price regulation and 
subsidisation. (49) 
These new interventions occurred in a climate that was 
largely favourable to agriculture, (50) but with the advent 
of the Depression and the resultant devastation in 
agriculture, there were renewed demands for increasing state 
intervention. Thus, soon after the start.· of the Depression, 
virtually every major commodity was 
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subject to a wide range of effective 
price subsidisation measures and 
controlled marketing. (51) 
The demands took three forms - firstly for domestic 
agriculture there were demands for compulsory price 
regulation and quantitative controls. Secondly, for those 
sectors which had to compete indirectly on the world market, 
there were demands to protect the local market by charging 
high import duties. Thirdly, for those sectors who had to 
compete directly on the world market, there were demands for 
export subsidies. Thanks to its powerful position in the 
power bloc, agricultural capital was able to secure a number 
of these demands. 
Richards, (52) for example, lists no fewer than 31 Acts 
passed by Parliament between 1930 and 1935 rendering some 
kind of assistance to farmers. Among these were acts 
controlling the dairy, wheat, maize and tobacco industries. 
These measures were fairly successful in stabilising prices, 
and in some cases raising prices well above world levels. 
( 53) 
Furthermore, agricultural capital also benefitted from 
massive direct aid which was largely financed from increased 
revenue from the gold mines. (54) The Export Subsidies Act 
of 1931 provided for a direct export subsidy of 10% on all 
exports excluding gold, diamonds and sugar. A few months 
later, in 1932, subsidies were increased to 20% and 25%. 
(55) £650 000 was paid out in 1931/32 and nearly £2, 6m the 
following year. (56) 
There were also indirect subsidies in the form of lower 
railage rates, as well as increased expenditure on 
agricultural services and emergency aid. (57) 
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There are unfortunately, very few reliable estimates on the 
total transfer of resources to the agricultural sector. 
Richards attempted to calculate the direct and indirect 
costs of subsidies and higher prices for the year 1933. He 
arrived at a figure of nearly £7,5 m out of a total 
production of £30,6 m. (58) Kaplan argues that even this 
figure is too low as it excluded wh~t he called "permanent 
measures", such as relief on Land Bank loans, special relief 
measures, etc. 
Related to the crisis in agriculture was the increasing 
realisation by farmers of the importance of 'cooperation'. 
In 1922 there were only 54 cooperatives with 12878 members. 
By 1933 there were 416 cooperatives with 85697 members. (59) 
This can be attributed partly to the fact that, as the 
Cooperation and Agricultural Credit Commission (CACC) 
reported, many members only joined to try to get higher 
prices. When this failed to materialise they often left 
again. (60) Despite this the massive increase in the 
strength of organised agriculture added to its already 
substantial political influence, and was an important factor 
in the winning of its demands. 
This then is the overall context that one must bear in mind 
when one considers agriculture in the Western Cape, viz. that 
agriculture as a whole was in a state of crisis, especially 
those sections that depended on the world market; that 
agricultural capital had been able to a considerable extent 
to win its demands for state intervention; and that the 
latter fact reflected the considerable power of agricultural 
capital with-in the power bloc. 
III WESTERN CAPE AGRICULTURE AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
What then were the conditions in which Western Cape 
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agriculture found itself in the late twenties? Tinley 
summarises the position in 1935 as follows: 
the Southwest Region has only 7 per cent 
of all farms and 4.3 per cent of all land 
in farms in South Africa, (yet) it has 72 
per cent of all vines, 44 per cent of all 
deciduous trees, 33 per cent of the total 
area of wheat, and 40 per cent of the 
total. area in barley, rye and oats in the 
country. ( 61) 
These figures exclude the districts of Robertson and Montagu 
which fall under the South Karroo region. (62) If they are 
included, the Western Cape had more than 90% of all vines, 
about 50% of all deciduous fruit trees, and about 35% of the 
area under wheat. (63) 
Thus agriculture i~ the area was dominated by the wine, 
fruit and grain producers. There was also a fairly 
significant presence of woolled sheep - as many as in many 
woolgrowing districts. (64) But it was not an independent 
sector in the Western Cape as most of the sheep were on 
wheat farms. It did not have the domination of the nationai 
scene achieved by the other three sectors - only 4,3% of 
woolled sheep were in the region. (65) Nor did wool 
dominate the regional scene as happened in the Karroo and 
Eastern Cape. 
Wine 
The wine industry was the first sector of agriculture to 
cooperate on a large scale. The KWV was formed on a 
voluntary basis in 1917 to try to increase the very 
depressed prices of as low as £2 !Os to £3 per leaguer. 
Initially it had great success: 95% of producers and 
52 
merchants joined and it managed to stabilise prices for the 
next two years. {66) 
In 1920 there was an unprecedented boom during which 
speculators drove the price up to £30 per leaguer. But 
during the next two years over-production led to a massive 
surplus, much of which had to be destroyed, while the price 
again dropped to £3. 
In 1923 the merchants left the KWV and the situation became 
chaotic until the state intervened in 1924. It passed the 
Wine and Spirits Control Act which gave the KWV a monopoly 
over the pricing and distribution of distilling. As this 
was the major part of the market, it effectively also gave 
the KWV control over the wine and raisins markets. 
The KWV's pricing policy, however, soon created problems. 
The CACC concluded that 
it is very evident that the very problem 
which the control measure was instituted 
to overcome, viz., overproduction, has 
been accentuated and aggravated through 
control. Complete control over the 
industry at once created in the minds of 
producers the psychological atmosphere 
for expansion, an aspect which was 
further strengthened by the price policy 
(67) 
The KWV charged a fixed price of £7 18s 9d per leaguer to 
the merchants, but because of the increasing overproduction, 
the producers' price fell rapidly at the onset of the 
Depression. The position is summarised in the table below. 
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TABLE 4: WINE (68) 
Year Prod Price Surplus Total Production Gross Value 
£.s.d Index % Leaguers Index £000 Index 
1924-28 4.16.4 100 39,4 136 308 100 637 100 
1929 4.15.3 98,9 40,0 159 722 117,2 753 118,2 
1930 3.19.5 82,5 50,0 175 586 128,8 722 113,4 
1931 3.11.6 74., 2 55,0 165 948 121,7 598 93,9 
1932 3.3.6 65,9 60,5 207 421 152,2 655 102,9 
1933 3.3.6 65,9 60,5 662 104,0 
% Change -36,8 (1929-32) +29,9 (1929-32) -27 ,0 (1928 
I 
Within four years of the start of the Depression, production 
had increased by over 50% above the average of the previous 
five years. This, moreover, part of a long term trend, as 
production in 1932 was nearly 80% higher than in 1924. 
For the years 1924 to 1928 nearly 40% of the crop was 
surplus production. During the Depression this percentage 
rose to over 60%, due to the falling local demand and 
increasing overproduction, causing the producers' price to 
fall by nearly 35%. Overall, though, the industry was not 
too badly affected. The fact that it was able to maintain 
the domestic retail price meant that the gross value of 
production remained relatively stable. The 27% decrease 
from 1928 was only because production was exceptionally high 
in 1928. Some of the surplus was destroyed, but the bulk 
which had been paid for already, was available to make 
inexpensive fortified wines, and was used to capture 
overseas export markets as shown in the table below. 
-31) 
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TABLE 5: SPIRITS USED IN FORTIPICA'rION (69) 
Year Leaguers Index 
1927 128 866 100,0 
1928 187 908 145,8 
1929 302 204 234,5 
1930 388 360 301,4 
1931 538 652 418,0 
1932 526 514 408, 6 
The CACC analysed the reasons behind the long term increase 
in production as follows: 
There does not exist the least doubt in 
the mind of the Commission that the 
policy followed by the Vereniging 
definitely encouraged the production of 
an inferior article. This applies 
particularly to the newer areas of wine 
production, viz., Montagu, Robertson and 
Worcester, where lower land values and 
high yields made distilling wine prices 
very lucrative to these districts as 
compared with the older wine districts. 
(Paarl, Stellenbosch, Malmesbury, Ceres, 
Tulbagh, Cape and Caledon). Without-the 
necessary capital outlay for fustage and 
storage accommodation and for proper 
wine-making equipment, the majority of 
these producers merely became producers 
of distilling wine. In most cases cement 
tanks in the vineyard, where the pressing 
and wine-making are done, represent the 
only capital outlay ••• Wine production 
for distilling purposes was thus made 
extremely attractive for these areas and, 
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with no penalization as regards quality, 
it is not to be wondered at that 
plantings increased year after year and 
that production grew proportionately. 
These areas are cited because of the fact 
that the main increase in production had 
been in these newer districts, but it 
should be noted that the same conditions 
apply in respect of production in some of 
the older areas. ( 70) 
The commission's analysis is borne out by the tables below: 
TABLE 6: NUMBER OF VINES (71) 
Year Old Districts New Districts 
Total Increase % Total Total Increase % 
1927 42, 83m - 60,2% 28,92m -
1929 40,64m -5,1% 53,8% 34,89m 19,1% 
1932 45, 98m 13,1% 51,7% 42, 95m 23,1% 
Total increase 7,4% 51,9% 
TABLE 7: QUALITY OF WINE (72) 
Quality Old Districts New Districts 
Leaguers Proportion Leaguers Proportion 
Superior 4885 7,5% 842 2,3% 
Good 29563 45,3% 4192 11,6% 
Distilling 30754 47,2% 31192 86,1% 
Total 65502 100,0% 36226 100,0% 
At least part of this massive increase in production in the 






effects of the Depression on the deciduous fruit industry as 
will become clear later. 
From the evidence to the CACC and the above figures, it 
would seem that the wine farmers in the new areas were not 
particularly badly affected by the Depression. Production 
was increasing rapidly and they probably received an 
increasing share of the total revenues of the wine industry. 
At least one effect of the rapid increase in production, 
which will merely be noted here, was a massive labour 
shortage. The Farmers Weekly reported in mid-1929 that 
Wheat 
in the Hex River valley ..• the orchards 
and vineyards must be prepared for the 
coming deciduous fruit season, but work 
is almost at a standstill because the 
labour shortage has reached unprecedented 
proportions. (73) 
Wheat was not as important as wine and fruit in the areas 
where the ANC (WP) organised, so a brief overview will be 
sufficient. Wheat was also subject to very different 
constraints. Local production was far from sufficient and 
South Africa imported wheat on a large scale. Thus, 
although wheat was integrated in the world market in the 
sense that it had to compete against imports, it was also 
relatively easier to take effective countermeasures in the 
form of import duties. 
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TABLE 8: WHEAT PRICES ( 74) 
Year Liverpool spot SA Wheat Price Premium 
s/d Index s/d Index s/d ~ world price 
1924-28 23/7 100 26/1 100 2/6 12, 7 
1929 20/2 85,5 22/3 85,3 2/1 10,3 
1930 15/5 65,4 20/2 7 7, 3 4/9 30,8 
1931 11/0 46,6 21/8 83,1 10/8 97,0 
1932 11/10 50,2 20/11 80,2 9/1 76,8 
1933 10/8 45,2 17/7 67,6 6/11 64,9 
As the table indicates, the world price fell by more than 
50% within three years. The farmers demanded protection 
against this 'unfair' competition, and in response the 
government increased the duty on imported wheat to bring its 
effective price up to 22/6 per bag. (75) As in the case of 
wine, the stabilised price led to a tremendous increase in 
production, which in turn produced a crisis of 
overproduction and a decrease in the local price of wheat. 
(76) This is demonstrated in Table 9: 
TABLE 9: WHEAT PRODUCTION (77) 
Year Volume Value Imports 
m bags Index £m Index m bags Index 
1924-8 1,968 100 2,773 100 1,876 100 
1929 1. 958 99,5 2,415 87,1 2,398 127,8 
1930 2,981 151,5 3,214 115,9 1,473 78,5 
1931 2,379 120,9 3,020 108,9 1,094 58,3 
1932 3,754 190,8 4, 303 155,2 0,510 27,2 
1933 2,838 144,2 2,803 101,2 0,038 2, 0 
In the years prior to the Depression nearly 50% of wheat was 
imported. By 1932 the local crop had nearly doubled and was 
more than local consumption, while imports decreased to 
58 
negligible amounts. Total value of production was well 
above the pre-Depression levels. 
This did not mean that wheat farmers benefitted from the 
Depression to the extent shown in the figures. Many farmers 
had switched from other crops to wheat because of its 
'artificially' high price (78) and the total revenue had to 
be shared amongst many more farmers. The increase in 
production also meant that farmers had higher expenses. But 
the overall prosperity of the wheat farmers is shown by the 
fact that land values in the wheat growing areas stayed 
relatively stable during the Depression - in fact there was 
even a slight increase. (79) 
Fruit 
It is rather more difficult to make an accurate assessment 
of the position of the deciduous fruit industry as the 
figures are often combined with other fruits in published 
statistics. 
TABLE 10: FRUIT PRODUCTION (80) 
Year Value Volume Price 
£m Index Index Index 
1924-28 2,981 100 100 100 
1929 3,592 120,5 112,4 107 I 2 
1930 3,694 123,9 143,5 86,3 
1931 2,829 94,9 131,6 72,l 
1932 3,280 110,0 143,5 76,7 
1933 3,291 110,4 155,5 71,0 
The table show.that, overall, the price of fruit fell by 
nearly 30% from its pre-Depression levels. Farmers were 
able to increase production to a significant degree - an 
average increase of 9,2% per year - during the Depression, 
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and consequently the gross value of ·production was 
relatively stable. 
Both citrus and deciduous farmers were aided by the steep 
increase in exports. In this case separate statistics were 
kept for dec.iduous fq.iit and one can be fairly sure that it 
applies to the Western Cape. This region supplied about 
98% of all deciduous fruit exports in the 1920s and early 
1930s. (81} 
South A'frica had earlier started to make big inr~ads 1 i~to the 
British market. After the disruption caused by the World 
War, exports reached a new peak in 1920 and continued to 
grow at a rate of nearly 20% per year for the next eight 
years. Overseas prices were remarkably stable, and exports 
continued to increase at nearly the same rate as during the 
1920s. ( 82} 
TABLE 11: DECIDUOUS FRUIT EXPORTS (83} 
Year Value Volume Price 
£000 Index Tons Index Index 
1924-8 356,7 100 21662 100 loo 
1929 407,9 114,4 23312 107 I 6 106, 3 
1930 609,0 170,7 39297 181,4 94,1 
1931 509,9 142,9 31252 144,3 99,0 
1932 653,8 183,3 40394 186,5 98,3 
1933 873,l 244,8 55394 255,7 95,7 
Thus the Western Cape farmers were effectively protected 
from the ravages of the Depression - in fact they were 
probably more prosperous after the Depression than before. 
Fruit farmers were not particularly well organised in 
comparison with other sectors. Although a fruit 
cooperative was established prior to 1926 to market fruit, 
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it soon became clear that separate organisations were 
required to cater for the very different needs of citrus and 
deciduous fruit farmers. (84) 
Thus the two sectors split in 1926 and a SA Cooperative 
Deciduous Fruit Exchange was formed. (85) It also ran into 
problems quickly in its attempts to deal with inland 
marketing and to develop new overseas markets. These were 
financial disasters, and had to be abandoned. By 1931/32 it 
was concentrating merely on the supply of packing materials 
and on an attempt to set up a coordinated distribution 
system. Even these efforts were not very successful and the 
Cooperation and Agricultural Credit Commission recommended 
that the industry needed to be reorganised from scratch. 
(86) 
In the case of fruit farming, one is fortunate in being able 
to draw on a very detailed study by Tomlinson and Van Wyk of 
the actual conditions prevailing on the farms. They 
studied 56 fruit farms in the Stellenbosch, Ceres and Elgin 
areas in 1933, and concluded that: 
the farms are of the most intensive and 
specia1ized in the country. (87) 
They cite several indicators of the degree of intensive 
farming. The average size of the farms was only 103,2 
morgen, as against the average of nearly 600 morgen for the 
whole of the Western Cape and a similar figure for the rest 
of the country, excluding the Cape. (88) Nearly 33% of the 
land was under cultivation, as against the average of only 
15% in the Western Cape and 11% in the rest of the country. 
(89) 
The extent of specialisation is shown by the fact that 81% 
of cultivated land was for the production of fruit, and by 
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the fact that farmers derived no less than 97% of their 
cash income from the sale of fruit. Unfortunately there are 
no comprehensive figures to indicate the extent to which the 
farmers were dependent on the world market. Certainly those 
farmers producing grapes in the Stellenbosch districts were 
extremely dependent on the world market as more than 85% of 
their production was exported. Another, unrepresentative, 
sample for all fruit was reported in Die Burger: 
TABLE 12: FRUIT MARKETING OF FRANSCHHOEK CROP (90) 
Consigned to Tons Proportion 
Cape Town 902 37,6% 
Export 660 27, 5% 
Jam 740 30,8% 
Inland 99 4,1% 
It was also reported that 80% of the raisin crop was 
exported. (91) Fruit farmers who exported were extremely 
dependent on the world market as they produced a quality 
product which sold for high prices overseas. It was a 
perennial complaint of the farmers that there was virtually 
no local demand for their products, as consumers were used 
to paying very low prices for inferior fruit. (92) 
A further indication of the extent of production for the 
market is the very high land values. The average value of 
the farms were £7700, or nearly £75 per morgen. This 
compares with average land values in the maize producing 
areas of the inland plateau of some £6 per morgen. (93) The 
high land value was clearly a further imperative towards 
commodity production as the interest charges, at 5%, 
amounted to some £385 per year on an average farm. It is 
important to bear in mind, though, that these values were 
purely notional, and only represented the actual capital 
outlay by the farmers who had recently acquired their farms. 
62 
Nevertheless, fruit farming demanded a considerable outlay 
of capital for the establishment of orchards and vineyards, 
probably much more so than for other kinds of farming. This 
factor is reflected by the fact that the value of orchards 
represented about 58% of the total vaue of the farms. 
Buildings accounted for a further 25%. 
Thus it is not surprising that farms produced a considerable 
cash income. The average value of production sold on the 
market was over £1600 per annum, while production for own 
use was valued at only £50 per year. Again this figure 
compares favourably with the Highveld average production, 
for market and subsistence, of some £1000 per farm, 
generated by farms over seven times larger. (94) 
The total net income of farmers, allowing for the value of 
their own time and for the value of income in kind, was 
about £470 per year. (95) This represents a return of 6,1% 
on their notional capital invested, and probably much more 
on the actual capital invested. The return was, in any 
case, well above the cost of capital of some 5% per year. 
A few other interesting aspects also emerged from the study. 
Although Tomlinson and Van Wyk do not give the figures for 
the actual number of workers employed, they say that on 
average there were about 5 permanent workers. During the 
season they would be joined by up to 15 or more temporary 
workers. On the basis of a wage - in cash and kind - of 
about 3s per day, they calculated that about 10 man years of 
labour was required on each farm. Wages, including that of 
the manager, was the single most important item in the 
expenses, amounting to about 42,5% of the total. 
They also found some evidence of a labour shortage, 
especially in the intensively farmed area of Stellenbosch. 
Farmers were often reported to be employing more permanent 
63 
workers than they needed 
in order to be sure of having good 
labourers when in great demand during the 
busy season. ( 96) 
Altogether, about half of the labour needs of the farmers 
were met by casual labour and about 75% of all workers were 
casuals. In their case the wage form w~s clearly 
predominant and payments in kind was restricted to supplying 
food and "tots" during working hours. 
In the ·case of permanent labourers, payments in kind was 
more important and included housing and, probably, the right 
to grow some food on a small scale. No accurate figures are 
supplied for payments in kind and an imputed figure is 
simply included under miscellaneous income. But even using 
this full figure of £17,5 per year, the value of payments in 
kind averages only about 3, 6% of .the total wage bill. ( 97) 
Even if one excludes the wages of casual workers and the 
manager, it is clear that payments in kind were extremely 
small and that even for permanent workers the wage form 
predominated. (98) 
I I I CONCLUSION 
One can draw two broad sets of conclusions from the above -
firstly around the nature and specificity of Western Cape 
agriculture, and secondly around the effects of the crisis 
in agriculture. 
Firstly, there can be no doubt that the transition to 
capitalist agriculture had been completed. Agriculture was 
characterised by the production of commodities and the 
wage form predominated, even in the case of permanent 
labourers on the farms. 
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The specific form of capitalist agriculture and the crisis 
did much to shape the nature of rural organisation. Although 
it is beyond the scope of this work to compare rural 
organisation in the Western Cape with that elsewhere in the 
country, it is clear from the above that it rested on a very 
different material basis. The most successful rural 
organisation elsewhere in the country was undertaken by the 
ICU in Natal and Transvaal. As Morris and especially 
Bradford have shown, the ICU was most successful precisely 
in those areas where the peasantry was particularly 
threatened by the specific form of the transition to 
capitalist agriculture. (99) 
The specificity of capitalist agriculture in the Western Cape 
lies firstly in the specific path taken by the transition, 
and secondly in the fact that the transition had largely 
been completed by the 1930 1s. This had important effects on 
the nature of class struggle in the rural areas, especially 
as regards the form of organisation, and the tactics and 
demands that emerged out of the rural struggles in the 
Western Cape. 
Secondly, it would appear that in the main sectors of 
agriculture in the Western Cape, there was no question of a 
severe recession. Agriculture in the region came through the 
Depression relatively unscathed and some sectors were 
probably even better off than before. Nevertheless, one 
should stress the specifically capitalist nature of the 
Depression and solutions that were adopted. The impact of 
the Depression should also not be under-estimated. Farmers 
were faced with falling prices, a general climate of crisis 
and uncertainty prevailed (100) and they were forced to act 
to maintain their material situation. This they did by 
exerting pressure on the state for direct assistance, by 
organising themselves, by expanding production, and by 
' 
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attempting to cut costs. 
Furthermore, some of these solutions brought new problems 
in their wake, especially in the form of an aggravated labour 
shortage at a time when farmers were attempting to cut 
wages. ( 101 ) 
Although the crisis in agriculture created fertile 
conditions for organisation, it is important not to fall 
into the reductionist trap of attempting to explain every 
twist and turn in the progress of rural organisation in 
terms of the crisis. At most the crisis produced a 
situation in which a militant mass movement could find a 
ready response, viz mass dissatisfaction on the farms, 
large-scale seasonal unemployment and overcrowding in the 
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APPENDIX 1: NATIONAL INCOME 
Year £m Index 
1924-28 24S,62 100.0 
1929 270, S 110,l 
1930 2S3,2 103,1 
1931 234, l 9S,3 
1932 217,1 88,4 
1933 236,9 96,4 
% Change -20,8 (1928-32) 
Source Union Statistics for SO Years, Table L4 
See note 39 for an explanation of the table. 
APPENDIX 2: MANUFACTURING 
Geographical Income Net Output Gross Output 
£m Index £m Index £m Index 
' 1924-28 30,68 100 29,0S6 100 68,91S8 100 
1929 38,2 124, S 34,194 117,7 78,42S 113, 8 
1930 39,1 127,4 - - - -
1931 37, 2 121,3 - - - -
1932 33,S 109, 2 30,700 !OS, 7 67,332 97,7 
1933 32,0 104,3 36,401 12S, 3 82,448 119, 6 
% Chaffge -18,2 (1930-33) -10,2 (1929-32) -16,S (1928-32) 
Source Union Statistics for SO Years, Tables L3, S3 
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APPENDIX 3: MINING 
ueograpnical Income Total Sales Value TSV excl Gold 
£m Index £m Index £m Index 
1924-28 44,46 100 S8,34 100 lS,386 100 
1929 4S,O 101,2 62,6 107, 1 18,371 119,4 
1930 43,8 98, s S6,7 97,2 ll, 180 72,7 
1931 39,4 88,6 S3,3 91,4 7,094 46,1 
1932 39,2 88,2 S4,8 93, 9 S,034 32,7 
1933 S6,4 126,9 74,6 127,9 S,913 38,4 
% Change. -22, 1 (1928-32) -14,9 ( 1929-31) -72,6 (1929-32) 
Source : Union Statistics for SO Years, Tables K4, KS, KlS, S3 
APPENDIX 4: COMMERCE 
National Inc Exports Imports 
£m Index £m Index £m Index 
1924-8 37,6 100 41,02S 100 71,197 100 
1929 43,7 116, 2 44,189 107, 7 81,849 116,4 
1930 36,7 97,6 30,247 73,7 64,181 90, 1 
1931 32, 3 8S,9 20,72S so, s S2,440 73,7 
1932 2S,8 68,6 17,900 43,6 32, 209 4S,2 
1933 29, 1 77,4 22,441 66, 9 48,443 68,0 
% Change -41,0 (1929-32) -S9,S (1929-32) -61,1 (1929-32) 
Source : Union Statistics for SO Years, Tables N2, N4, s3. 
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CHAPTER 3 
GARVEYISTS, MILITANTS AND THE RURAL POPULAR CLASSES 
THE ANC IN THE WESTERN CAPE, 1928 - 1931 
I GARVEYISTS AND MARXISTS IN THE WESTERN CAPE 
The ANC in the Western Cape was not particularly active in 
the period up to the mid-twenties, but by the late 1920's it 
was by far the most active and militant branch of the ANC. 
This transformation was largely the result of a very 
specific combination of black nationalism and marxism, 
combined with the crisis in capitalist agriculture which was 
examined in chapter 2. 
The black nationalists - in the guise of militant Garveyists 
- started to organise in the ANC(WP) in 1924 when James 
Thaele was elected as president. He was, according to all 
accounts, a rather flamboyant figure: 
something of an opportunist and 
dilletante ••• attracting attention as 
an agitator and on account of his 
flowery language and sartorial 
affections: 'white sun helmet, white 
suit, white spats, white gloves' and a 
walking stick. (1) 
Much of the secondary and primary sources on the period 
characterise him in similar terms, including Roux who knew 
him personally and describes him as a rather "facile" 
person. (2) Though his actions certainly lend themselves 
to appellations such as "opportunist", such terms fail to 
come to grips with the complexity of the dilemma which faced 
the radicalised petty bourgeoisie. The chapter below will 
a void such terms and try to demonstrate that insofar as 
Thaele's actions were "opportunist", they were also largely 
compatible with his class position. 
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Thaele had studied in the United States for fifteen years 
prior to his return in 1922. On his return he started a 
night school in Cape Town and became involved.in local 
politics. He joined the ICU (3) and soon became a fairly 
regular contributor to the Workers' Herald. He also 
produced his own, rather periodic, newspaper called the 
African World. 
Thaele had become a Garveyist overseas and his newspaper 
articles were permeated with Garveyist rhetoric. As a 
result of his efforts and that of an American negro, Arthur 
McKinley, Cape Town was almost certainly the most important 
centre of Garveyist influence in South Africa, although 
there were also branches of the UNIA in Johannesburg and 
Natal. ( 4) 
Thaele, his brother Kennon and McKinley also worked in the 
ANC(WP), especially once the ICU started to decline in Cape 
Town. After Thaele's election as president, they set about 
re-organising the ANC(WP) and expanding its influence. 
Regular lunch-time meetings were held on the parade and they 
even organised in some of the nearby rural towns. 
The discourse of the ANC(WP) at that time was characterised 
by a fairly militant Garveyism. The slogan of "Africa for 
the Africans" was popularised, there was a stress on the 
need for "racial pride" and a separatist churches, and even 
talk of non-cooperation with the authorities. At the same 
time, there were two factors which tempered their particular 
brand of Garveyism, which were to prove of crucial 
importance in the latter evolution of the ANC(WP). 
In the first place, the traditional Garveyist emphasis on 
blackness and racial purity was somewhat muted in the 
particular conditions of Cape Town where coloured people had 
always belonged to the ANC(WP). (5) Thus coloured people 
were usually included in the definition of "Africans". The 
fact that the Thaeles themselves had a coloured mother was 
probably not irrelevant to this re-definition. However that 
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may be, it certainly opened up the possibility of organising 
in the surrounding rural areas. 
Secondly, in the Western Cape the Garveyist hostility 
towards socialist organisation was also rather muted. (6) 
In fact Thaele at times displayed a remarkable respect for 
the Communist Party. When he addressed students at the CP 
night school in Johannesburg in 1929 he 
congratulated them on belonging to the 
intelligentsia of the African race who 
understood the meaning of exploitation 
and could get down to work. His 
sympathies were entirely with the 
Communist Party. It was the party 
destined to bring forward in the near 
future a far reaching change in social 
conditions. He did not believe in 
compromising in matters of principle and 
what he was saying here he did not 
hesitate to say elsewhere. The people 
of Russia who formerly groaned under 
Tsarist tyranny, now enjoyed freedom and 
they could appreciate the fact. 
Communism meant the emancipation of the 
struggling workers and the levelling of 
the oppressed races. (7) 
This can be partly explained by the fact that Garvey's 
hostility to socialist movements rested primarily on their 
domination by whites. Vincent argues that there were 
several cases where Garveyists co-operated with indigenous 
socialist organisations in the Third World. (8) Thus the 
specific form that Garveyism took in the Western Cape 
facilitated the establishment of an alliance with the 
socialists in the CPSA. 
At the same time the CPSA had also been going through a 
process of transformation which would bring it much closer 
to the black nationalists in theory and in practice. In 
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1925 it had "begun to break out of its isolation from 
Africans" by adopting a (still relatively undemocratic) 
programme of reforms. At the Fifth Congress of the party in 
1927 it was further resolved to form African branches and to 
train a "cadre of class conscious workers". ( 9) 
It seems, from the available evidence, that the Cape Town 
branch was one of the prime movers behind these measures. 
(10) At the 1924 conference the Cape Town branch in 
alliance with the Young Communist League and Bunting, had 
initiated the process of reorientation towards black 
politics. (11) Several members of the branch were already 
active in the ICU, notably John Gornas and James la Guma. 
(12) Although there were still periodic attacks on Thaele 
in 1926, it appears that their attention was shifted to the 
ANC(WP) as the ICU declined in Cape Town. By 1928 and 1929 
Johns reports that the activity of the CP in Cape Town was 
at a low ebb as the majority of its black members were 
devoting most of their time to the ANC(WP). (13) 
This "movement" received added impetus when La Gu ma visited 
the USSR in 1927. He had extensive consultations with the 
Executive Committee of the Communist International and it 
was probably here that the slogan of a "Black Republic" was 
first formulated. (14) This is not the place to enter the 
debate surrounding the slogan and its eventual adoption at 
the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928, (15) other than 
to note the concrete eff~ts of the debate and the 
implementation of the slogan in Cape Town. 
The most important results were that the Cape Town branch 
was strengthened by its "victory" in the debate and 
reinforced in its belief that the slogan was correct. It 
also meant that there was now an important group within the 
ANC(WP) that was committed to mass mobilisation and, in 
theory, to the leadership of the working class in the 
struggle for national liberation. 
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Thus the CP began to see the Cape as the new centre of 
revolution: 
Here in the Western Province is a 
growing revolutionary ferment, based 
primarily on the increasing discontent 
of thousands of Native and Coloured 
workers and peasants groaning under the 
iron heel of British and Boer 
imperialism, as expressed in the 
Pirowcratic dictatorship. The main 
strength of the revolutionery movement 
lies in the bitterly exploited rural 
workers whose land was stolen a 
century ago by the white plutocracy. 
In Cape Town, the only large urban 
centre in this area, there is a Non-
European industrial proletariat, working 
in the docks, railways and factories. 
These town workers are slightly better 
off than their country brothers and at 
the same time more politically conscious 
and educated. 
The CP believed that there even existed amongst the coloured 
people a nascent national bourgeoisie which was required for 
an application of the Black Republic theory: 
This relatively small but important 
class desires the support of the masses 
in order to gain its own demands: 
modification of colour bar and the right 
to share the privileges of the Europeans 
of the same social class. But these 
ladies an~ gentlemen do not want to see 
a revolutionary upheaval involving the 
liberation of the toiling masses in the 
town and country, including their own 
servants and employees. Consequently 
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·they 'seek to head the movement in order 
to behead it'. (16) 
In Cape Town, at least, the adoption of the slogan had 
largely positive results and it provided a fairly coherent 
basis for a fruitful alliance between the CP and the 
Garveyists in the ANC. Within the ANC(WP) this took the 
form of an alliance between militants like Elliott Tonjeni, 
Bransby Ndobe, Johnny Gomas and Arnoth Plaatjes who all had 
close links to the CPSA, and the moderates like James and 
Kennon Thaele who were convinced Garveyists. As will become 
clear later, most of the actual organisation took place 
under the ANC banner, while the ANC in Cape Town more or 
less adopted the CP political programme of a "Black 
Republic". 
The ANC(WP) had expanded gradually under the leadership of 
the Garveyists, but it was only in the late 1920's that it 
was transformed into a militant mass movement as the 
alliance between the black nationalists and socialists took 
shape in practice. Most of the impetus came from the 
appointment of two young and dynamic organisers who had 
close links with the CPSA: Bransby Ndobe was appointed as 
organiser during Thaele's absence in the Herschel district 
in late 1927 and later became provincial secretary, while in 
1929 Elliot Tonjeni was appointed as assistant provincial 
secretary. (17) Although they had close links with the 
CPSA, they apparently were not particularly vociferous in 
their support for the CPSA, especially not in Cape Town. 
(18) In fact the CPSA organ reported in 1929 that both 
Tonjeni and Ndobe had been "lost" to the party in the course 
of the year - it is unclear whether they had resigned or 
been expelled. (19) 
Although there was a leftward movement in the ANC at a 
national level with the election of Josiah Gumede as 
President-General and Eddie Khaile as Secretary-General in 
1927, an alliance between the CP and the ANC was never 
formalised or extended on a national level. The Cape Town 
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branch continued to push for an open alliance, for example 
in their motion at the 1928 conference urging the executive 
to explore every avenue towards the 
closest co-operation with the Communist 
Party. ' ( 20) 
But they never succeeded. Only a few members of the ANC 
outside the Cape were prepared to co-operate with the CP, 
although they included the influential Gumede. 
II A SPARK AT PAARL 
The actual move of the ANC(WP) into the rural areas, was 
sparked off by an inciden.t in Paarl at the end of 1927. The 
official police version of the incident was that 
Saturday night Constable Bleeker on duty 
Paarl heard screams found four natives 
attacking coloured girl he asked them 
desist X was attacked with {sic} and 
knocked down and in self defence drew 
revolver fired three shots killing one 
native wounding another ••• reported 
dying. (21) 
Few people, however, believed this. The following morning, 
Sunday 18 December, the 
native locations around Paarl were in a 
state of ugly ferment ••• signs of 
unusual anger were evident amongst the 
native population and shortly before 
nine o'clock the police station was 
besieged by natives who demanded to see 
constable Bleeker. (22) 
Many people also gathered at the hospital to see the wounded . 
Samuel Tshitsha, but their demands were refused and police 
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were called in to control the crowd. At lunch time 
unsuccessful efforts were made to get Bleeker to come to the 
Island Street location, but it was reported that "the 
cons table was removed to a place of safety". 
the afternoon 
( 2 3 ) Lat er in 
the native quarter in Island Street was 
the scene of an unprecedented demon-
stration in which several hundred 
natives participated. (24) 
The ANC(WP) soon became very active in the protest. The 
Huguenot branch at Paarl was one of the oldest in the 
ANC(WP) (25) and Walshe states that it was one of the 4 
branches established in the Western Cape in 1920. (26) It 
is not clear how active the branch was by 1927, or even 
whether it survived the slump in the ANC during the early 
1920's. Roux seems to imply that it did survive, at least. 
It is not known to what extent it was involved in the 
protests that erupted on the Sunday after the shooting, but 
by the next day Ndobe, secretary of the ANC(WP), was 
reported to be in Paarl attending the inquest. (27) At the 
same time or soon afterwards, Stanley Silwana and John Gomas 
(who was secretary of the CP) also arrived in Paarl to help 
Ndobe organise the protest. From this time the ANC was 
clearly the dominant force in the protests. 
They even managed to have the trial postponed so that they 
could obtain the services of an attorney to represent them 
in court (28) and proceeded to organise a series of well 
attended protest meetings. 
The first was held at Huguenot station on Sunday, 25 
December. According to the Paarl Post 
Die toesprake bet gewemel van 
uitdrukkings soos 'onreg' en 
'uitbuiting', en alle nieblankes is 
aangeraai om te organiseer sodat hulle 
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deur middel van 'n algemene staking -
hul enigste wapen - die regering op sy 
kniee kan dwing. Hierdie wapen meet 
dien as 'n strydmiddel teen die 
georganiseerde blankes wat mag in the 
hande en masjien-gewere en alle moderne 
wapens in besit bet. (29) 
About 300 Africans and a few coloured people and whites 
attended the meeting. (30) Another big meeting was held on 
the 27th to collect money for the Cape Town attorney and it 
was clear, stated the Paarl Post, that the "Opgewondenheid 
het nog nie bedaar nie". 
Another meeting was held at Huguenot the following Sunday at 
which Arthur McKinley was the main speaker. He stressed the 
need for unity and organisation: 
.•• ek hoop dat elke gekleurde man 
gedurende die nuwejaar sal aansluit by 
die Afrikaanse Nasionale Kongres -
wanneer ons na die Paarl kom, kom ons 
nie om te veg nie, maar om te 
organiseer. Die witma.n wil die 
samewerking - die gemeenskap tussen die 
nature! en die kleurling verhoed. Maar 
die Afrikaanse Nasionale Kongres sal 
alles in sy vermoe doen om samewerking 
en gemeenskap teweeg te bring. (31) 
The other speakers were Joseph Manuel and Johannes Letsalu 
from Paarl and about 250 people attended. After these 
meetings, it seemed that the main effort was directed at the 
court hearings which were attended by crowds of up to 400. 
( 32) 
The protests had considerable effect in Paarl, and were 
probably directly responsible for Bleeker being charged with 
culpable homicide. Initially the state had tried to hold an 
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inquest, as the police argued that he was justified in his 
action, (33) but the attempt was abandoned after a few days. 
Bleeker was committed for trial in February, but was 
subsequently found not guilty by an all white jury, and 
acquitted. 
At the same time the state tried to repress the protests. 
Gomas, Ndobe and Silwana were charged under the notorious 
hostility clause of the new Native Administration Act. (34) 
Their arrest and subsequent heavy sentences in the Paarl 
Magistrate's court led to further demonstrations, (35) but 
there is little evidence that the effects on organisation in 
Paarl. Their subsequent appeal in Worcester, however, had 
one important immediate effect - apparently they u~ed the 
opportunity to organise a branch in Worcester. 
III WORCESTER AND ORGANISATIONAL METHODS 
Worcester was at that time the largest of the towns in the 
Boland. The local magistrate reported that it seemed 
to be a suitable centre for the 
congregation of non-Europeans. 
Nearly 5 000 Coloured people and about 400 Africans lived in 
the Parker Street area, often under conditions of desperate 
overcrowding and squalor. (36) Every weekend the 
population of the town was further swelled by an influx of 
Natives and lower class coloured 
population from all the farms 
surrounding {sic}. (37} 
From 1929 onwards the overcrowding and poverty were 
aggravated by the beginning of the crisis in agriculture, 
leading to further discontent. 
When the ANC(WP) started to organise in Worcester early in 




set up, and a local building worker, Adam Paul, was elected 
as secretary. Soon it had more than 300 members and had 
collected enough money (about £200) to buy a plot of land 
and build a small hall (17' x 32') and to employ Paul full-
time. (38) 
The idea of building or buying halls were very pervasive in 
the ANC(WP) and over the years a number of properties were 
bought. (39) This seems to have been based fairly directly 
on the Garveyist tradition of buying Liberty Halls. (40) 
Worcester soon became the most active branch in the whole of 
the ANC, and it served as a centre for the subsequent organ-
isation of other Boland towns - stretching from Rawsonville 
to Robertson, Bonnievale and Montagu, and even as far as 
Barrydale, Suurbraak and Swellendam. By May 1929 the 
ANC(WP) could claim more than 2 000 members in Cape Town and 
the Boland, while new members were still flocking to join 
the organisation.· (41) 
The methods of organisation in Worcester were much the same 
as elsewhere. They consisted firstly of broad, but· 
relatively superficial, organisation. One or more of the 
important leaders visited the town and arranged public 
meetings where they spoke and urged people to join the ANC. 
The meetings were always held outside in a prominent place 
so as to attract as many passersby as possible. 
Members had to pay a membership fee of ls per month (6d for 
women), while new members had to pay an entry fee of 2s 6d. 
(42) This money was used for a variety of purposes - to pay 
the full-time organisers, to acquire land and/or buildings 
for offices, to pay local officials, to pay the cost of 
numerous court cases, etc. The entry fee was a common 
feature of popular organisations at the time and was related 
to the methods of organisation. Organisers often had to 
travel long distances between towns and would arrive in a 
new town with little or no money. The relatively high entry 
fee helped to provide them with subsistence as well as their 
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travel expenses to the next town. (43) 
After a few meetings, and when sufficient people had joined 
the organisation, a branch would be set up and local 
officials elected. At this ?tage organisation usually 
became more in depth. Regular house visits were made at 
which issues could be discussed in greater detail and the 
branches tried to have regular weekly branch meetings. (44) 
However, public meetings retained their place as the primary 
method of organisation. Meetings were usually held every 
Sunday afternoon and, in the more active branches, on 
Wednesday and Saturday afternoons as well. The timing of 
these meetings was of critical importance. Not only were 
the townspeople able to attend the meetings, but many 
workers from the surrounding farms were able to attend 
meetings regularly as they usually came to the town over the 
weekend. Many farm workers joined the ANC and played an 
active part in the organisation, while at the same time 
extending the ANC's influence even further. 
In Worcester and other strong branches, the ANC also set up 
an ANC bodyguard or police. These were trusted ANC members 
who were dressed in uniforms and carried "two thick assegaai 
wood batons" up their sleeves. ( 45) Their ma in function 
was to keep order at meetings, but they also played an 
important role in protecting the more prominent leaders 
against assaults. 
By early 1930 the ANC(WP) claimed to have over 800 members 
in Worcester itself, plus another 200 on the surrounding 
farms. (46) It had been able to forge a significant unity 
between the struggles on the farms and in the towns, a unity 
which was reflected in the issues and demands that where 
taken up by the ANC(WP). 
As indicated earlier, the ANC(WP) more or less took over the 
CPSA political programme of a "Black Republic" and 
campaigned actively under this slogan. But it is more 
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important to stress that this indicated little more than an 
acceptance of a broad direction - it did not necessarily 
entail a commitment to the detail of the CP programme. In 
practice the slogan came to be used almost synonomously with 
"Mayibuye" (Let it, i.e. Africa, return), 
rallying cry to "give back our country". 
if any, discussions of the fact that the 
a more general 
There was little, 
Black Republic 
would only be a "stage towards a Worker's and Peasant's 
government", and that there would be "full protection and 
equal rights for all national minorities." This was the case 
even in the pages of the CPSA organ, Umsebenzi itself. (47) 
Although the Black Republic programme was very important in 
giving coherence and direction to the organisation, it was 
the immediate oppression and demands of the rural poletariat 
that dominated the discourse and practice of the ANC(WP). 
Outside Cape Town itself, the organisation was almost 
entirely working class in character. There simply was no 
African petty bourgeoisie in the rural areas, other than the 
occasional minister, while the "coloured" petty bourgeoisie 
remained almost entirely antagonistic towards the ANC(WP) as 
it threatened their traditional, informal leadership within 
their communities. (48) The only significant petty 
bourgeois element within the organisation in the rural areas 
was in fact the paid officials who were mostly of petty 
bourgeois origin. Thus in the rural areas the ANC(WP) 
articulated primarily the economic demands of the rural 
proletariat, namely low wages, unemployment, the tot system, 
passes and to a lesser extent, housing and the use of 
convict labour. 
There were continual demands for higher wages, and even 
demands for the Wage Board to set minimum wages for farm 
labour. (49) In contract to the almost millenarian wage 
demands of the ICU in the Transvaal and Natal rural areas, 
the ANC dJmanded a wage of Ss per day as against current 
wages of 2s to 2s 6d per day. (50) Sometimes the emphasis 
on economic demands were such that even the authorities 
described an ANC meeting as 
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not a political one but it was organised 
by the African National Congress and 
dealt with the economic questions of the 
country, more especially with the wage 
question. ( 51) 
It has already been pointed out that farmers were badly 
affected by the Depression and they attempted to reduce 
costs and protect their profits by reducing wages. There 
was fairly widespread, but largely individual resistance to 
these measures, mostly in the form of a refusal to work for 
lower wages. Many people left their jobs on the farms and 
went to the towns in the hope of finding better paid 
employment. 
This had two major consequences. In the first place it 
aggravated the unemployment in the towns, although wages 
still remained much higher than on the farms. It also 
brought about increasing conflict over the instruments of 
labour control, viz. passes and the tot system. However, 
the former affected only African people and as such never 
became a very major issue in the Boland. 
The tot system, on the other hand, was a well entrenched 
method of social control backed by the organised political 
power of the wine farmers. Furthermore, the farmers also 
viewed it as a vital outlet for their products and they made 
. 1 d h h · L' continua attempts to exten t e system to ot er provinc,J. 
The importance of the tot system can be seen from the 
following figures for Worcester magisterial district: 
No of regular workers: 880 white and 
2 282 black 
Total viticulture production: 16,65m litres 
Wine for own use: 0,69m litres (52) 
This means that more than 4% of the viticultural crop was 
consumed on the farm itself. Although the figures leave out 
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casual labour, the average consumption of wine per working 
day of 0,7 litres per person! At that time tots consisted 
of one pint of wine and were given 4 or 5 times a day. (53) 
IV THE FARMERS COUNTER-ATTACK 
Once established in Worcester, the ANC(WP) rapidly organised 
throughout the Boland and branches were established as far 
afield as Carnarvon, George and Ladismith. From the 
beginning, however, it had to overcome some great obstacles 
that are peculiar to organisation in the rural areas. 
The farmers were not only more reactionary than the bosses 
in the towns, but they were also more powerful. Politically 
agricultural capital was organised into the National Party, 
and the farmers from the Western Cape formed a particularly 
powerful block within the party. (54) Thus agricultural 
capital formed a critical part of the alliance between 
national capital and the white working class that 
constituted the power bloc in the late 1920's. (55) 
As a class they were well organised in numerous farmers 
associations, while they all knew each other personally. 
Thus it was easy for them to combine to take collective 
action against ANC members. 
They were also able to dominate the local state fairly 
effectively, especially the town councils. Their influence 
over the local representatives of the state was, however, 
less di~ect and on several occasions there were conflicts 
.between the farmers and these representatives, as will be 
shown later. 
One of the major obstacles faced by the ANC was direct 
repression by farmers who were afraid that an organised 
labour force might force them to pay higher wages and 
abandon the tot system. The farmers also complained 
bitterly that this "agitation" was primarily responsible for 
increasing shortages of black labour 
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that their labourers are being 
influenced to stay away from work. (56) 
The agitators were reported to be 
particularly bitter in their attitude 
towards farmers. (57) 
The first common tactic tried by the farmers in their 
struggle against the ANC(WP) was the use of victimisation. 
Thus it was reported that 
The majority of farmers have spoken 
seriously to their labourers regarding 
association with the Congress 
organisation. (58) 
As the class struggle in the rural areas intensified, more 
direct methods were used. For example, farmers would search 
their workers to 
see whether they wear under their 
clothing a badge or other indication of 
their connection with the most hated 
organisation in Worcester 
while the Railways at Worcester was reported to be using 
photographs of ANC meetings to identify members. (59) 
Several farmers' associations also attempted to institute a 
blacklist of ANC members, but this tactic was less 
successful because of the critical labour shortage. (60) 
Only in one case was it reported that a farmers' association 
had decided to proceed with a blacklist, viz in 
Villiersdorp. 
Of course, there were cases of individuals being victimised 
by farmers and the ANC did not have any coherent strategy 
for dealing with this. In at least one case about 30 farm 
workers on two farms near Robertson came out on strike when 
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some of their fellow workers were, sacked for attending an 
ANC meeting, but they were all dismissed and it seems that 
the strike failed. The strikers and their families were all 
evicted from their houses on the farms. (61) In the cases 
of victimisation, the local branches tried to look after the 
dismissed people, providing them with housing and food in 
the towns. (62) In this case, the Robertson branch looked 
after them as "guests of honour", until they were evicted as 
vagrants by the municipal sanitary inspectors. 
Another common tactic was to attempt to intimidate the ANC 
and its leaders into abandoning the rural struggle. In many 
of the smaller towns the farmers attempted to keep out the 
ANC by threats and even brute force. In early 1929, Bransby 
Ndobe was organising in Worcester and Swellendam 
where he stirred up much feeling by 
loose talk and was warned to leave. 
(63) 
This was a popular way for farmers to intimidate ANC 
organisers and it soon became clear that these threats had 
to be taken seriously. It is worthwhile to examine the 
events at Robertson at some length, as it gives considerable 
insight into the bitterness with which the rural struggle 
was waged. 
After Ndobe was forced to leave Swellendam, he organised in 
Robertson where he "stirred up" feelings again. The farmers 
became increasingly upset about the 
Native agitators addressing meetings 
there, as they content that it causes 
dissatisfaction among labourers and aggravates the 
farm labour shortage. (64) 
N-dobe received several threats to leave Robertson, but he 
ignored them all. However, when, in early April, he tried 
to attend the court hearing of an ANC member who had been 
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arrested after a stone-throwing incident, he was surrounded 
by a hostile crowd of white people - the two estimates are 
40 and 500! The police arrested him and after interrogation 
at the local police station, he was taken to the local 
station and warned to leave the area immediately. Before he 
could do so, however, he was attacked and assaulted by the 
crowd. (65) 
At this stage it seemed that the ANC(WP) started to 
formulate a strategy to deal with this kind of intimidation. 
It decided to return "in force" with several hundred ANC 
niembers from Cape Town and Worcester and to hold a meeting 
on Saturday 24 May. Elliott Tonjeni outlined the plan at a 
meeting in Worcester. He 
declared that May 24 would be a 
memorable day and told all those 
dissatisfied with their lot to meet him 
and to go over to Robertson. They would 
then show the 'ignorant backvelders that 
we will not be intimidated'. (66) 
On Friday May 23, 1 500 whites met in the Robertson Town 
Hall to discuss plans for the following day. At the same 
time the 
people in Robertson are arming 
themselves in preparation for tomorrow. 
Relatives have been summoned from 
surrounding districts and are arriving 
in motor cars. (67) 
It was clear that the ANC would have to hold their meeting 
in the face of some very determined opposition. 
The local ANC made "lavish preparations" for Ndobe's visit 
and a crowd gathered early to wait for him. (68) There 
were setbacks in both Cape Town and Worcester. In Worcester 
the ANC was unable to obtain lorries as the owners had, as a 
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gesture of solidarity with the Robertson farmers, agreed not 
to hire them out to the ANC. In Cape Town, Ndobe was 
interrogated by the police and his departure was delayed for 
several hours. 
Ndobe, T~njeni, Thaele and Brown were also forced to sign 
statements that they were going to Robertson at their own 
risk. They eventually arrived in Robertson with three 
crowded lorries (presumably they picked up some of the 
Worcester members along the way) and said that the meeting 
would start at 12 midday. A "number of determined looking 
Europeans" approached, but the police persuaded them to keep 
their distance. 
Wilson Tsekwe, a member of ANC executive, opened the meeting 
of about 150. He, and several of the other speakers, 
referred to the massacres at Bulhoek, Port Elizabeth and 
Johannesburg, and made it clear that repression and 
intimidation would not stop the black people from 
organising. 
'I was flogged at Robertson and lost my 
property', said Ndobe, 'because I spoke 
the truth. I do not blame the Europeans 
because history will repeat itself. 
There must be martyrs. But I have taken 
the pledge to spread the gospel of the 
African National Congress.' 
The meeting continued fairly quietly and was eventually 
closed. The crowd, which had grown to about 200, started 
to disperse and Ndobe left with the three lorries from Cape 
Town. The Worcester lorry was still there when the whites 
surged forward and police reinforcements 
were summoned. One native sneered at a 
Mr le Roux who afterwards said that he 
knocked the native down. Then someone 
threw a brick. Immediately big stones 
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and half-bricks whistled through the 
air, and knives were flashed. 
In the ensuing fight, several whites were stabbed before 
police reinforcements arrived from Worcester and 
before the stout attack of the police 
and civilians, the coloured crowd fell 
back ... A few natives urged an{nother} 
attack 
but this did not materialise and the crowd eventually 
dispersed. 
That night the local township, Jubelsdorp, was in a state of 
revolt. According to reports, the township had gone 
"beserk" and "hooligans" were breaking lights and stoning 
cars in Robertson. Two policemen who ventured into the 
township to arrest a stone-thrower, Hans Marais, were 
attacked by a crowd and only escaped after threatening the 
crowd with their revolvers. 
The police, however, soon had the situation under control, 
and as far as can be ascertained, the ANC(WP) did not try to 
provoke another confrontation. Nevertheless, they had made 
their point. It seems that the ANC was now able to organise 
relatively freely in Robertson and by June it claimed to 
have many members in Robertson. (69) 
V AN UNEASY TRUCE 
For the rest of 1929, there was something of a lull as both 
sides reassessed their positions and strengths. From the 
available evidence it seems that the ANC(WP) was able to 
continue its organisational activity, although it tried to 
keep a low profile. Thus by October the Worcester Standard 
and Advertiser reported that the ANC(WP) 
has now established branches in nearly 
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every town in the Western Province and 
the South Western Districts. (70) 
Unfortunately, there is little evidence available on this 
period, at least partially due to the conscious conspiracy 
of silence in the bourgeois press. The Worcester Standard 
and Advertiser summed up its and the farmers' attitude, when 
it wrote that 
{n}aturally the more publicity the 
affair is given, the better pleased the 
Natives will be - and that is what they 
are after. 
The ANC(WP) did hold a conference of all its branches in the 
new hall at Worcester in October. The delegates gathered 
under banners proclaiming 
You were shot down under these flags 
{the Union Jack and Vierkleur - WH}. 
Remember Bulhoek, Port Elizabeth and 
Johannesburg. Down with capitalism. 
(72) 
But the political programme that emerged from the conference 
was much more nationalist than socialist in character, 
stressing firstly, non-cooperation with whites, and 
secondly, the secession of blacks from white churches. From 
the scant evidence of the conference, it is dangerous to 
attempt any definitive analysis of this programme, 
especially as one does not know which points were not 
reported. They do emphasise, though, the importance of the 
influence of Gandhi and the missionaries in South Africa. 
In the speeches of the Congress leaders there were often 
references to the Indian national struggle which was being 
fought with great bitterness at this stage and which 
received much publicity in the local press. Thus in his 
speech after the conference, Tonjeni said that he felt 
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like going beyond all reasonable 
boundaries today ... It is foolish to be 
loyal to a disloyal people. So long as 
I live I will organise until I am 
satisfied that I have aroused the 
non-Europeans. You will remember 
Gandhi's policy of non-cooperation with 
the whites. It was caused through 
oppression and he would not be holding 
these meetings but the oppression of the 
African race. (73) 
But the slogan of non-cooperation with whites was at best a 
compromise within the ANC(WP). The militants interpreted it 
as passive resistance to "white" laws, whereas the moderates 
and Garveyists saw it as not co-operating with white 
organisations. The latter interpretation would in fact be 
used later to attack the militants for their links with the 
"white" CPSA. (74) 
Attacks on white churches and the call for separatist black 
churches were, in fact, an important element in the 
discourse of the Garveyists. ( 75) The church was often 
discussed at ANC meetings and the white churches came in for 
heavy fire. But very few people attacked religion as a 
whole and some black churches like the Volkskerk were even 
regarded as part of the struggle and lent moral support to 
the ANC. (76) In fact it was even reported that the ANC 
had established the Volkskerk as its own church, but this 
seems doubtful. 
Throughout 1929 the economic crisis worsened, particularly 
on the farms where the labour shortage grew increasingly 
worse. Although this was due in a large measure to the 
organisation of the ANC (WP), there were also other 
contributory factors. 
The most important of these, as noted _in Chapter 2 was the 
fact that production was expanding rapidly and consequently 
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farmers required more labour. Secondly, it appears that the 
demand for labour by the municipalites and railways was also 
increasing. Wilson has pointed out that the labour shortage 
in the Western Cape was traditionally more acute than 
elsewhere, partly because of the absence of a large African 
population, and partly because of the competition for labour 
from the railways and docks. (77) 
This was aggravated, ironically, by the various relief 
measures undertaken by the State for so-called "civilised 
labour", which benefitted coloured people to some extent. 
In the early 1920's the National Party, and especially the 
Cape party, had an assimilationist policy towards the 
coloured people - at least at an economic level. As Marais 
notes, correctly, there was little notion of the coloured 
people constituting a separate group in society. (78) The 
National Party even started the Afrikaner Nasionale Bond as 
a political party to mobilise the support of coloured 
people. 
Thus the measures adopted under the civilised labour policy 
seldom discriminated against coloured people in theory, 
although in practice the enforcement of the rate for the job 
tended to favour white labour at the expense of coloured 
labour. (79) The small benefits derived by coloured 
labourers from the civilised labour system became even more 
limited as the National Party dropped its assimiltaionist 
policy in the late 1920's. (80) 
work in the towns was both more regular and better paid than 
agricultural labour. The latter paid about 2s to 2s 3d per 
day without food or ls 6d per day with food. In addition 
the hours of work were much shorter than on the farms. As 
the labour shortage increased, some Worcester businessmen 
even suggested that a few farmers were "deliberately 
exploiting" their labourers, and that this practice was 
giving farming a bad name. As a case in point they 
mentioned a labourer charged with desertion who had been 
paid Ss per month. (81) 
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The town councils did everything in their power to assist 
the farmers. They tried to stop the steady migration to the 
towns. The Worcester council announced that in future it 
would only employ "raw natives" and would refuse to employ 
people who had lived on farms before. (82) Later the 
(>Duncil also stated that it would not build any more houses 
in the overcrowded Parker Street area, as any alleviation of 
the housing shortage would further aggravate the farm labour 
shortage. (83) Housing was an important way in which 
farmers were able to obtain labour. Some farmers even built 
houses in town and rented them out on condition that the 
head of the household work on the their farm during the 
season. (84) However, even when employment or housing were 
not directly available, many people still left the farms to 
live in the towns. The precise nature of this contradiction 
i.e. a labour shortage on the farms and widespread urban 
unemployment, still needs to be researched in greater depth. 
VI SQUATTERS IN CARNARVON: THE FARMERS ATTACK 
With the continuing crisis and the increasing level of ANC 
organisation, it is clear that the comparative lull of the 
second half of 1929 could not last. The first incident in 
the renewed onslaughton the ANC(WP) occurred at Carnarvon in 
January 1930. 
There had been a long period of struggle at carnarvon about 
the position of African squatters and occupiers on the-outer 
commonage at Schietfontein. In the mid-19th century, - Sir 
George Grey had granted grazing, sowing, and limited 
occupation rights on the commonage to a number of Africans. 
These rights were gradually alienated to whites, mainly 
through indebtedness, but many Africans remained as 
squatters on the commonage. An attempt by the government to 
evict them proved unsuccessful in 1914 when the Supreme 
Court ruled that it was a civil matter between the new 
owners and the squatters. (85) 
The legal position is very unclear, but it seems that an Act 
98 
was passed in 1926 (86) to transfer ownership to the land 
back to the Crown. The government now subdivided the 
commonage as a prelude to evicting the 300 to 400 squatters. 
(87) 
This was still the position when ANC members in Carnarvon 
sent a deputation to the ANC in Cape Town to ask for help. 
James Thaele was sent to investigate the problem, as well as 
complaints about the strict, but vague location regulations. 
(88) He was also to try and strengthen the organisation at 
Carnarvon. 
After his arrival he met with the location superintendent, 
the town clerk, the local police and the magistrate to 
attempt to clarify the issues, but met with very little 
success. The reportback meeting on the Saturday was much 
more successful, though, and about 200 people attended. He 
expounded at great length on the need for unity amongst all 
the black people, and on the various ways in which whites 
tried to subvert this unity: 
There are only two colours never mind 
the shades, I am going to call you all 
my people . . . the 'wi tman' goes to 
the Native and tells him he must not 
associate with the Hottentot and Bushmen 
they are below your social standing, the 
Native turns away from the Bushman and 
Hottentot with his head blown up with 
very great ideas that he is better than 
they are, because the white man said so. 
The same white·man goes to the Hottentot 
and Bushman and tells them that they 
must not take notice of the Coolie 
because he has just come here to fill 
his pocket with money and then he clears 
off to his country, the Bushman and 
Hottentot likewise turn away with the 
same great idea that he is better than 
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the Coolie because the white man said 
so. This is the same white man who 
tells you that there is only one bible 
and one heaven, he merely tries his best 
to keep you apart and to prevent you 
from organising, while at the same time 
the Jew, Italian, Irishman, Scotchman 
and Hollander all stick together and do 
their best to organise. (89) 
Although he praised the resistance of the people of India 
and China to colonial rule, his ideas for the liberation of 
South Africa were a rather vague mixtuie of passive 
resistance and millenarianism: 
Slow but sure Africa is coming to you. 
Let the white man make all his machine 
guns, airoplanes {sic} and submarines it 
is his business, and when he comes with 
these to you put your hands in your 
pocket. 
We will have a Black Republic and 
black government in Africa before long, 
and without guns, only continue to sing 
that one song and watch the African 
National Congress, there is no other 
power between heaven and earth to upset 
it 
We must call a convention, and by 
constitutional means, in another 20 to 
35 years time we will put all the 
whitemen into one pot and whip them with 
the double whip with which they are 
whipping us today, and will then tell 
them to go back to where they came from. 
About 20 white civilians attended the meeting, and at one 
stage they tried to break it up, but they were restrained by 
the policemen who also attended. 
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Thaele addressed at least two other meetings during the 
weekend, one on Saturday evening at a private house and the 
other a public meeting attended by 250 to 300 people. Again 
there were about 20 whites present who 
were dis~atisf ied with the utterances 
and made some very strong remarks about 
it. 
On Monday morning Thaele had an appointment to see the 
Mayor, Colonel van Zyl, about the land issue. It is of 
interest to note that Colonel van Zyl, an attorney who had 
been Mayor for 30 years, was in his own words, 
the largest Opstalhouer. On the 
Carnarvon outer Commage there are a 
large number of native squatters who 
have no right on the Commonage. 
Unfortunately these men squat on a 
portion of the land which will belong to 
me when the survey is completed. (90) 
Thus he had been in the forefront of the struggle to evict 
the squatters and there was little love lost between him and 
the squatters. When Thaele arrived at the Mayor's office 
with a following of 150 people mostly women and children, he 
was referred to the municipal office. The mayor delivered a 
lecture on the "uneducated natives", but refused to listen 
to Thaele unless he first apologies for his speeches. 
Thaele refused, and was attempting to explain his actions 
when 
uproar {broke out} ... started by some 
Europeans who tackled Thaele. The 
natives {outside - WH} used knobkieries 
and smashed the door of the off ice. 
Two natives hit out at the Mayor who had 
time to dodge but received a cut on the 
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forehead. Thereupon a fight ensued in 
which many natives and Europeans were 
hurt. (91) 
Many of the whites were armed with pickaxe handles and 
railway droppers which they collected outside, while chairs 
and knobk ier ies were freely used. The fighting ended when 
the blacks retreated from the off ice and gave the police an 
opportunity to separate the groups. Soon thereafter, 
according to the local police commander, 
the whole town was full of reckless 
youngsters with rifles issued to them by 
the {Defence - WH} Rifle Association, 
and school cadets, ••• I ••• had 
considerable trouble with the Europeans 
who at this stage just wanted to attack. 
(92) 
Although the police managed to avert the attack on the 
location by threatening to arrest the whole crowd, the 
magistrate added to the tension by commandeering about 30 
people to serve as "special constables". They joined dozens 
of armed whites roaming the streets, "guarding" the town 
against attack. 
By the evening, however, the District Commandant of Police 
arrived from Beaufort West and almost immediately took steps 
to restore peace. Interestingly these measures fell most 
harshly on the white population. The special police were 
disbanded the next morning, and the police 
collected a number of rifles from men, 
who were walking about the streets with 
them. ( 93) 
The only immediate measures taken against the blacks, were 
to hold meetings in the location where they were assured 
that there would be no attack on them from the whites, and 
warned not to offer any provocation. Two blacks were also 
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arrested for their part in the violence, allegedly to 
prevent white vigilantes from trying to arrest them and 
causing trouble. Once peace had been restored, however, 
Samuel de Bruyn and several others were charged with public 
violence and assault, (94) despite the fact that a later 
police report clearly stated that 
It is, I think, common knowledge that 
the riot of 13/3/1930 was largely due to 
European interference. (95) 
Thaele and 10 others were also charged with incitement to 
public violence. (96) In the second trial, all the accused 
were found not guilty as the State failed to prove intent. 
(97) The outcome of the first trial is not known. Thaele 
was further charged under the hostility clause of the Native 
Administration Act, (98) found guilty and sentenced to a 
fine of £15 or three months hard labour. (99) 
Although there were periodic visits by ANC organisers after 
these events, (100) it seems that the organisation remained 
at a low level inbetween these visits. In the course of 
1930, there were, nevertheless, a number of "scares" with 
rumours circulating that the "natives ... are threatening to 
take cert a i n p e op 1 e ' s 1 i v es " . (101) 
VII RAWSONVILLE: 'AN EYE FOR AN EYE' 
The fighting and the relative lack of success of the legal 
apparatus to deal with the ANC, only increased the resolve 
of the farmers to smash the ANC(WP) by violence. Thus the 
Cape Times commented that it was clear that the "Europeans 
are determined to stand no further nonsense from the 
natives". (102) 
The ANC(WP) on the other hand, renewed its resolve not to be 
intimidated. A large meeting at Worcester expressed its 
dismay that "white hooligans" who often started the 
fighting, were seldom "brought to book" and decided that 
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it should in the future be the policy of 
the African National Congress to adopt 
the Mosaic policy of retaliation -
'tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye'. 
{103) 
Although Carnarvon was too far away to take effective 
countermeasures, this new resolve would be evident at the 
next confrontation at Rawsonville. 
I.n February the ANC(WP) held a meeting at Rawsonville at 
which the usual demands were voiced, especially for 
increased wages. The current wage of 2s 6d per day was 
much too low, they'declared, and their wives had to work as 
domestics to supplement the family income. The time had 
come for white housewives to do their own dirty work. (104) 
Eventually some whites broke up the meeting on the village 
ground, but it was continued at a nearby black church. A 
spokesperson for the farmers declared that 
Naturally this {demand for increased 
wages - WH} upset our townsfolk and they 
decided that these gatherings would have 
to cease. { 105) 
The police, however, refused to stop the meetings and the 
farmers then decided that they would take matters into their 
own hands. {106) The ANC was equally determined to have 
another meeting and again tried the tactic of bringing 
supporters from Worcester and Cape Town. They managed to 
hire three lorries and packed them with 60 people for a 
meeting on 9 March. The meeting was successful, although a 
large group of about 60 whites arrived and ordered the 
meeting to disperse. This warning was ignored and the 
' meeting eventually ended peacefully. But as people were 
about to leave, the whites, described by the Worcester 
magistrate as "irresponsible European lads", assaulted a 
coloured man who allegedly swore at them. Soon stones were 
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thrown and knives flashed as a full scale fight erupted in 
which one white man was nearly throttled,_and 13 were 
injured. Two coloured 1nen were also injured. ( 107) 
A more serious development was the claims by Peter 
vumazonke, new secretary of the Worcester branch, and Martin 
Runeli, leader of the ANC "bodyguard", that they were shot 
at by civilians. (108) One of the farmers admitted that he 
"fired two shots in the air", although the police reported 
him as saying that "ek gaan hulle nou skiet". (109) But as 
was almost invariably the case, it was only the ANC members 
that were prosecuted. The leader of the ANC at Rawsonville, 
David Cornelius, and his son, August, were arrested and 
charged with public violence. The charges were later 
withdrawn. (110) No whites were charged, although the 
newspapers reported that 
the police report throws the blame for 
causing the trouble on the Europeans. 
(111) 
At the same time another incident occurred that made it 
clear that the farmers were on the offensive. 
Tonjeni arrived at Barrydale with 20 ANC members from 
Mon tagu to hold meetings. ( 112) The loca 1 pol icemen warned 
him not to hold any meetings until police reinforcements 
could be summoned to keep the peace. Tonjeni refused and 
the meeting began under a barrage of heckling from about 30 
whites, restrained only with difficulty by the single 
policeman. Eventually the meeting was adjourned till the 
next day. The next morning Tonjeni was pulled out of bed by 
50 armed farmers and given two hours to leave tbwn or be 
killed. He ignored the warning, despite the policeman's 
plea that he was unable to protect him. Soon thereafter a 
lorry and several cars filled with whites abducted him at 
gunpoint and dropped him several miles outside Barrydale 
with a warning never to return. 
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The battle lines were now clearly drawn. On the one hand 
were the farmers who stated that 
In future ... we will not allow any 
organisation to hold political meetings 
on Sundays. If our farmers mishandled 
their employees or were underpaying 
them, there might have been some excuse. 
The agitator's allegations are totally 
unfounded .and the {Rawsonville Village 
Management - WH} Board is determined, 
law or no law to prohibit any gatherings 
of natives on Sundays more especially 
when the purpose of such a meeting is to 
incite our employees to insubordination. 
(113} 
A hundred Rawsonville farmers, determined to take matters 
into their own hands, met to discuss the situation. They 
rejected the proposal of the Worcester District Commandant 
of Police that the whole matter should be left in the hands 
of the police. But they were unable to come up with a 
coherent strategy of their own. Several farmers suggested a 
blacklist of all farm labourers belonging to the ANC, but 
others pointed out that this would be "unpracticable" due to 
the farm labour shortage. ( 114) 
The confidence of the farmers was, however, boosted when the 
Minister of Justice authorised the Worcester magistrate to 
ban meetings over the next weekend in Rawsonville, Barrydale 
and Bonnie vale. ( 115) 
The ANC, on the other hand, was determined to return to 
Barrydale and Rawsonville in force, while meetings were also 
planned for Montagu, Robertson, Swellendam and Worcester. 
(116) But the pressure of the farmers and the consequent 
escalation in violence were beginning to tell on the 
alliance between the militants and moderates. (117) 
Apparently on his own initiative, James Thaele had assured 
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the Worcester District Commandant that no further meetings 
would be held and that 
he had instructed all natives and branch 
secretaries, as well as his brother, 
Kennon, that the meetings {planned for 
the weekend - WH} were to be stopped at 
any costs, as they did not want trouble. 
(118) 
The militants, and even Kennon Thaele, were not at all happy 
about this action, arguing that such a decision should be 
made by the full "cabinet" (executive) of the ANC(WP), 
comprising the Thaeles, Ndobe, Tonjeni and Jacobus Darries 
from Bonnievale. 
planned. 
(119) They were determined to carry on as 
There were also divisions about whether the ANC should try 
to organise in Rawsoriville again. Tonjeni and Kennon Thaele 
were determined that a branch should be opened, but it was 
reported that many people, presumably led by the moderates, 
were against further at tempts. ( 120) 
The divisions in the leadership, combined with the bans on 
the meetings and the mass intimidation, took their toll. No 
meetings took place, except in Worcester where Tonjeni and 
Kennon Thaele held the usual meeting in defiance of both 
James Thaele and the fact that 
·,. 
{m}ounted police, armed with revolvers, 
patrolled the Worcester streets. (121) 
Armed police and civilians were, in fact, much in evidence 
everywhere. Many farmers were declaring that no meetings of 
the ANC would be allowed, and were "openly threatening to 
kill native agitators". Barrydale farmers even managed to 
find a new method of intimidation - a "shooting competition" 
was hastily arranged and 200 heavily armed farmers came to 
the town to take part. They defied a call by the police to 
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disperse and eventually a co1~romise was reached whereby the 
farmers were allowed to watch and take action if the police 
did not do so! 
The bourgeois press immediately seized on the lack of 
meetings and proclaimed that the end of the ANC was at hand. 
(122) In fact the ANC was never seriously weakened by the 
direct repression and intimidation of farmers. It might 
even have served to strengthen the organisation, giving it a 
greater sense of cohesion and a clear, identifiable enemy to 
tackle. Certainly its defiance of farmers and the personal 
bravery of its leaders merely enhanced its prestige. 
VIII THE STATE INTERVENES 
The farmers were also weakened by the fact that the state 
had maintained a relatively neutral stance in the struggle 
up to that stage. The police were mostly concerned with 
keeping the peace when things became violent. They often 
ignored appeals from farmers to act against ANC members, 
stating that it was perfectly legal and even desirable for 
them to state their views and grievances openly. Thus even 
after the fighting in Robertson, the Worcester police 
decided not to request a ban on all meetings - they wanted 
rather to attend meetings to find out what the grievances 
were. (123) It was only when physical violence broke out, 
that the police fought on the side of the farmers and showed 
where their sympathies lay by prosecuting only ANC members. 
The Worcester magistrate banned a meeting for the first time 
as late as March 1930, and even then banned both black and 
white meetings as he was concerned not to give the 
impression that he was taking sides in the struggle between 
the farmers and the ANC, and 
to show the natives that no 
discrimination is being made between 
white and black. 
t 
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Even the Minister of Justice, the notorious Oswald Pirow, 
did not grant permission for bannings lightly and wanted 
confirmation that it was really necessary. (124) It is not 
quite clear why the state took this attitude. At this stage 
one can only suggest some possibilities. 
In the first place one can point to a dislocation between 
the upper and middle ranks of the state apparatus. With the 
change in hegemony in the state in the 1920's, the National 
Party had taken control of the upper levels of the state 
administration. It was not possible, however, to transform 
the whole state apparatus within a few years, and many lower 
level officials were still imbued with the ideology of 
previous hegemonic class, viz imperialist capital. In this 
ideology, the legitimation function of the state (125) was 
still extremely important, especially as the struggle in the 
rural areas did not pose an immediate threat to their 
interests. 
Beinart has also pointed out the specificity of the local 
state in the Cape in contrast to the rest of the country: 
he argues that in the Cape one can talk of a tradition of a 
'listening state'. Local representatives of the state, and 
especially magistrates, played a crucial role in keeping the 
central state in touch with the mood and demands of the 
rural popular classes and in shaping the responses to any 
attempt at popular organisation. (126) In general this is 
how the Worcester magistrate saw his role and even the 
police tended to share this conception. 
This ideology was strongly supported and reinforced by the 
capitalist press which attacked "irresponsible actions" by 
white civilians and urged the state to remain neutral. (127) 
This attitude would change later as the rural struggle 
became increasingly violent. 
In the second place, the farmers were initially confident of 
their ability to repress the organisation on their own, and 
did not exert very great pressure on the state to intervene 
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on their behalf. 
This situation began to change as the rural struggle 
escalated when the ANC attempted to resist the intimidation. 
As showed above, during the weekend of 15 and 16 March three 
meetings were banned and the police patrolled many towns to 
"keep the peace". The farmers were also beginning to 
realise that despite all their use of force and 
intimidation, they could not defeat the organisation on 
their own. The ANC went from strength to strength despite 
the weight of repression. 
However, the farmers were also a powerful section of the 
ruling class, and they were able to exert great pressure on 
the state to intervene on their behalf. As early as 
September 1929 the political representatives of the farmers 
had pushed through a motion at the Cape Congress of the 
National Party urging the state to take stricter steps 
against the ANC. (128) This pressure was one of the main 
factors in the introduction of the amended Riotous 
Assemblies Bill at the beginning of 1930. (129) 
At the same time the relative neutrality of the middle 
levels of the state apparatus also began to change gradually 
under the pressure both from the farmers and the increased 
hostility of the ANC(WP). As late as the beginning of 1930 
the police at Carnarvon had been able to report that they 
were 
pleased to say that the Public generally 
- Europeans, Natives and Coloured have 
the greatest confidence in the Police, 
who therefore have every reason to be 
optimistic about matters in general. 
( 130) 
From the side o.f the ANC(WP) itself there was at least a 
tacit recognition that the police were relatively neutral. 
While the farmers were frequently abused at meetings, 
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similar attacks on the police were much less common in that 
period. Even when the police were criticised, it was mostly 
for their role in prosecuting ANC members with greater 
vigour than white offenders. (131) There were even cases 
where organisers reported their presence to the police when 
they arrived in a town. (132) 
The attitude of the ANC(WP) began to change as the police 
became more directly involved in repression and by the end 
of 1930 the police were regularly referred to as "Pirow's 
dogs". The events that precipitated this dramatic worsening 
of relations were connected especially with discontent at 
the role of the police in the enforcement of unpopular laws. 
The most unpopular of these laws were the various liquor 
laws prohibiting home brewing of beer and the consumption of 
hard liquor by Africans. This resulted in widespread 
illegal brewing of beer and illegal sales of hard liquor. 
These laws were the source of much discontent and had 
already resulted in a widespread boycot of municipal beer 
halls in Durban in 1929. (133). Regular liquor raids were 
needed to enforce these laws, especially in the Western 
Province where the entrenched tot system had resulted in 
widespread alcoholism. The farmers were prepared to go to 
great lengths to maintain their monopoly over the supply of 
liquor. ( 134) 
On the whole the ANC(WP) had a rather ambiguous policy on 
liquor. Many of the leaders like Tonjeni were teetotallers 
and they condemned "intemperance and loose living" on the 
part of Congress officials. (135) At almost every meeting 
they agitated for the abolition of the tot system and 
condemned the evils of alcohol. The demand for the 
abolition of the tot system gave rise to a rather ironic 
situation with some farmers arguing that the African and 
Coloured people would never co-operate since the Africans 
were against the tot system! (136) On the other hand the 
ANC recognised that prohibition was not feasible and they 
regarded the traditional home brewed beer as prefer~ble to 
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other forms of liquor. Thus the ANC always condemned liquor 
raids as yet another form of oppression. 
One such raid was to precipitate the more direct involvement 
of the state in repression. On Saturday 5 April the police 
.conducted a routine early morning raid in the Parker Street 
"location" in Worcester. The four unarmed policemen and 2 
civilians expected to find the location asleep. But an ANC 
tea party had just ended and the "location was still astir". 
(137) The raiders soon met with resistance 
and in a few minutes the narrow street 
was crowded with a belligerent crowd of 
natives and coloureds. A fight started 
and bottles, knobkieries and sticks were 
freely used by the mob. (138) 
Apparently the sergeant had sent the other 2 policemen ahead 
with 3 prisoners. He and the civilians were trying to 
retrieve their bicycles from the yard of a certain James 
Bob, when the crowd attacked them. Bob was later found 
guilty of leading the attack. (139) They narrowly escaped 
after one of the civilians had fired a dozen shots at the 
crowd. The sergeant suffered 3 deep cuts in the head and 
several bruises, while 2 Africans were seriously injured. 
One of them, Johnson Jidi, an ex-ANC member, died 2 weeks 
later. The shots angered the crowd even more, 
and only the intervention of Elliot 
Tonjeni ... prevented a strong body of 
natives there and then from swarming 
into the European quarters to 'avenge 
the corpses of our compatriots'. (140) 
The next morning in the location 
the street was {still} crowded with 
natives and coloured people carrying 
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sticks and knobkieries. They were in a 
truculent mood. 
But the crowd was fairly quiet when Tonjeni was present as 
he appeared 
to have absolute authority over the 
location residents. 
Tonjeni alleged that one of the civilians returned after the 
fighting and tried to kill him and some other people. The 
man was in fact later convicted of firing at Tonjeni and 
discharging his rifle in a public place. The magistrate 
praised him for his public spiritedness and he received a 
token fine of Ss, perhaps as Tonjeni commented later, not 
for shooting at him, but for missing! (141) 
In the aftermath of the fighting, the level of militancy in 
the location was increased even further. When Captain 
Barter with eight well-armed policemen came to collect the 
mangled bicycles, they were greeted with "shouts of abuse 
instead of the usual silence". 
In the aftermath of the raid, the police were actually 
forced to announce that they would not be entering the 
location for fear of provoking the inhabitants. The whole 
affair gave the police a sense of insecurity as it seemed 
that 
no police constable dare to enter this 
locality during the weekend debauch, 
without running a great risk of attack 
and subsequent trouble (142) 
and it seems that it was at this stage that the state and 
especially the police started to press for firmer action 
against the ANC(WP). 
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IX 'ALL QUIET ON THE WORCESTER FRONT' 
After the liquor raid and the subsequent fighting, the 
situation in Worcester was extremely tense. Although whites 
were reported to be "not uneasy", a new record number of 
permits for fire-arms and ammunition was issued by the 
Worcester magistrate each week. Special police detachments 
were stationed in Worcester, Rawsonville and Barrydale, 
while special telephone lines were ar.ranged for the use of 
the police. In fact, Umsebenzi could say with some 
justification that the Boland was being turned into an 
"armed camp". (143) 
The ANC on the other hand, continued to organise in new 
areas. Tonjeni was invited by 40 people in Ladismith to 
form a new branch there. He was also active in the 
Barrydale area where he claimed 30 new members, while he was 
said to have secured the support of 
practically all the men {sic} of 
zuurbraak, a coloured village 15 miles 
away. (144) 
The militants were also anxious to return to Rawsonville and 
Barrydale in force and they planned to use the long weekend 
over Easter, 18-21 April, for this purpose. Once again deep 
divisions emerged within the ANC over this issue. James 
Thaele opposed the holding of meetings at Rawsonville and 
Barrydale, as this would probably lead to a confrontation 
with the farmers. He wanted to consult with pirow before 
any hasty decisions were made. A lengthy meeting attended 
by branches from "Simonstown to Swellendam" was held at 
Worcester on Thursday night, 17 April, but it was unable to 
resolve the issue and another meeting was scheduled for the 
next night. The position of the militants was, however, 
weakened by the absence of Tonjeni and Ndobe who were the 
official delegates of the ANC(WP) at the ANC national 
conference in Bloemfontein. (145) 
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Although Thaele's "influence" was reported to be "waning", 
he managed to force a compromise that a meeting would be 
held at Barrydale only. However, it turned out that the 
hire of lorries would be prohibitively expensive and the 
plan was dropped. Eventually it was decided to walk the 
approximately 15 km to Rawsonville to hold a meeting th~re, 
but this idea was also abandoned as it was already too late. 
( 146) It is not clear why an ear lier plan to make use of 
the cheaper excursion fares on the Railways was not followed 
up. 
These divisions also affected meetings in the other centres 
and in Worcester it was reported that the meetings were 
poorly attended. Again the press hopefully proclaimed the 
end of the ANC under headlines like "All quiet on the 
Worcester front", a reference to the popular film at the 
time, "All Quiet on the Western Front", based on the 
remarkable book by E. Remarque. The military analogy 
illustrates the level of bitterness which which both sides 
were waging the rural struggle at the time. 
But this "collapse" of the ANC was no more than wishful 
thinking on the part of the bourgeois press. As soon as 
Tonjeni and Ndobe returned from Bloemfontein, the ANC 
resolved to show its strength. 
The local, mainly coloured, petty bourgeoisie had sought to 
capitalise on the defeat of the ANC by arranging a public 
meeting at which the Mayor and other prominent white 
citizens would address the coloured community on the need 
for co-operation and "for a better understanding". ( 147) 
The meeting was held in the Town Hall under the chairmanship 
of one of the organisers. (148) 
Contrary to rumours that it would boycott the meeting, the 
ANC decided to turn it into a show of strength and turned up 
with hundreds of supporters. As the meeting commenced, 
Tonjeni demanded that English and Xhosa interpreters be 
provided. The mayor declared that the meeting was only for 
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coloured people, but this caused an uproar amongst the 500 
strong audience and a Xhosa interpreter was eventuall.1 
provided. The mayor was, however, forced to stop his speech 
when he was "howled down", and a similar fate befell his· 
deputy when he refused to answer "political" questions put 
by Tonjeni. After a few more speeches had been disrupted or 
stopped by the crowd, Tonjeni and Ndobe rose and 
"harangued" the crowd for 15 minutes. 
When ordered to stop, they declared 
their intention of not trying to pacify 
the crowd and left the meeting. Mounted 
on the benches, the crowd sang the 
Congress' anthem and shook knobkieries 
threateningly and derisively at 
Europeans on the platform. (149) 
The platform speakers were warned to leave by the police and 
were smuggled out t.hrough the back door, while the chairman 
spent the night at the police station for fear of being 
at tacked. The crowd then marched back to the location, 
singing the Congress anthem and allegedly assaulting a group 
of white youths. 
The next day was 1 May and the ANC had arranged a meeting 
for the evening to celebrate May Day and protest against the 
Riotous Assemblies Act. Samuel Hendricks had applied for 
permission for the ANC to hold the meeting in Parker Street 
and to stage a protest march. ( 150) The latter request was 
refused, but when the meeting started in a heavy drizzle at 
half past six, there were apparently no police present to 
en force the ban. (151) Despite the ban and the rain, the 
ANC was determined to march: 
'We will march through the streets' said 
one {speaker - WH} 'and if anybody 
interferes with us, we will kill him. 
Rather let us die under the Congress 
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banner than in the slavery of the 
Europeans ' . ( 152) 
As the crowd marched through Parker Street, it quickly grew 
from about 100 to about 400 people. Apparently a certain Mr 
Lange angered the crowd when he attempted to drive through 
the procession. He and the other two occupants narrowly 
escaped after the crowd attacked the car. The crowd then 
briefly went on the rampage, breaking the windows of several 
shops and houses, before dispersing of its own accord at 
about eight o'clock. (153) 
These events further increased the deterillination of the 
police to take tougher action. The next day, on Friday 2 
May, a senior police officer, Major Thomas, was sent from 
Cape Town to investigate the position. It was clear that he 
had instructions to enforce a tougher policy against the 
ANC(WP) - for example in his evidence at the subsequent 
inquest into the fighting that erupted on May 4: 
The Magistrate: Why was it so necessary 
{to arrest an African who had taken a 
leading part in an attack on the police 
- WH} - Because Worcester had been a 
storm centre. Many disturbances had 
arisen and there was a dangerous spirit 
in the location. This man with his 
companion had constantly flouted the 
authority of the police and it was 
necessary to assert this authority. We 
had taken every measure to conciliate 
them without avail. It was necessary to 
show them that we were not afraid to 
enter the location to arrest people on a 
serious charge ••• If the 15 men and 
the District Commandant cannot in broad 
daylight go into the location to make an 
arrest there is a pretty bad state of 
affairs. (154) 
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When Thomas attended an ANC meeting on Sunday morning, he 
was clearly determined to find an opportunity to reassert 
the authority of the police. He found the opportunity soo~ 
enough, when it was reported to him that a certain "chief" 
Manzini had earlier paraded on the outskirts of the meeting 
with a rifle. (155) It emerged later that Manzini had 
earlier been a member of the CID for some years, leading to 
allegations that the police had in fact set up the whole 
incident. The truth will probably never be known, but 
Manzini was subsequently released without being charged, so 
that at least in one sense, it was a deliberate provocation. 
(156) 
Thomas ordered Manzini's arrest, but he was obviously aware 
of the provocative nature of this act, and proceeded 
carefully. The police enticed Manzini (who no longer had 
the.rifle) away from the crowd of about 300, then bundled 
him into a car and took him to the police station, while 
Thomas and one policeman remained behind. But the crowd had 
noticed the capture of Manzini and became angry. 
No sooner had the motor car disappeared 
than the crowd rushed the police 
of·f icers who were compelled to make a 
dash for safety and seek shelter in 
cottages on Grey Street. (157) 
Although they were armed with one revolver, even Thomas 
acknowledged that their lives were probably saved by 
Plaatjes and three of the ANC "bodyguard" (Hendrik and David 
Aspeling and Norman) who came to their aid and enabled them 
to seek shelter in a cottage. They were eventually rescued 
under a hail of stones by the returning police car~ 
The police now decided to take firm action. All 18 
policemen in Worcester were gathered and issued with rifles 
and bayonets. Barter ordered that 
each man was to take deliberate aim at a 
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man attacking the police and to fire to 
hit him. (158) 
There was to be no warning shots, or shooting over the 
heads, as it might "injure innocents"! The police then 
fixed bayonets and marched down Parker Street towards the 
crowd which had grown to about 500, (159) with the intention 
of arresting Abel Simpi who had been in the forefront of the 
previous attack. Apparently he was a habitual criminal who 
had been out of jail for less than five years since 1906, 
and was a new arrival in Worcester. He subsequently became 
something of a folk hero in the Boland, hiding from the 
police and supported by farm workers for more than 10 weeks 
despite a massive manhunt. His presence was eventually 
betrayed by a young child in return for some sweets. ( 160) 
The crowd was obviously in an angry mood and was shouting 
"Korn aan! Die pad is oop". (161) Then 
Constable Walters, who had been injured 
in the fight following the police raid, 
and another constable went forward to 
arrest a native {Simpi - WH} They 
handcuffed him and Walters was stabbed 
just below the ribs. His assailant 
fell a second later with a bullet in his 
body. A volley was fired at the crowd, 
which was composed of men and women ••. 
The crowd rushed the police, who poured 
a steady volley at them. Here one fell, 
there another, some kicking and 
screaming, others lying very still. 
Captain Barter, who was in the front of 
his men, was felled to the ground and a 
native flayed one side of his face from 
ear to ear with an axe. The native was 
shot ••• A native woman hit Captain 
Barter across the throat, but the police 
surrounded their chief, and drove the 
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crowd back with bayonets. Stones were 
raining on them, but they assisted 
Captain Barter to his feet and half 
carrying him and Walters, they slowly 
retreated. ( 162) 
The crowd did not try to follow the police. The affair had 
started at about five and was over within 10 minutes. The 
firing had lasted only about two minutes and 32 rifle and 33 
revolver shots had been fired at the crowd. 
The injuries of the wounded were 
terrible - arms had been shattered, legs 
fractured and heads partially shot away. 
(163) 
Five people, all except one ANC members, were killed, 16 
seriously injured and many slightly injured. Another person 
died some weeks later. (164) 
Afterwards the whole of Worcester was in uproar and 
repression reached unprecedented levels. The state was 
mobilising all its resources. Police reinforcements were 
secretly rushed in from Cape Town, Paarl and other areas and 
by midnight there were over 90 policemen in Worcester. A 
hundred armed civilians, members of the Defence Rifle 
Association were also on standby. 
Hundreds of white civilians also gathered at the police 
station during the night and demanded that further action be 
taken. But they were also quite prepared to take the law 
into their own hands. Umsebenzi reported that: 
a mob of armed white hooligans took 
charge of the town. They assualted a 
number of Native and Coloured people but 
their main object seems to have been to 
lay their hands on Ndobe and Tonjeni. 
(165) 
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Later that night one of the police drivers who had rushed 
police reinforcements to Worcester returned to the police 
station. He reported that he had been "stormed" by a group 
of Africans when he stopped at a culvert outside Worcester, 
but had managed to escape. A group of 50 white civilians 
then commandeered this lorry and charged the culvert, where 
stones were thrown at them, but they were unable to find 
their assailants. Eventually they came upon an African man 
and woman with a motor-cycle and proceeded to beat up the 
man until the police came to his rescue. 
Early the next morning, the first of a series of "shows of 
strength" took place, when 50 armed police and a tear gas 
bomber accompanied by a mass of armed civilians, raided 
Parker Street in search of the "ringleaders" whom they 
wanted to capture "at al 1 cos ts." ( 166) 
It is a tribute to the strength of the ANC organisation in 
Worcester that Ndobe and Tonjeni were able to hide for the 
next four days while 
citizens, white detectives and coloured 
'trap boys' prowled about trying to 
establish their whereabouts. (167) 
Eventually they were smuggled out of Worcester by 2 Cape 
Town communists, Eddie Roux and Johnny Gomas in the boot of 
a borrowed car. ( 168) In fact, they were remarkably lucky 
to escape with their lives as threats to lynch them abounded 
and they were unable to venture into Worcester for several 
weeks afterwards. They and Plaatjes had been at the ANC 
hall at the time of the f ighting1 which was fortunate for 
them as they were well known to the police who had explicit 
instructions to shoot at the so-called "ringleaders". 
(169) 
In the following weeks the massive onslaught on the ANC 
continued at all levels. The police held daily parades in 
Parker Street to encourage those "intimidated by ANC 
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members", and also made the first ever daylight liquor raid 
carried out by 36 armed police and a teargas bomber. (170) 
The Railways at Worcester were reported to be dismissing all 
ANC members but they later denied this. The farmers 
intensified their searches of their labourers to try and 
identify ANC members, but as pointed out earlier, only one 
Farmers' Association was reported to have instituted an 
official blacklist. (171) Even the nurses at the Worcester 
hospital became involved in the struggle. The Matron said 
that 
she and her staff were determined not to 
look after non-Europeans wounded in the 
fight, and were even prepared to resign 
their positions if ordered to do so. 
(172) 
Initially the weight of the repression had some effect. 
During the first police raid it was reported that Parker 
Street was very quiet and that nobody was wearing ANC 
badges, armlets or hatbands. But within a week the ANC was 
again able to hold a meeting in Worcester in spite of the 
repression and intimidation. Although the meeting started 
with a mere 10 people, the crowd increased rapidly, only to 
dwindle again when 26 police arme_d with rifles and fixed 
bayonets paraded around the meeting. Kennon Thaele 
continued with the meeting, however, and after half an hour, 
the police left. Although there were still many armed 
civilians about, the crowd increased again to over 200 
people, many sporting ANC badges. The determination of the 
ANC to continue the struggle was expressed by Peter 
vumazonke: 
If you want to get your rights, you must 
be prepared to wash your hands in blood 
instead of water. ( 17 3} 
Tonjeni, addressing a big protest meeting on the Parade also 
made it clear that the ANC would not be deterred by 
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repression. He 
urged his audience to cultivate in 
itself the realisation that no subject 
race in the world has been freed from 
bondage without bloodshed. 
He said that they would all die anyway and should not grieve 
for the Worcester dead who gave their lives for liberty. 
(174) 
The next week the ANC again held a meeting at Worcester. 
This time the people were not cowed by the presence of 20 
armed police and soon there were well over 200 people 
present. (175) The Worcester Standard and Advertiser even 
suggested that it was the biggest ANC meeting to date, (176) 
but this seems doubtful. The speakers were mainly concerned 
with the findings of the inquest which had absolved the 
police of all blame, and they demanded another inquest. 
The symbolic importance of these meetings can be gauged from 
the fact that when there was no meeting the next weekend, 
probably because of the absence of the ANC leaders, the Cape 
Times again suggested that the ANC was "waning", except 
perhaps amongst the women, who were the "most loyal 
supporters". In fact James Thaele held a meeting in 
Robertson while Tonjeni and Ndobe - still afraid to return 
to Worcester - spoke at a protest against the Riotous 
Assemblies Bill in Ndabeni. ( 177) 
Thereafter the ANC continued to organise and despite the 
ocntinued presence of armed police and civilians and the 
press reported that "record crowds" were flocking to ANC 
meetings. (178) 
X NEW FORMS OF REPRESSION: THE RIOTOUS ASSEMBLIES ACT 
However, there were two developments that would lead to a 
serious decline in the fortunes of the ANC(WP) in the . 
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Boland. Firstly, the state and the farmers began to realise 
that sheer repression and violence would not crush the 
ANC(WP), and that it was necessary to try a new strategy. 
Secondly, there was the increasing breakdown in the alliance 
between the moderates and the militants. 
As discussed above, the Cape Congress of the National Party 
had already advocated sterner measures against the ANC in 
1929. This pressure, combined with those of the Natal 
farmers who were worried about the ICU, led to the amendment 
of the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1913 during the course of 
1930. (179) 
The amendment made provision for more subtle methods of 
repression to be used against popular organisations 
instead of trying to crush them directly, the state could 
now prevent them from holding meetings or could bar their 
leaders from certain areas. 
From the introduction of the Bill, the ANC campaigned 
actively against it. It was raised at virtually all 
meetings and numerous resolutions were pass.ed condemning the 
Bill. This was part of a campaign encompassing the ~vhole of 
the left - from the Labour Party to the CP, but unlike most 
of the other organisations, the ANC(WP) intended to take 
militant action to prevent the implementation of the Act. 
Tonjeni told the Cape Times that 
{a}t the present time and for some 
months past our organisation has been 
accumulating funds for a general strike 
of non-Europeans. our resistance, 
however, will be purely passive. We are 
strong enough to disorganise the country 
without resorting to force, and an 
industrial and agricultural strike will 
be our protest against the proposed blow 
at the freedom of speech. (180) 
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The ANC(WP) delegates also made this proposal at the 
national ANC conference in Bloemfontein in April, but it was 
overwhelmingly rejected. (181) This strike was apparently 
planned to start on Saturday 31 May, to coincide with the 
passing of the Act, but in the press there is little mention 
of any further planning for the strike except to say that it 
did not materialise. (182) 
The ANC(WP) also pressed the the ANC to take part in the 
campaign and proposed a strike, but without success. In the 
Western Cape there were a number of protest meetings against 
the Act, followed by a big demonstration outside Parliament. 
(183) 
It is to these "new" methods of repression provided by the 
Riotous Assemblies Act that the state turned in the struggle 
against the ANC(WP). As soon as the Act was passed in June 
1930, the Minister of Justice banned all political meetings 
on Sundays in the Boland, i.e. in the magisterial districts 
of Worcester, Robertson, Montagu, Barrydale and Swellendarn 
as from Sunday 22 June. ( 184) In view of the importance of 
Sunday meetings to the organisation, (185) it was essential 
that the ANC find an effective strategy to deal with these 
bans. 
The ANC was clearly determined that the ban would be 
resisted in some way. Kennon Thaele declared that 
We have been sent out to see that those 
meetings will be held. We have property 
in Worcester, and will hold our 
meetings. I want the authorities to put 
me in_gaol, so that I can organise the 
non-Europeans there. (186) 
The eventual strategy that they decided on was one of 
arranging a big show of strength, but no direct 
confrontation with the state. This was to be achieved by 
holding a meeting on the ~irst day of the ban, 22 June at 
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the ANC hall. As this was private property, it was not 
affected by the ban on public meetings. The ANC had earlier 
purchased several properties in anticipation of a ban on 
public meetings. (187) 
Meetings were held nearly every night that week in 
preparation for the Sunday meeting and it was reported that 
"enthusiasm was at a high pitch". The meeting proved to be 
the high point of the ANC organisation in Worcester. (188) 
Between 500 and 800 people attended the meeting, which 
spilled over into the street adjoining the hall. The 
opposition also came out in force. Despite repeated 
requests from the police and magistrate that no whites 
should attend, more than 500 whites, many of them armed, 
gathered on the fringes of the meeting and had to be 
constantly controlled by the many policemen present. 
At about five o'clock, nearly three hours after the meeting 
started, the police moved in and arrested James Thaele who 
was the speaker at the time. Thaele agreed to leave quietly 
with the police, after first closing the meeting and 
appealing to the crowd to remain calm. He blamed his arrest 
on members of the ANC bodyguard which had permitted whites 
to enter the grounds and thus making the meeting a public 
one. 
When he appeared in court the next day, there was a big 
crowd present. However, policemen surrounded the court and 
proceeded to arrest another three people who had spoken at 
the meeting - Kennon Thaele, Peter vurnazonke and Jacobus 
Oosthuizen, who had been chairperson. They were also 
charged with addressing an illegal gathering and bail was 
fixed at a prohibitive figure of £100 each. (189) With the 
arrest of Lester the next day (190) and Jacob Conscience a 
month later, it meant that virtually the entire Worcester 
leadership was in gaol or unable to return for fear of 
arrest. The gaoled people were only released a month later 
after the bail had been reduced to £25. Even then they were 
only released on condition that they did not address any 
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meetings at all for the duration of their trial, which 
eventually ended in mid-September, when they were acquitted. 
( 191) 
Initially the defiance of the Riotous Assemblies Act seemed 
to be successful, despite the arrest of the Worcester 
leadership. An enthusiastic meeting on Tuesday night, 24 
July, resolved to continue with the daily meetings and to 
have the usual meeting the following Sunday. (192) In Cape 
Town a mass demonstration was planned the next Sunday to 
demand the release of the ANC leaders and to start a defence 
fund for them. (193) Arnoth Plaatjes wrote a defiant letter 
from Bonnievale supporting this idea and saying that 
{n}o members or agitators of the African 
National Congress who come under the 
provisions of the Riotous Assemblies 
Act, will be bailed, and no fine will be 
paid to the Government, as we realise 
that the Government is trying to break 
down the work of our good organisation. 
This cannot be done anymore. 
Furthermore, I, Plaatjes, notified 
the Government to be prepared for many 
expenses from now on in the line of food 
for non-Europeans, gaolers and 
agitators. The black man is prepared to 
go to gaol under this Bill {sic} 
introduced by Mr Pirow, Minister of 
Machine Guns. The black man's eyes are 
open. {194) 
Although many historians argue that the bans did not hinder 
the ANC, (195) this optimism seems misplaced. The ANC found 
it virtually impossible to continue organising while the ban 
remained in force and it only attempted to hold another big 
meeting in Bonnievale at the end of August. (196) It is not 
clear whether newspaper reports referring to this as the 
first meeting after the one at Worcester at the end of June 
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ref~r only to Sunday meetings, or to all meetings. There 
are, at any rate, no reports of any other meetings, which 
probably indicates that no large meetings were held. 
The meeting at Happy Valley in Bonnievale illustrates some 
of the problems that the ANC encountered at this time. 
Apparently Tonjeni, who was organising in the town at the 
time, announced at an ANC bazaar that he would hold a 
religious meeting the next Sunday at the local ANC hall. 
The reference to religion was probably no more than a ploy 
to get around the banning of meetings. When Tonjeni 
returned from the Eastern Cape at the end of July, he had 
apparently conceived of the idea of holding religious 
services: he told a meeting in Cape Town that he 
dienste gaan lei en uit die Bybel gaan 
hy sy politiek put. (197) 
The incident does, however, demonstrate the extent of 
religious ideology at the time. Not only did Tonjeni 
deliver his entire speech as a sermon, but his translator, 
Moseleba, was the chairman of the local Dutch Reformed 
Mission Church and an ex-chairman of the local ANC. (198) 
The police, however, were not fooled. Soon after the end of 
the meeting they moved in and arrested Tonjeni. Tonjeni 
thus became embroiled in yet another court case. He was 
r~leased on £25 bail on condition that he did not address 
any meetings in the Boland. 
Therefore one cannot argue that the ban on meetings had 
little effect on the ANC. Clearly the ban and subsequent 
enforced inactivity of most of the important leaders managed 
to bring to a virtual halt one of the most important ways in 
which the ANC(WP) organised. This lead to a significant 
decline in the ANC activity and seriously weakened the 
organisation. 
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XI THE ALLIANCE BREAKS DOWN 
The ANC(WP) never really recovered from these heavy blows. 
Their effects were aggravated by and in turn aggravated the 
divisions within the organisation. Some of the divisions 
within the leadership of the ANC(WP) have already been 
indicated above. It is now necessary to delve more deeply 
into these divisions. 
To some extent the division corresponded to a growing 
division between militants and moderates/conservatives in 
the ANC as a whole. In January 1930 the whole national 
executive had resigned in protest against the "radical" 
policies of Gumede. (199) A special conference was held in 
Bloemfontein over Easter to elect a new executive at which 
the right wing won a total victory, some allege through the 
unscrupulous use of the chair. Even Die Vaderland reported 
that 
The left wing is not being allowed to 
speak much and their propositions are 
nipped in the bud by the Speaker. (200) 
The conservative Seme was elected as the new President of 
the ANC and he surrounded himself with a like-minded 
executive. The ANC then lapsed into total inactivity until 
it was revived at the time of the All African Convention in 
the mid-1930s. (201) 
The ANC(WP) had been represented at the conference by 
Tonjeni and Ndobe, the most influential of the militants. 
On their return they launched a scathing attack on the 
proceedings at Bloemfontein in an open letter to the 
National Executive: 
Complaints are made that Congress did 
not probe into any of the fundamental 
problems relating to the life of the 
natives, such as housing conditions, 
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adequate educational facilities, and the 
conditions of employment in the mines, 
in the factories and in domestic 
service. Moreover, the 'militant' 
delegation from the Western Province and 
others were stated to have been 
'malignantly abused'. 
Congress praised and pandered to 
the exploiters who are perpetrating 
crimes against us. Many bona fide 
delegates from such organisations as the 
Federation of non-European Trade Unions, 
the League of African Rights, and the 
Communist Party were deprived of their 
right to vote. The new Executive 
Committee represents only a small group 
of usurpers and pretenders and has no 
mass following. The cry of 'Moscow' and 
'Moscow gold' was used as a camouflage 
in order to disguise the hand of London 
and the gold of the owners of the Rand -
mines. 
Vital proposals such as the struggle 
for a South African native republic, 
were ignored. ( 202) 
The defeat of the militants at the national level also 
increased the strength and confidence of the moderates in 
Cape Town. Thaele and other moderates were becoming 
increaasingly anxious over the level of violence in the 
rural areas. They tried to avoid confrontation and seek 
some accommodation with the police. Thus even after the 
Worcester massacre, Thaele was unwilling to attack the 
police as it was "too early to put the blame on either 
side," (203) while later he put part of the blame on the 
militants. (204) 
The moderates now felt strong enough to start harrassing the 
militants. Thaele repeatedly postponed the militants' 
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reportback from the ANC conference which, as far as can be 
gathered, never took place. This caused much 
dissatisfaction, especially when on 19 May a large crowd 
turned up at the ANC hall to hear the reportbacks, only to 
be told that they had been postponed again. A heated debate 
took place, but Thaele as chairman, was able to overrule all 
objections. (205) Nevertheless, a resolution pledging 
support for Gumede was accepted by over 200 votes to 3. 
(206) 
The dispute came out in the open at the beginning of June 
when Thaele attempted to bar members of the CPSA from 
speaking on the ANC platform on the Parade. Umsebenzi 
reported that this attempt was rebuffed by the rank and file 
members who wanted to hear the CPSA speakers, especially 
Johnnie Gomas, Brown and J. Ngedlane. (207) In practice, 
however, the militants were increasingly excluded from the 
ANC platforms. While the CPSA was confident that 
Thaele will not be able to clear out the 
Bolsheviks like Kadalie did (208) 
they underestimated his position of power in the Cape Town 
branch. Within two weeks he succeeded in barring CPSA 
members from official ANC platforms. (209) The Cape Times 
(210) reported that all CPSA members "and their supporters" 
had been expelled, but this seems improbable as there is no 
mention of expulsions in Umsebenzi and certainly no large 
scale expulsions took place. 
After this relations deteriorated rapidly. Umsebenzi 
reported that Kennon Thaele has been sent to Worcester and 
other branches in the Boland to discourage them from buying 
Umsebenzi. (211) The two groups also held rival meetings on 
the Parade on Sunday 15 June at which over l 000 people were 
present, but there is no indication as to the relative 
support of the two meetings. Thaele made it clear that he 
was not prepared to compromise - the ANC could not work with 
the CPSA 
131 
as the white man and Moscow were at the 
back of Communism whereas the Congress 
had no time for white men and was out to 
claim Africa for the Africans. (212) 
The CPSA, in return, issued a pamphlet which attacked 
Thaele: 
{O} ur good boy, Prof Thaele, continued 
to play the role of pacifist clamping . 
down the fighting spirit of the people 
and working hand-in-hand with the 
police. He spreads the idea that 
Worcester non-Europeans were responsible 
for the trouble last month and that such 
butcherings by the police can be avoided 
by good boy leadership. He fails to 
draw attention to the fact that the 
police and the government by the policy 
of colour justice and incitement are 
quilty of the crime of May 4. (213) 
The pamphlet also called for 
civil disobedience in calling for a 
million Africans to refuse to pay the 
poll tax. (214) 
In Thaele's reaction one can clearly see some of the 
contradictions in regards to the earlier motions adopted by 
the ANC(WP) which called for non-cooperation with whites. 
(215) Thaele denounced the pamphlet and denied that the 
ANC(WP) wanted civil disobedience. The pamphlet was the 
work of a "well-meaning member" who had been "used as a 
tool" by the CP. (216) But he did moderate his stand on 
the party and 
said the African National Congress was 
opposed to the Communist Party as a 
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party, but upheld its principles ••. 
'Our aim is a black South African 
republic, or, if possible, Africa for 
the negro race.' 
Thus the ANC would not co-operate with any whites, including 
the CP. The dissident group consisting of Gomas, J Ngedlane, 
T N Faka, J Mphahlele, GJ Mayo and M Adam made it clear 
"that it is not our desire to cause a split". The rival 
meetings had only been held because Thaele had barred them 
and other "radical" members of the ANC(WP) from speaking 
from the official platform and they would stop their 
separate meetings as soon as they were allowed back on the 
ANC platform. (217) 
At this stage events were overtaken by the arrests in 
Worcester. The organisation was again united in organising 
protest meetings and a defence fund and a "better spirit" 
prevailed in which communists were again allowed onto ANC 
platforms. There were still occasional attacks on the CPSA, 
but these were overruled by the 
many members {who} are saying that at 
the present time when Congress is 
suffering violent police persecution it 
would be suicidal to continue domestic 
squabbles. (218) 
Umsebenzi even expressed the hope that Thaele "has now been 
forced to play a revolutionary role". (219) This newfound 
unity was, however, shortlived. Almost as soon as the 
leaders were released from prison, the moderates resumed 
their offensive, especially Thaele who made several speeches 
"in which the usual incoherent at tacks were made on the 
Communist Party". (220) As Roux pointed out, 
Thaele's strength was on the Parade 
where the Congress held daily meetings. 
Ndobe and Tonjeni, away on organising 
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work in the country, could speak there 
only occasionally, whereas Thaele was 
always on the stump and had become 
well-known to audiences. The burden of 
his refrain was that the communists were 
the agents of the 'white man'. (221) 
Thaele's influence in Cape Town, which still housed the 
official head office of the ANC(WP) was a great advantage. 
The most important militants, Tonjeni and Ndobe, felt too 
isolated to defend the communists forcefully, in Cape Town 
itself, although they continued to work closely with them. 
Umsebenzi commented that it had 
warned the Cape radicals against 
allowin_g matters to slide. 
Unfortunately our warning has not had 
the desired effect. The good boys have 
been ceaselessly at work trying to 
discredit Ndobe, Tonjeni, Gomas and 
other radicals, urging the more backward 
members not to read 'Umsebenzi'. (222) 
It is probably true that Tonjeni and Ndobe had little 
stomach for the political infighting that was taking place 
in Cape Town. In the months following the beginning of the 
split in June, there is only one report of their presence in 
Cape Town, to attend a "banquet" in their honour in the City 
Hall. (223) The rest of the time they spent in the rural 
areas, trying to rally existing branches, and, even, to 
organise in new areas. Thus while on his way to stand trial 
in the Eastern Cape in June, Tonjeni spent a month in 
Graaff-Reinett laying the foundation for the IANC's later 
efforts to organise in the area. ( 224) Matters soon came 
to an open break again with rival meetings on the Parade and 
even an attempt by Thaele's followers to break up communist 
meetings. (225) 
Throughout all these struggles, there were persistent 
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rumours that the moder at es, especially Thae le, were working 
c las ely with the CID. ( 226) While there is no hard 
evidence to suggest that he was actually employed as an 
agent by the police, Thaele had talks with them on many 
occasions and often made statements in which their common 
interest in "preserving the peace" was stressed. (227) It 
is interesting to note though that Thaele should have been 
deported for his conviction in the Carnarvon case, but that 
he appealed successfully to the Minister of Native Affairs 
for its suspension by submitting 
as a bona fide statement my past record 
for your consideration, Sir as· well as 
my dealings with the local authorities 
for the last ten years, the Native 
Affairs Department, the Police 
Department and the CID. (228) 
The local Deputy Commissioner of Police supported his 
application in terms which make it quite clear that 
The presence of Thaele in Capetown 
undoubtedly has a restraining influence 
on the leaders of the African National 
Congress, and he has given assistance in 
dealing with native agitators, he is 
perfectly frank with members of my 
Suspect Branch. (229) 
His less than proud record was further blemished by the fact 
that despite 
his almost daily Parade harangues 
against the white men in general and 
communists in particular, the Professor 
yet found time to appear on the 
municipal election platform in support 
of a European, a Mr Bloomberg, and he 
had Bl~omberg's election posters stuck 
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up in the windows of the Congress Hall. 
(230) 
Soon the moderates felt strong enough to move again~.t Ndobe 
and Tonjeni themselves - again Thaele arranged the 
confrontation in such a way as to derive the maximum benefit 
from his control of the Cape Town branch, and therefore the 
central committee. He was able to convene "bogus" meetings, 
pack them with his own supporters and expel all members in 
Cape Town who disagreed with him. (231) Ndobe was summoned 
at short notice from Riversdale where he had been organising 
to appear before the executive meeting 
and answer to charges of Communist 
tendency preferred against you. (232) 
Predictably Ndobe refused to "attend such a 'bioscope' ". 
Instead he left for Bonnievale to assist Tonjeni who had 
been organising there and had recently been arrested. The 
so-called executive meeting was held on 7 September and was 
little more than a farce as 
{a}ll who were known to have radical 
sympathies were either banned from 
attending or, if they did attend (as in 
the case of Leepile) were not allowed to 
speak. (233) 
Furthermore, only a few of the country branches, including 
Worcester, were able to attend the meeting, because of the 
short notice. At this meeting, which lasted for several 
hours, a mot ion was adopted suspending Ndobe for one year 
owing to his constant advocacy of the 
policy of the Communist Party, by the 
spreading of Communist literature in 
spite of repeated warnings and his 
action in applying for a passport to 
travel to Moscow without the knowledge 
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of the officials and rank and file of 
the Congress. ( 234) 
In an apparent effort to consolidate their position, the 
moderates also pushed through the following resolution 
Having noticed the spread of 
Bolshevistic tendencies among the 
non-Europeans in the Western Province, 
Congress is of the opinion that leaders 
and progagandists of Communist doctrine 
should not be allowed to address 
meetings organised by the Congress. 
Further that the sale of literature 
published by the Communists should be 
prohibited on premises owned by the 
Congress, and that copies of these 
resolutions be sent to all branches in 
the Western Province. (235) 
Despite their success at the meeting though, it seemed that 
the moderates still did not feel strong enough to purge all 
the militants. In fact they felt it was necessary to 
attempt to divide the militants by appointing Tonjeni as 
Ndobe's replacement as provincial secretary. 
The militants refused to accept the suspension. Ndobe 
argued that there was no provision for a te1~orary 
suspension or a suspension without a fair trial in the 
constitution. The only reason for his suspension was that 
Thaele has the fear of his arrest at 
Carnarvon and Worcester before his eyes, 
it will be remembered that when he was 
arrested at Worcester, he told the 
police that his arrest was unfortunate 
and, as usual, he blamed his people. In 
order to win the sympathy of his 'boss' 
(Mr o. Pirow) James Thaele has gone as 
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far as to be a tool of the oppressor, 
and to assist by all available means to 
get rid of the radicals who are prepared 
to launch a militant struggle against 
the ' top dogs ' • 
'I am called upon by all the branches 
of the African National Congress to 
continue my activities, as there is no 
time for good boys'. (236) 
Tonjeni similarly made it clear that he had no intention of 
taking over Ndobe's job. (237) Although there was much 
agitation in both Cape Town and the rural areas against the 
suspension, Thaele's control of the Cape Town branch made it 
virtually impossible to challenge the decision 
constitutionally. Many of the local ANC branches refused 
to enforce the ban on selling Umsebenzi. J.H. Fortuin, the 
secretary of the Montagu branch, wrote that 
We do not want to be bluffed. We are 
prepared to support solidly the paper 
that is prepared to fight for the 
emancipation of the black race and 
starving masses. We who have to slave 
fourteen hours a day for eight pence on 
the farms are waking up. (238) 
In the wake of the split, there was 
a ding dong battle between the radicals 
and the reactionaries in half a dozen 
dorps in the Western Province. In some 
centres, where the radicals are in the 
majority on the local Congress 
committee, the paper is being sold at 
meetings. In other centres the 
Thaelites hold the reign of government 
and the sale of the paper is officially 
prohibited. 
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In these latter areas some individuals still tried to sell 
Umsebenzi. Sometimes the balance of power even changed from 
week to week, and Umsebenzi would be distributed one week, 
and not the next. 
The growing disarray within the ANC(WP) was aggravated when 
the state implemented that next stage in its new strategy of 
legalistic repression. As mentioned above, the strategy of 
banning public meetings on Sundays had been extremely 
effective, though its effectiveness was threatened when the 
Supreme Court acquitted the Worcester accused and ruled that 
meetings on private ground were still legal. (239) 
Although this ruling only affected those areas where the 
ANC(WP) owned some property, there was an outcry from the 
farmers around Worcester who were particularly unhappy about 
the verdict. (240) At least partly as a result of the 
farmers' demands for firmer action, the Minister of Justice 
decided to use his new powers under the Riotous Assemblies 
Act (241) to ban individual ANC leaders from entering the 
Boland. 
Ironically, James Thaele was the first person to be banned, 
because of his prominent role in the Worcester ~rial. 
Within days of the acquittal of the Worcester leadership, 
Thaele was served with an order banning him from the 
Worcester and Swellendam magisterial districts. (242) 
Predictably this did little to harm the cause of the 
militants within the ANC(WP) and it was reported that the 
Worcester branch regarded it with "more amusement than 
consternation". (243) 
Tonjeni had been trying to re-organise the Worcester branch 
in the wake of the banning of meetings, the arrests of the 
leadership and the demoralisation that accompanied the 
incipient split within the ANC(WP). He had already visited 
there at the end of July and again at the end of August. 
(244) 
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It seemed that the Worcester branch was still solidly behind 
the militants. Umsebenzi reported that Worcester had asked 
for an increased supply of the paper, and that when Thaele 
attempted to hold a meeting at the beginning of October he 
faced a "hell of an opposition" and his "long jawbreakers 
cut no ice with the Worcester workers". (245) It is not 
clear whether it was James Thaele who had already been 
banned from entering the area, or his brother, Kennon. 
When Tonjeni arrived back in Worcester in the middle of 
October (246) it looked as though this might herald a 
revival of the ANC there, but the state acted swiftly to 
stamp out this threat. On 14 October, 17 people were 
arrested on charges of public violence in connection with 
the fighting in May. (247) During the course of the next 
week 15.more people were arrested, including at least 6 from 
the surrounding farms. Although the majority of them were 
eventually acquitted, 6 men and 4 women were given sentences 
ranging from l to 6 months with hard labour. (248) It was 
also reported that the police arrested everybody who abused 
them, and that this had had a "salutary effect". (249) 
A week after the first arrests an even heavier blow was 
struck against the militants within the ANC(WP) when Tonjeni 
and Ndobe were both banned for six months from most of the 
Boland areas, viz the magisterial districts of Robertson, 
Wellington, Montagu and Swellendam. (250) 
XI I CONCLUSION SOME WEAKNESSES AND STRENGTHS 
This conclusion will only be a brief assessment of some of 
the organisational weaknesses and strengths of the ANC in 
the Western Cape. A more detailed assessment of the nature 
and importance of the organisation is made in the final 
chapter. 
The removal of the top leaders and the banning of meetings 
were heavy blows to the organisation of the Boland, blows 
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from which it never recovered fully. For the first time the 
ANC was not able to come up with an effective strategy to 
counter the state. Why did this happen? 
It is not easy to give a definitive answer and one can only 
suggest some reasons here. One of the main weaknesses in 
the organisation was an over-reliance on leaders and public 
meetings. Little attention was devoted to grassroots 
organisation. Thus the organisation lost direction when the 
leaders were removed, as there did not seem to be enough 
people to carry on their work. This problem was aggravated 
by the fact that no new methods were found to mobilise 
people effectivel_y once it became more difficult to hold 
meetings openly. 
Although the lack of grassroots organisation was a serious 
problem, one should not be overcritical of the ANC(WP) for 
its failure to cope with it. Almost the whole of the 
national struggle in South Africa up to the 1950s and 1960s 
was characterised by this weakness, and it has only been 
partially overcome today. 
Another weakness was that the fragile alliance between the 
militants and moderates in the ANC(WP) came under increasing 
strain as the level of violence escalated. It reached 
breaking point when many leaders (including moderates) were 
first arrested, and then banned. The hand of the moderates 
was strengthened by the rightward swing of the ANC at a 
national level in 1930 and especially by their control over 
the Cape Town branch, which still housed the head office. 
Thus when the moderates decided to move against the 
militants, they were able to pack meetings called at short 
notice, and successfully expel the militants. Thereafter 
much energy was devoted to infighting between the two groups 
at the expense of expanding the organisation. 
In conclusion, though, it is necessary to re-emphasise the 
very real advances that were made in popular organisation at 
the time. Unlike the ANC at a national level, the ANC(WP) 
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also allowed women to join the organisation and managed to 
involve them to the extent where the Cape Times reported 
that women were "the most loyal supporters" of the ANC. 
(251) Unfortunately there is frustratingly little 
information on the subject, but as far as can be 
ascertained, no women were ever elected to any positions 
higher than the less important posts on local executives. 
Thus there were certainly limits on the involvement of 
. women. 
One of the great strengths of the organisation in the 
Western Cape was that it organised both African and coloured 
people. In fact the great majority of the ANC members in 
the Western Cape were coloured people and the ANC 
successfully resisted all attempts by the farmers and the 
state to divide people along racial lines. Both the farmers 
and the state were very aware of the importance of this 
unity and one of the measures proposed to deal with it in 
Worcester was 
to proclaim a Native Location .•• which 
would keep these natives under proper 
,control and segregate them from the 
Coloured .•• population entirely. If 
the natives refused to live there, they 
could at once be repatriated. It would 
alsi, to some extent, remove them from 
the influence of the African National 
Congre~s agitators and the present 
combination of natives and low coloured, 
against law and order would be 
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'A MILITANT AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT': 
THE FORMATION OF THE INDEPENDENT ANC 
AND ORGANISATION IN THE SOUTHERN CAPE 
I THE FORMATION OF THE IANC 
The previous chapter indicated how the ANC(WP) had become 
increasingly divided, especially after the suspension of 
Ndobe in September 1930. In the ensuing struggle for 
control between the militants and moderates, the former won 
over most of the country branches. (1) 
Initially they were confident that 
the branches supported this militant 
policy and Thaele with his good boy 
tactics would find himself kicked out of 
the Congress before two months were 
over. ( 2) 
Thaele was able, howev~r, to retain nominal control of the 
ANC(WP) by the unscrupulous use of his position as chairman 
and his control over the Cape Town branch. (3) After a last 
effort at reconcilliation between the sides had failed in 
early November, (4) the militants decided to form their own 
organisation as 
the present African National Congress 
has lost all fighting spirit on account 
of its corrupt 'good boy' leadership and 
has become a mere tool of the Government, 
sabotaging the attempts of the masses to 
free themselves. (5) 
Thus they founded the Independent ANC at a meeting in Cape 
Town on 17 November 1930 (6) and Tonjeni was elected as 
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acting provincial chairman. It is not clear whether this 
step had the support of all the militants, as Plaatjes and 
vumazonke were expelled (or resigned) from the ANC(WP) only 
about a month later. (7) Possibly they supported the IANC, 
but still attempted to work in the ANC(WP). It would seem 
that those of the rural branches that did not join the IANC 
lapsed into total inactivity, as there is only sporadic 
evidence of continued organisation by the ANC(WP). (8) 
The new organisation resolved: 
that the time has come for the formation 
of a militant African liberation 
movement which will not bow the knee to 
British and Boer imperialism, but will 
lead the oppressed slaves of Africa in 
earnest struggle against the Pirowcratic 
government of South Africa and its 
obnoxious laws. (9) 
To this purpose it adopted the CP program of a "Black 
Republic" as a basis for urging 
A militant struggle .•• against the 
Government ••. by means of agitation and 
mass demonstrations and organisation 
aimed at securing a general stoppage of 
work and civil disobedience if our 
demands are not granted. 
This "programme of action" was by far the most militant 
programme to emerge out of the national movement until the 
late 1940's. Several of the demands went much further than 
the policies of the other nationalist movements in that 
period. 
Firstly, there was the unambiguous call for a majority rule 
government - the Black Republic. It is not clear whether 
the IANC in fact advocated a universal franchise as there 
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was simply a call for "equal voting rights", but when this 
is read with the call for a Black Republic, it clearly went 
beyond the call of the ANC for the extension of the Cape 
franchise to the other provinces. 
Secondly, the call for the "return of the land to the 
Africans" clearly articulated the demands of the peasantry. 
Although this demand was of some propaganda value, it was of 
less importance in the day to day work, as the IANC 
organised primarily in those areas where the proletarian-
isation of labour was relatively advanced. Certainly in 
practice the ICU in Natal and the Transvaal organised more 
directly around this demand. ( 10) 
The other demands, for example, the abolition of pass laws, 
colour bars and better education were all standard demands 
of the national movement. But the methods to be used in the 
struggle - "mass demonstrations, a general stoppage 
of work and civil disobedience" were much more militant than 
those in the programme of other nationalist organisations. 
A weakness in the programme of the IANC is the fact that it 
was not made clear who the "African people" were. Although 
it is probable that the Indian and "Coloured" people were to 
be part of the struggle, this is never made explicit. In 
the document it is implicitly accepted that only African 
people would fight for liberation. The position of other 
oppressed groups were left somewhat unclear - at times they 
are clearly included when the term "non-European" is used, 
but it is not always clear that they were also included 
under the rubric "African". This ___ omission or, at least, 
lack of clarity, is particularly strange given the fact that 
the militants had been organising mainly coloured people up 
to that time. Nevertheless, it seems to have had little 
effect on the organisational practices of the IANC, which 
continued to be non-racial. 
A second weakness of the programme is its lack of socialist 
content. The "programme of action" is very close to the CP 
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line at the time and is an indication of the close co-
operation between the two bodies in the Western Cape. (11) 
In this document the emphasis is clearly on the national 
demands, on "the liberation of the African people". No 
specifically socialist demands are made, or even 
acknowledged, and there is no mention of the working class· 
beyond a vague, general promise of 
assistance ... to all African trade 
unions with the object of improving the 
conditions 6f the African workers. 
In fact, even this promise meant very little in practice as 
there was virtually no contact between the IANC and the 
organised working class. 
However, the IANC must be given credit for being one of the 
first organisations to recognise that, at that stage, the 
urban working class would not be able to accomplish any 
fundamental change without an alliance with the peasantry 
and agricultural labourers, and to carry this recognition 
into political practice. But the nature of their organi-
sation resulted in an increasing isolation from the urban 
working class. 
Several factors gave rise to this isolation. The most 
important one was probably the increasing isolation of the 
CP from the urban working class. In 1930 an authoritarian, 
sectarian faction under the Woltons and Lazar Bach achieved 
almost total dominance in the party. (12) This is not the 
place to discuss this development in detail. It is only 
necessary to mention that a series of expulsions, 
authoritarian decisions and the absence of a "mass line" 
left the CP virtually defunct by 1932. The decline was 
relatively more severe in Cape Town as Umsebenzi was moved 
to Johannesburg, where the party was being centralised. 
While the militants had been working closely with the CP, 
they had concentrated almost exclusively on the rural areas. 
At that stage there was probably some justification for this 
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as the CP was organising several African unions in Cape 
Town, and a duplication of organisation was unnecessary. 
However, as the CP declined and began to lose contact with 
the IANC, it meant the latter had few direct links with the 
urban working class. 
Secondly under the influence of the ultra-left swing of the 
Comintern, the CP consciously distanced itself from the 
IANC. Umsebenzi pointed out that it would not give 
unqualified support to the IANC: 
Perhaps our policy in the past ••• has 
been a little too uncritical of the 
'opposition'. Perhaps we have seen a 
struggle between 'lefts' and 'rights' 
between 'militants' and 'reactionaries' 
where there has in reality only been a 
squable between rival aspirants for 
leadership and where certain leaders 
have found it politic to adopt radical 
phraseology in order to win support of 
the rank and file ••• 
We will support Ndobe and Tonjeni and 
other African leaders so long as they 
persue a clear-cut policy of struggle 
against the Government of the white 
dictatorship and slave laws .•• when 
they make mistakes we will criticise 
them. (13) 
Thirdly, it is possible that the leaders of the IANC 
regarded the rural struggle as so important, that they 
deliberately ignored the towns. It is certainly significant 
that when they were banned from a rural area, they always 
went to a new one to organise. They did come to Cape Town 
occasionally, but mostly only to "recuperate". {14} In 
fact, as they were banned from more and more rural areas, 
they were in effect restricted to the major urban areas of 
Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. (15} 
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Lastly, given the preference of the militants in the IANC 
for organising in the countryside, the pattern of bannings 
forced them further and further away from Cape Town. This 
led to practical problems of maintaining communications and 
co-operation. 
Thus it is somewhat paradoxical that the IANC was 
increasingly identified as "the communists" in the press, 
although it hardly ever made socialist demands and certainly 
did not have a coherent socialist programme. 
After a hectic interlude during which the IANC was very 
active in the Southern Cape, the IANC held its first 
congress in the Bethel Institute in Hanover Street in cape 
Town. {16) Unfortunately there is very little available on 
the deliberations at the congress, other than the agenda and 
the opening speeches by Tonjeni and Ndobe. These sources 
confirm many of the points raised in connection with the 
political programme of the IANC. The agenda included the 
following points: 
( 1) Oorlog teen die verbanning van die 
Afrikaans {sic} leiers 
( 2) Veld tog vir die bestryding van die 
Paswet. 
( 3) Belastings en werkloosheid. {17) 
In his speech Tonjeni declared that the IANC would not 
co-operate with any other political organisation or party. 
(18) It is not clear whether this statement applied to all 
other groups, or only to the "good boys". It would 
certainly be strange if the CP was included as Tonjeni still 
had close links with them. Furthermore, one of the main 
points in the programme of the IANC was that 
Existing organisations agreeing to a 
militant programme to be asked to 
affiliate on an equal basis. 
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co-operation {sic} with all bodies 
having as their object the liberation of 
the African people. 
Certainly, later in his speech, Tonjeni referred only to the 
ANC when he argued against co-operation: 
'ons is gedwing tot slawerny in die land 
van ons voorvaders en weier beslis om 
met ons vyande saam te werk ••• Die IANC 
wat afgeskei het van die ANC omdat 
laasgenoemde met die blankes wil 
saamwerk, is die geswore vyande van alle 
onderdrukkers van die naturelle en ons 
sal stry vir die regte van die 
naturelle: ons sal seevier'. 
Most of his speech was devoted to stressing the nationalist 
nature of the IANC's struggle, for example, by likening the 
struggle of the IANC to that of the nationalist movements in 
India, China and Japan. Even when he spoke about the 
economic oppression of the Africans, he regarded the remedy 
for this to be the regaining of their political rights in 
the land of their ancestors. 
Both in his speech, and it would appear in the congress as a 
whole, there was little discussion of the specific problems 
and demands of the working class (with the possible 
exception of the discuss ion of unemployment}. 
This is not to argue that this subordination of socialist 
demands to nationalist demands was invariably the case. 
There were occasions when the IANC expressed a clearer 
understanding of the class nature of their struggle and did 
not reduce it simply to a nationalist struggle. Thus Ndobe 
wrote in an open letter to Pirow that 
The growth of the African National 
Congress in the Western Province has 
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been due to the terrible conditions -under which non-European farm labourers 
are groaning. The exploited suffer 
from terribly low wages, long hours, bad 
food and de?:>rable housing conditions 
••• the legitimate attempts of the 
African labourers to organise to secure 
better working and political conditions 
has been met by brutal suppression by 
the white farmers and their agents, and 
these in turn have been assisted by the 
armed forces of the Government ••• Your 
attempt, on behalf of your class, to 
crush the spirit of the African masses 
by banning their leaders will not 
succeed. (19) 
The congress apparently decided that the IANC should 
concentrate its efforts in the Midlands area as afterwards 
few of the leaders were active in the Southern Cape. This 
decision was probably the result of the fact that Tonjeni, 
Ndobe and Plaatjes had all been banned from the Southern 
Cape (20) and it seemed unlikely that the bans would be 
allowed to expire (bannings were usually for periods of 
between three and six months). The Midlands will be dealt 
with in the next few chapters as it had many distinctive 
features, but first the rest of this chapter examines the 
campaigns of the IANC in the Southern Cape. 
II ORGANISATION IN THE SOUTHERN CAPE 
Initially the IANC concentrated its efforts on the areas 
that had been covered by the ANC(WP), and especially those 
areas where the leaders and meetings had not yet been 
banned. These areas comprised most of the Southern Cape: it 
included some well-organised branches, as well as others 
where only preparatory work had been done. 
Agriculture in the area was based largely on the production 
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of grain and wool. (21) Both these industries are analysed 
in greater detail elsewhere in the work {22) and the 
analysis is also applicable to the Southerri Cape. Here one 
only need to point out that the grain farmers were fairly 
successful in combating the effects of the crisis by 
increasing production and preventing cheap imports, while 
the wool industry was almost totally devastated by the 
Depression. As a result the crisis in the Southern Cape was 
more severe than in the Western Cape, but not as deep as in 
the Eastern Cape. (23) 
A writer to Umsebenzi outlined the plight of the farm 
workers: 
Op die Karo {sic} is die Gekleurde 
mense, ons susters en broers, in 'n 
kondisie van slawery. 
Hulle is veewagters, en kry van 10/ 
tot 15/ in die maand. As die vaalpens 
(die baas) by die kraal kom, in plaas 
van om te vra 'Hoe gaan dit?' se hy 'Is 
my skape almal?' of 'Is hulle nog mooi 
vet?' 
As die veewagter dan meer geld vra, 
antwoord die Vaalpens horn 'Jy bet dit te 
lekker by my, en is doodgevreet aan die 
brood 1 • 
Die arme werker kry net 'n half sak 
meel maandeliks. (24) 
Herdsmen were only allowed to keep five live animals on the 
farm (excluding chickens) and at ploughing and harvest time, 
they were expected to work on the lands from 7 in the 
morning till 7 at night, while their children .had to look 
after the sheep. 
Like both the Western Province and Midlands, the Southern 
Cape was characterised by a labour shortage on the farms and 
unemployment in the towns, as agricultural labourers refused 
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to accept the decreased farm wages. It was a general 
comp la int that 
baie werklose kleurling in die dorpe le 
wat nie will werk nie, onderwyl die 
boere nie genoeg werksmense bet nie. 
(25) 
The resistance of the agricultural labourers helped to 
create objective conditions that were favourable for a 
militant mass movement like the IANC. 
Riversdale 
Organisers from the ANC(WP) had been active in Riversdale 
from as early as 1929 and the South Western Echo reported 
that the town was a "happy hunting ground" for agitators. 
( 26) 
Tonjeni and/or Ndobe organised in the area in March and 
April 1930, but the main attempt to organise came in August 
after they had effectively been excluded from organising in 
the Western Cape. (27) Ndobe had been in the area since 
some time in July and apparently he stayed there more less 
continuously until he went to George in the middle of 
September. 
The ANC(WP) immediately clashed bitterly with the church, 
and it seems that especially the Lutheran's Reverend Backman 
made 
veel bitter sprakies oor die A.N.K. 
adviserend die gekleurde werkers van 
Riversdal om teen die kaffers te wees. 
( 28}. 
He said that money should go to the Lutheran god, while the 




Ons mense, swart en bruin, moet saam 
organisier {sic} en saam veg teen blanke 
imperialisme. Die Nature! moenie se dat 
hy 'n nasie is nie, en dus nie 
gemeenskap kan maak met die bruinmense 
nie. En die Bruinman moenie dink dat hy 
(met sy witter fel {sic} en !anger haar) 
sy eie pad kan volg nie. Ons moet weet 
dat ons altwee onder dieselfde blanke 
regering ly. (29) 
It seems that a concerted campaign was launched to 
intimidate people away from the ANC. Johannes Jansen, the 
local secretary, was expelled from the school - it is 
unclear whether he was a teacher or a pupil - the church 
refused communion to some ANC members and prohibited 
attendance at ANC meetings. On at least one occasion a list 
was read out in church of all those who had attended an ANC 
function. (30)_ 
Some indication of the methods used to organise in the area 
can be gleaned from the discussion between the local MP and 
the Deputy Commissioner of Police for the Western Cape. 
Tot hiertoe besoek g'n blanke persone 
die vergaderings nie, maar hulle, so 
verklaar Mnr. Ba4.enhorst, dreig om sulks 
te doen as sulke vergaderings nie deur 
die outoriteite gestop word nie, en dit 
had die beoefening van al sy gesag nodig 
gehad om hulle te belet om sulks in the 
verlede te doen. 
Die uitinge waarvan gekla word is die 
waarin No. 195 Bransby Ndobe verklaar 
dat nie-Europeane net so goed is as 
Europeane en hul nie nodig bet om hul 
hoede vir hul by ontmoeting te lig nie, 
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dat die Europeane die land gesteel het 
van die naturelle, aan wie dit 
regverdiglik behoort, en dat die 
nie-Europeane die plase behoort te 
verlaat en in die stede kom bly ••• Mnr. 
Badenhorst het ook verklaar dat meeste 
van die moeilikhede veroorsaak word deur 
die persoonlike stemwerwery van die 
Oproermakers, en nie as die gevolg van 
die toesprake by die vergaderings gegee 
{sic}. Die waarde van die vorige manier 
in vergelyking met die laasgenoemde is 
nadruk op gele {sic} deur Mnr Badenhorst 
van sy ondervinding in verband met 
Parlementere verkiesings. 
Die Posbevelhebber te Riversdal, het 
gerapporteer dat die Poliesie g'n 
moeilikheid gehad het in verband met die 
vergaderings, en hy dit nie verwag nie. 
Hy verklaar dat opelug vergaderings 
gehou word op 'n stuk gehuurde grond, 
sender omheining, en omtrent 200' x 200' 
groot is {s~c}, en in die nie-Europeane 
grond van die dorp, of in 'n gehuurde 
saal, en dat omtrent 50 persone 'n goed 
bygewoonde vergadering uitmaak. (31) 
Another example of the insubordination preached by the ANC 
of which Badenhorst complained, was that the police were 
experiencing problems in making arrests 
as agitators have advised the coloured 
people that if arrested they must 
protest and take the number of the 
policeman and report to them, when their 
expulsion from the force will be 
ensured. (32) 
The local press, with vivid and effective malapropism, 
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reported that the farmers 
are eloquent in their apprehension over 
the inflammatory speeches made by 
agitators, who are growing in boldness, 
as their influence spermeating {sic} 
through the district. (33) 
The pressure of the farmers on their parliamentary 
representatives soon paid dividends and at the end of 
October Ndobe and Tonjeni were both banned from the area. 
There is some ambiguity though, as at the end of November a 
deputation consisting of 
a large section of the Coloured popu-
lation ... and ... nearly 100 Europeans 
went to complain to the major about Ndobe's presence in the 
town. ( 34) It seems that Ndobe .was able to ignore his 
banning order for some time when the Supreme Court held that 
it was necessary for the Minister to sign each order 
personally. (35) 
At any rate, Ndobe left shortly afterwards to help Tonjeni 
organise in George and oudtshoorn and after that there is 
only sporadic evidence of activity from the area. (36) 
Early in 1931 one of the IANC organisers, Leepile, spent 
well over a month organising in the area, until he too was 
banned from Riversdale. (37) 
Swellendam and zuurbraak 
In the weeks following the formation of the IANC, there was 
an increase in the efforts to organise the countryside. All 
the leaders could again devote their energies to organising 
after the internecine struggles of the previous few months. 
The first evidence of this is Plaatjes' efforts to resume 
organisation in Swellendarn and zuurbraak. (38) 
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-In February 1930 Plaatjes and a certain Cupido had spoken at 
Zuurbraak ( 39) and they were "leli k toegetaken" by. a crowd 
of whites before the police took them to Swellendam. On 7 
November, apparently after continuing organisation by the 
ANC(WP), some of the few white inhabitants had met with 
"responsible" blacks and the meeting of over 200 people 
resolved that all future ANC meetings would be stopped as 
they were inflaming "die gemoedere van die gekleurdes". 
(40) A warning to this effect was pinned on a tree near the 
post office on 13 November. (41) 
Plaatjes and Ross (from Swellendam) intended to hold a 
meeting on Sunday 23 November, and when they arrived on 
Saturday, they expressed their determination not to be 
intimidated. ( 42) 
The most comprehensive account of the incident was given by 
the Worcester district commandant: 
On the arrival of Arnold Plaatjesand 
{sic} Ross (not Moses as previously 
stated) the rioters were called together 
probably by telephone in the case of 
those living outside and a large batch 
of Europeans and non-Europeans took 
possession of the village and started to 
hunt the agitators. 
The N.C.O. of Police, who was along 
at the time, did what he could but the 
rioters apprehended two local officials 
of the African National Congress and 
went in search of Plaatjes and Ross 
driving these men before them. The 
N.C.O. managed to get them away and took 
them to the Police Station grounds but 
after a short parley the rioters forced 
their way in and again took them into 
custody and continued the man hunt, 
eventually securing the persons of 
169 
Plaatjes and Ross who were manhandled 
and driven from the village, the local 
officials seeking refuge in the 
mountains until such time as the storm 
had abated. The rioters, after 
threatening to destroy the house which 
had given Plaatjes and Ross shelter, 
gradually dwindled and eventually order 
was restored. (43) 
Apparently Plaatjes and Ross then went to Swellendam where 
they were due to address a meeting at Bulawayo, the 
location, the next evening, Monday. (44) It seems that 
Swellendam was a well organised branch of the ANC and held 
regular meetings. In a subsequent trial, an IANC member 
"admitted" that 
she usually attended meetings of the ANC 
leaders, at which Europeans are reviled 
and blamed for 'enslaving the 
coloureds', and where they sang songs 
published in their paper, called 
Umsebenzi. ( 45} 
Again the district commandant takes up the story: 
The Swellendam affair was on a large . 
scale. 
When it was heard that Plaatjes and 
-Ross were in Swellendam and proposed 
holding a meeting there, the Swellendam 
rioters were evidently organised, began 
to collect pending the arrival of 
detachments from various parts of the 
District. I have not yet ascertained 
how they were called in but several 
motor-lorries arrived with parties of 
Europeans who joined the local 
detachment and the whole body {about 150 
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to 200 people - WH (46)} then moved 
towards that part of the town of 
Swellendam known as 'Bulawayo'. 
In this instance a fairly strong 
detachment of Police had been drafted to 
where it was Plaatjes' intention to hold 
his meeting but he and Ross had become 
alarmed and fled. 
The rioters advanced in a body 
assaulting any non-Europeans they met 
without ascertaining where their 
sympathies lay and an ugly position 
arose. 
The rioters demanded the production 
of Plaatjes and Ross, but as stated, 
they had gone. 
Defeated in their object, they went 
to the house which had given Plaatjes 
and Ross shelter and to various other 
houses including that of one Willem 
Prins, local Secretary (Swellendam} of 
the Congress and stones began to fly. 
A number of persons on both sides 
sustained injuries and several cottages 
were damaged. 
Sergeant Edwards, who was in charge 
of the Police detachment, did all in his 
power to restore order but was abused 
and treated with contempt and threatened 
with bodily injury should he interfere. 
Under all the circumstances Sergeant 
Edwards considered it unwise to arrest 
the leaders as it would have been quite 
impossible to hold them against the 
crowd in the state of mind they were 
then in and would only have led to 
Police casualties whereas evidence would 
babe been 9ifficult to obtain and once 
the Police had been knocked out there 
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would, no doubt, have been further 
excesses on the part of the rioters some 
of whom were obviously under the 
influence of liquor ••• 
Authority was flouted and in the 
Swellendam instance, threatened with 
injury by members of the assembly. 
The gravity of the position lies in 
the established fact that the riots were 
carefully organised and openly carried 
out. ( 4 7) 
Two days later 34 whites were charged with assault and 
public violence. This led to heated protests and threats of 
more violence, especially when several coloured people, 
including Willem Filander and Jan Prins - the ANC chairman 
and secretary - were called to give evidence. (48) It is 
perhaps no coincidence that soon after these threats were 
made, one witness changed his testimony and denied that he 
had been assaulted. It came as no surprise when the 
magistrate ruled that there was insufficient evidence 
against the accused and they were acquitted, even though 
several had been positively identified. 
George/Oudtshoorn 
The militants in the ANC(WP) had attempted to organise as 
far afield as George and Oudtshoorn as early as September 
1930. 
Tonjeni arrived in the Rosemoor location at George on 
Wednesday 17 September and held a meeting the same evening. 
(49) By the next evening the police were in attendence but 
the meeting was rained out. Ndobe joined Tonjeni and 
another meeting was held on Saturday, but unfortunately no 
details were given, except that Umsebenzi reported that they 
were received enthusiastically. (50) 
The next day they went off to organise in oudtshoorn, where 
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Tonjeni was described as a 
vreemde jong kaffer, uitgedo~ in 'n blou 
pak met bruin skoene en 'n wandelstok in 
die hand . ( 51 ) 
They held a meeting in the Vaaldraai location attended by 
300 people and several policemen at which Tonjeni urged all 
black people to stand together. He also said that Hertzog 
and Smuts 
were even worse than the devil in as 
much as that Satan showed no 
discrimination of our colour. (52) 
Some more meetings were held the next weekend, and Charles 
Makambi was recruited to distribute Umsebenzi in Oudtshoorn. 
He later became the IANC's local secretary. (53) Ndobe and 
Tonjeni returned to George after the weekend, whence Ndobe 
reported that they were promised the support of -thousands of 
people. (54) They apparently remained in George until 
they returned to the Western Cape later in October. 
After the banning of the ANC(WP) leaders and the formation 
of the IANC, Tonjeni returned to Oudtshoorn in late November 
1930. By then it was "the only town of importance still 
open to him". (55} Even to get to Oudtshoorn, he apparently 
had to deceive the police who thought he was on his way from 
Wellington to Cape Town. 
In the meantime a branch had been formed in Oudtshoorn which 
had about 200 members. (56) It seems that Tonjeni wanted 
to stay in Oudtshoorn for about 4 weeks until his banning 
order expired. He also wanted to have a rest "as Pirow's 
dogs were running full speed behind him". Neither of these 
intentions were, however, destined to be fulfilled. 
Tonjeni held meetings almost every day during his brief 
stay. The first meeting at Vaaldraai - "the poorer part of 
town", was attended by a crowd of about 300, most of them 
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coloured people. He spoke about the intended campaign on 
Dingaan's Day when 
he spoke about the proposed burning of 
native passes on the day as a protest 
against the Native Pass Laws. Those who 
did not care to burn the passes 
themselves, he said, could send them to 
him and he would do the needful {sic} 
and send them to h ••• ( 57) 
Although many people drifted away from the meeting, it was 
reported that "a good number were enrolled". In the course 
of the next few days Tonjeni addressed several meetings in 
the Nor th End and West Bank areas and new members joined the 
IANC. (58) It seems as though the IANC break with the ANC 
was not yet total, as Tonjeni was still selling ANC badges! 
As had been the case elsewhere, there was by now "a growing 
feeling of hostility on the part of certain Europeans". (59) 
They had been attending the IANC meetings and decided to 
disrupt the meeting scheduled for Thursday, 27 November. 
The magistrate had to call in the assistance of 
Eventually 
a certain European to use his influence 
with the European section not to resort 
to any violence as he informed me that 
they certainly would do on the Thursday 
night. ( 60) 
the Europeans accepted the assurance 
which I {the Magistrate - WH} had given 
them that the authorities were acting 
quickly in the matter and they promised 
me not to resort to any violence but 
they would not undertake to abstain from 
attending the Meeting. (61) 
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Thus when the North End meeting started at 6 o'clock on 
Thursday, the big crowd of 650 people included about 50 
whites and 
many of the Europeans who were openly 
hostile, were armed they appeared 
to be determined to break up the 
meeting. ( 62) 
Everything was quiet while Tonjeni spoke and most of the 
whites left when he finished and Ndobe started speaking. 
Both speakers delivered their usual 
·attacks on the Police and the Government 
... They repeated their intention of 
demonstrating and downing too.ls on 
Dingaan's Day when all passes would be 
burnt as a protest against the Native 
Pass Laws. Tonjeni himself would be in 
the Transvaal leading a 'big army'. 
Before Ndobe could finish his "very fiery" speech, the 
fifteen remaining whites started to stone the crowd. They 
were quickly surrounded by the crowd and the police had 
"great difficulty" in checking the whites "who were by now 
in a bellicose mood". 
Soon afterwards fighting started and police reinforcements 
were rushed in from the police station where they were on 
standby. The 34 "fully armed" policemen only managed to 
restore order 2 hours later. (63) Three whites were 
slightly injured, while Ndobe and Tonjeni managed to 
disappear "although they were closely watched". They were 
reported to be organising at De Rust on Friday and had 
planned a meeting at Dysselsdorp for Saturday afternoon. 
"Pirow's horses" were, however, catching up on the IANC. On 
Friday Pirow instructed the local magistrate to ban all 
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meetings held by Ndobe and Tonjeni "or their supporters" 
(64) until the end of the month, i.e. Sunday. It appears 
that further banning orders had already been signed for 
Tonjeni and Ndobe and were on their way to Oudtshoorn. 
On the same day a tear gas bomber arrived from Worcester 
. (65) and Tonjeni was arrested in Vaaldraai for some debt he 
had incurred in the Transkei. 
Probably as a result of Tonjeni's arrest, the police had to 
rush first to Vaaldraai and then to another part of town as 
blacks stoned whites. It seems quite likely that these 
incidents were the result of Tonjeni's arrest, but none of 
the newspapers make this connection. Meanwhile Jacob Janse, 
the secretary of the IANC Riversdale. branch, and Plaatjes, 
from Worcester, had arrived to help Tonjeni. (66) Tonjeni 
was bailed out by the local secretary, Makambi, on Saturday 
morning and it was decided to ignore the banning and hold a 
meeting at North End that afternoon, but this plan had to be 
abandoned because of heavy rain. 
On Sunday afternoon, however, a successful meeting 
addressed by Tonjeni, Janse and Makambi was held in a 
private house in North End, after Tonjeni had informed the 
police about the meeting earlier. (67) But the farmers 
were determined that the IANC would be stopped, and a crowd 
of 100 whites and 300 coloured people gathered outside. The 
whites,· 
composed mostly of the irresponsible 
type, were evidently determined to 
prevent Tonjeni from holding any meeting 
at all 
and they at tempted to storm the house. ( 68) Eventually the 
police intervened and dispersed, the crowd. They warned 
Tonjeni to leave Oudtshoorn and he was taken to the police 
station, allegedly at his own request, after several 
at tempts to assault him had been warded off. 
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Ndobe, Tonjeni and Plaatjes were then served with orders 
banning them from the Oudtsroorn district. Tonjeni had 
already been banned from George ( 69) and the next morning, 
he and Plaatjes left for Cape Town. It was believed that he 
would go to the Rand soon to lead a "big army" on Dingaan's 
Day. Makambi was reported to have disappeared. 
Ndobe, in the meantime, had returned to George where he 
addressed a big meeting on Sunday. (70) The next day he 
held a smallish meeting in Pacaltsdorp which was attended by 
about 100 people and 12 policemen from George and 
Oudtshoorn. ( 71) His speech is of interest chiefly because 
it is one of the few reported occasions when a speaker of 
the IANC outlined a clearly socialist position: 
There were two classes of people in the 
Union, he alleged, those who toiled from 
sunrise to sunset, and 'those who lived 
in palaces, who never know how to toil, 
and are living by exploiting the working 
classes. Between these two classes 
there was never peace The non-
Europeans in S.A., he declared, were 
faced with a double struggle; they were 
oppressed as a nation and as a working 
class ••••• 
They must adopt a philosophy expounded 
hundreds of years ago, said Ndobe, that 
they have nothing to lose, but the world 
to gain. (72) 
Ndobe continued to organise in the area, until he returned 
to Cape Town for the Dingaan's Day demonstrations and the 
IANC congress. 
By this time it was reported that the "whole of the 
South-West is seething with unrest". (73) The tense 
atmosphere is illustrated by the wild rumours that were 
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spread. For example, many newspapers reported the "fact" 
that hundreds of blacks were marching on Swellendam from 
zuurbraak and Buffelsjag. (74) This proved to be totally 
unfounded, but not before police reinforcements had been 
rushed to Swellendam. (75) Soon afterwards police were 
also rushed to Heidelberg where "trouble" was expected, ( 76) 
but it is not clear whether this was another rumour. It 
would seem to indicate that the IANC was in fact organising 
in Heidelberg. 
Soon afterwards the "trouble" died down, however, as many of 
the.leaders of the IANC assembled in Cape Town for Dingaan's 
Day (77) and the anti-pass campaign. This turned out to be 
a non-event, but as the IANC's first congress was due to be 
held at the end of December, most of the leadership stayed 
in Cape Town. 
After the congress, Tonjeni and Ndobe resumed their activity 
in the Southern Cape. Tonjeni had already been banned from 
George and Knysna and early in January 1930 he was arrested 
at the George station on his way to organise in Knysna. He 
was sentenced to one month imprisonment but eventually 
released on £50 bail pending an appeal, after spending four 
days in the Knysna gaol. (78) Ndobe was still not banned 
from George, and he returned there in January. ( 79) He 
continued to organise and held regular meetings on Sundays 
and some weekdays. (80) 
It was in Oudtshoor\1 that the ANC(WP) tried for the first 
time to challenge the dominant position of the IANC in the 
rural areas. Two of its organisers, Thomas Faku and Arthur 
McKinley, arrived in George to oppose the IANC, but when 
they tried to speak at an IANC meeting, they were shouted 
down by the women with cries that "Tonjeni is ons man - ons 
het nie tyd vir Pirow se honde nie". (81) 
It seems that Faku and McKinley were largely unsuccessful in 
their efforts. Umsebenzi reported that they were driven 
from the location, while the police advised them not to hold 
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meetings. 
Ndobe left soon afterwards to help Tonjeni organise in the 
Midlands (82) and it seems that organisation continued over 
the next few months under local leaders. At one such 
meeting, addressed by Darries, Marthinus Davids and Albert 
Ndada, it was announced that Tonjeni would return to George_ 
on 16 March even if it meant bloodshed. (83) This date 
fits in with Tonjeni's return from the Midlands, but there 
is no subsequent evidence that he organised in George. He 
was still banned from the area, although the status of the 
banning order was unclear as Tonjeni appealed successfully 
against his conviction for being in the area in January. 
(84) 
Evidence of subsequent IANC organisation in Oudtshoorn is 
rather sporadic. Despite the exodus and subsequent absence 
of the better-known IANC leaders, it seems that the 
organisation continued. At the end of March the police 
tried to clear away a crowd that was obstructing the 
traffic, and were stoned. Seven coloured people were 
arrested and received fines of 15s or 21 days. (85) About 
the same time, Lee Thelesko Leepile, described rather 
picturesquely as the "speurder" of the IANC arrived in 
Oudtshoorn. At a meeting of 300 blacks on Friday 3 April, 
he threatened to bring an army of agitators to Oudtshoorn 
and it seemed that this was the start of a renewed attempt 
to create a strong local branch. {86) It appears that the 
ANC(WP) was also still trying to organise in the area, 
because Faku and Mathope Matule, were gaoled for failing to 
pay their poll tax. (87) 
A few months later, towards the end of July, 5 policemen 
raided for liquor at Suikerbult (near Oudtshoorn), a 
"stronghold" of the IANC. ( 88) Four men and two women were 
arrested. A third woman tried to free them but failed and 
then returned with an axe to attack the police. She was 
also arrested, but then a crowd of about 200 blacks "in an 
ugly mood and very hostile" surrounded the police and 
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bombarded them with stones and knobkieries. One policeman 
fired a shot which appeared to "calm" the crowd and the 
police then managed to escape. 
After this it seems that little open activity took place at 
Oudtshoorn, as no further meetings were reported in the 
course of 1931. Of course, this does not mean that no 
further organisation took place, but the newspapers seldom 
reported on meetings unless something particularly 
"noteworthy" occured. Thus it seems quite likely that a 
branch operated in Oudtshoorn until well in 1932, gradually 
I 
losing influence and members of the IANC declined in the 
Cape. Much the same probably applies to Swellendam where 
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APPENDIX l 
~·· ' . Inc1.eJenien;:; 
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sui:t'ering under j_Jass laws; :poll tax, ca.ste:c and. se11 vant la.1s, etc. 
a~d. rihereas they are C.enied rer>resentation in tne goverll.l-nent o:r 
. -
-tl1c country, and. ·,1hereas the Gove1·n:ment has sought I'i t. to pass 
re::n·essi ve le5isla ti on aimed. at the annihilation oi the. A1·rican 
11 beration move.:r.znt 'Jy gag:;ing the v1hole :n8.tion \;i th the Riotou.s 
Ass~:2blie:3 .Act; 
i1he:ra::ts the :present A:rrics.n lfa.tional Con$ress llas lost all :tigl1tint!) 
s:pi:ci t on account oi its corr-u:pt 11 gooa. bo:~r 11 lee.dershi:p, and. has 
b•~co:ne a ne:re tool ot· the Gover:rHJ.e:nt, saootagi:ug the attempts. o:r·. 
the n~sses to frse theillselves; 
THEREFORE ue, the suffering masses, declare that tne ti8e has cooe 
- for- the :torm<ltion of 9. r:nli ts,nt A!'rice.n i1ne1·:?.tion r:1oveDent ~1.hicll 
-~·1ill not bow the knee to :Sri ti sh a:ncl Boe2"' imperialis.<n, but •1il~ 
1~1i the o~~re3sei slaves ar Arrica in earne3t str~g~l~ against 
o! South . .:\.:t.r:ica and. i ...L.. .-- ln::i 0 onoxi ous la•"f s. 
'de thereiore place the Iollo,,ing :programrne 0'3J.:ore the the 
A:fr·i ca:i.1 IJ?Ople: -
( 1 ) 'l'!Tc: organisation to be kno,,n e..s the Ind.epe:adent A.irican 
I -· • . 1 _r.,:;i. ~iona Con.g-.cess, an1i 02·ancl1Gs to be est.'.:!.blisnect. throughout the 
l . . 
i ·ul1i 0:-1. Existi:."1[:; ·:irg2.ni;3s.tions asrcei:ng to a i.a1li.t?.nt r:irogr2.rnne 
to l1e '~,3~cecl to ar± . .i.liate on an equ?..l basis. Co:pa1.,ation ~1ith ::i.11 
boD.i?~J h3.Ving as tfl.eir ohj<::ct the lioer.=,ti:J:n o:t" the AI:r::ican peo:yle. 
( 2) .As::>i st::>..nc e to be re:nderea. to all AI·i~ican trad.e U...'1.ions 
w1 th the object o:i:· ur;;iroving the con.ii tions o:r tne .. \.I.rice.n viOrkerz; 
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_1.c J of U::.:lo::a.. 
(4) 7ree cocpulsory prinary e~1cation ror all chiliren 
! ,..- ) u 
.Sit on ~j:.1ries. 
CHAPTER 5 
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'AGITATORS ARE AT WORK' : ORGANISATION IN 
GRAAFF-REINETT AND MIDDELBURG 
The previous chapter showed that the militants in the 
ANC(WP) did not confine their organising efforts to the 
Western Cape and organised extensively in the Southern Cape. 
In fact they went even further afield. In the course of 
1930, there were sporadic attempts to organise in the 
Midlands area in the Eastern Cape. 
In 1931 the IANC launched a concerted campaign to organise 
in the Midlands. This seemed to be part of a new thrust to 
widen the base of the organisation beyond the Western Cape, 
which had already resulted in an organising campaign in the 
South Western Districts. 
The new attempt was at least partially determined by the 
fact that the principal organisers of the IANC had all been 
banned from the Western Cape and, subsequently, from the 
South Western Districts. However, there were also a number 
of other determining factors. While the militants were 
organised in the ANC(WP) they had had to pay at least lip 
service to the existence of the Cape African Congress, CAC, 
and any attempt to organise in the Eastern Cape would have 
exacerbated the on-going jurisdiction disputes between the 
ANC(WP) and the CAC. It is significant that even the 
sporadic attempts in 1930 came only after the break in the 
ANC had come into the open. Obviously these constraints 
fell away completely when the IANC split from the ANC(WP) at 
the end of 1930. Furthermore~ the crisis in agriculture had 
created a discontented rural proletariat which could be 
mobilised against the existing relations of production in 
the countryside . Both these factors will be examined in 
greater detail later. 
The main thrust of the IANC campaign in the Midlands was in 
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the Middelburg/Cradock/Graaff-Reinett area. The first part 
of this chapter discusses the early attempts to organise in 
Graaff-Reinett and the reasons for the relative lack of 
success in that area. Events in Graaff-Reinett were seldom 
reported and anyway took a very different path from 
elsewhere in the Midlands. Thus they will be dealt with 
separately and not,be integrated into an analysis of the 
Midlands as a whole. 
The second part of the chapter gives a brief chronology of 
the events in Middelburg and the~ continues to examine in 
some detail the way in which the initial IANC organisation 
in the area took place. 
The next chapter examines some of the issues and themes that 
arose from the organisation in the Midlands. Chapter 8 
resumes the chronological account of the struggle in the 
Midlands, including an account of the start of organisation 
in the Midlands. 
I ORGANISATION IN GRAAFF-REINETT 
It seems that the militants in the ANC(WP) first tried to 
organise in the Midlands when Tonjeni arrived in 
Graaff-Reinett on 12 June 1930. (1) 
Graaff-Reinett had a black population of about 6 000 made up 
as follows: 
Men 
coloured people 1 109 











6 147 (2) 
Tonjeni immediately started to hold regular meetings on 
Sundays and Wednesdays (3} and had soon organised a local 
branch of the ANC(WP} with its own elected executive. Soon 
afterwards he was joined by Martin Runeli and together they 
organised against some of the local location regulations. 
L 
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Shortly afterwards the location superintendent ordered them 
to leave the location, but, as Tonjeni reported in 
Umsebenzi, 
men and women amoung the non-Europeans 
came forward with spirit and told me not 
to move an inch. (4) 
By the end of June the police estimated that about 75 
people, almost all African, had joined the ANC. But the 
influence of the ANC was almost certainly much greater than 
this. The Midlands News and Karroo Farmer reported, for 
example, that there was increasing anxiety about the 
"growing impudence and hostility" of many blacks in the 
Midlands: 
It appears from reports that agitators 
are at work amongst the non-Europeans 
over a wide area, and that even farms 
have been visited, and both Natives and 
Coloured are listening to doctrines that 
hitherto have been foreign to their 
ears. (5) 
As happened in the Western Cape, the farmers and the town's 
white inhabitants got very upset about these meetings. 
Later we will look at some of the structural determinations 
of this conflict, but for the moment we examine only the 
conflict itself. The local MP, Dr Karl Bremer, raised the 
matter in Parliament, while an angry letter to the local 
press claimed that the police seemed unable to stop the 
meetings: 
Kan die stadsraad van Graaf f-Reinett dan 
nie sulke persone belet om hier te 
kom nie? ••• Die nature! {Tonjeni - WH} 
gebruik oproerige taal ~n probeer om die 
naturelle op allerhande maniere op te 
sweep. Ek verstaan dat daar alreeds 'n 
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hele klomp beloof bet om die oproermaker 
te ondersteun. (6) 
As in the Western Cape, there were often differences about 
how the "agitators" should be dealt with, differences which 
were underpinned by very different material bases. These 
differences came to the surface for the first time when the 
local town council requested the local magistrate to ban 
Tonjeni from the area. The local police argued strongly 
that the ANC was not causing any unrest as yet, and that 
Tonjeni seemed to be heeding a stern warning by the local 
police chief. They were convinced that 
It will be a great mistake to commence 
any repressive measures here under 
prevailing conditions ... {because it} 
would o.nly result in formenting trouble. 
The Deputy Commissioner of Police in the Eastern Cape, on 
the other hand, disagreed with this strategy, and urged the 
Minister of Justice to ban Tonjeni from the area. But it 
seems that the strategy of the local police prevailed - they 
persuaded the town council of the correctness of their view 
and no action was taken against Tonjeni. (7) 
Apparently Tonjeni left Graaff-Reinett after about a month 
of organising, while Runeli continued to organise at least 
until the end of July. (8) There is only sporadic evidence 
of activity in the town until the beginning of 1931 when the 
IANC launched a concerted campaign to organise in the 
Midlands. 
From the available evidence it is not clear whether these 
early efforts were the beginning of a planned strategy of 
expansion into the Eastern Cape, or whether it was merely an 
independent act by Tonjeni who was on his way to the 
Transkei for a court case. (9) The length of his stay and 
the arrival of Runeli seems to indicate that a fairly 
concerted organising campaign was launched. But there were 
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certainly no attempts by the ANC(WP) to follow up their 
efforts in Graaff-Reinett or to organise elsewhere in the 
Eastern Cape until the beginning of the following year. 
Even before Tonjeni returned to Graaff-Reinett late in 
January 1931 to build on his earlier efforts, there were 
indications of the effects of these efforts. It seems that 
a fairly well organised local branch existed as there was 
much paranoia in December 1930 about a possible ""opstaan" 
van die naturelle" on Dingaan's Day. Extensive precautions 
were taken and a record number of arms were sold in the 
town. On Dingaan's Day itself, African people were 
reportedly afraid to come to town, because "die boere wil 
ons sk iet". ( 10) Shortly thereafter the ANC cal led a 
"monster mass meeting " on January 11 for the purpose of 
'exposing and opposing Elliot Tonjeni 
and others' and shewing Bolshevistic 
tactics are not the right methods to 
adopt to gain emancipation of the 
'oppressed African people'. (11) 
It would seem that this meeting was in fact called by 
representatives of the ANC(WP), probably Thomas Faku and 
Archie McKinley, who had just arrived in the area to combat 
the influence of the IANC. In the words of Faku, the first 
people 
once and for all to oppose and expose 
its existence amongst our non-European 
people's were we: will not leave no 
stone unturned in whipeing out its 
dangerous Policy, were ever - ever we 
set our foot no Communist can Compete, 
we don't care who he is. (12) 
Tonjeni and Arnoth Plaatjes held their first meeting in the 
Cape location a week later, on Friday 23 January, and they 
were give~ a very sympathetic hearing by a crowd of about 
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150 people. In their speeches they attacked the pass laws, 
and stressed that 
Those that follow us must not only be 
prepared to eat fire, but walk on fire. 
Tonjeni also launched an attack on Faku and McKinley and 
threatened to "play Rugby with them" at their next meeting 
on Sunday. (13) On the Sunday the two groups started off 
having separate meetings and, according to the police 
report, most of the people went to the ANC meeting. 
Apparently under pressure from the crowd, Willem Hendricks 
(Velapi), a member of the local IANC, met with the local ANC 
chairman James Ngendana, and they decided that a joint 
meeting should be held. This was arranged, but it soon 
broke up in disorder when Ngendana refused Tonjeni 
permission to speak. The IANC again resumed their own 
meeting, followed, it seems, by a large majority of the 
crowd. (14). 
I 
Tonjeni attacked the ANC and accused it of working "hand in 
hand with the CID". He again reaffirmed his determination 
to 
make a movement to abolish the Poll Tax 
••• {and} passes ••• {He planned} to 
lead a demonstration here in 
Graaff-Reinett with the native women of 
this location ••• to follow me at night 
and see if the Police dogs will demand 
their passes ••• 
As far as is known this march never took place, probably as 
a result of the disputes between the IANC and the ANC. The 
pass issue seems to have been a particularly burning 
grievance in the Midlands. In addition to the payment of 
various levies and taxes which were enforced through these 
laws, there was also much bitterness about the nightly raids 
for passes. Time and again it was stated that 
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these Police dogs they make love to you 
{i.e. the women - WH} when they ask your 
passes at night time, they put you up 
the family way and when the child is 
born and they don't own up as the father 
of the child but call it a bastard. 
(15) 
For the moment it seemed as if the IANC had gained the upper 
hand in Graaff-Reinett as Tonjeni and Plaatjes held two 
further successful meetings during the following week, 
attacting crowds of 200 and 250 people respectively. At the 
second meeting, the new IANC flag was hoisted, probably for 
the first time. ( 16) 
But the next week both Tonjeni and Plaatjes left to organise 
in Middelburg (17) and when they returned to Graaff-Reinett 
two weeks later, only about 30 people attended their first 
meeting - most people were attending a meeting of the ANC. 
(18) It is not clear whether the IANC leaders were 
discouraged by this fact alone or whether other developments 
had taken place, but Tonjeni and Plaatjes left again for 
Middelburg a few days later and the IANC never again 
attempted serious organisation in Graaff-Reinett. 
Certainly Faku attempted to claim the credit for this 
setback when he wrote to the Secretary for Justice that 
For instance in Graaf freinet 1931 last 
when the Municipal authorities were 
being threatened with a critical trouble 
because of the Revolutionary teachings 
of Elliot Tonjeni, I got out from Cape 
Town, only to find Graaffreinet in a 
restless position, owing to Tonjeni's 
teachings, I at once set upon him and 
explained matters both to the 
authorities and the resident Natives and 
Coloured, and within three successful 
194 
weeks Tonjeni was obliged to catch a 
midnight train and leave Graaf freinet 
B.R. Ndobe also attempted a 
Campaign in Graaffreinet but, I got him 
out rapidly. (19) 
Faku continued to organise in Graaff-Reinett and he was 
joined by another ANC(WP) organiser, Mathope Mputle, soon 
afterwards. They held regular meetings which attracted 
crowds varying between 100 and a maximum of 300. 
It is necessary to attempt to answer the question as to why 
the ANC(WP) was successful in its campaign against the IANC. 
Firstly, as showed earlier, there is some doubt about the 
level of commitment to organise in Graaff-Reinett by the 
IANC organisers. They all seemed to be fairly fully 
occupied in organising in Cradock and Middelburg. Although 
Faku was also organising in Aberdeen and Willowmore, he 
spent most of his time in Graaf f-Reinett and it certainly 
seems as though the ANC(WP) worked much harder in organising 
in Graaff-Reinett. 
Secondly, Graaff-Reinett was first organised under the 
banner of the ANC(WP) and this would give an advantage to 
the latter, especially as Graaff-Reinett was far removed 
from the causes of the divisions in Cape Town. In fact 
there seemed to have been a great degree of confusion about 
the various organisations and the reason for their 
existence, as is evidenced by the following question by one 
Japie Gazea at one of the first meetings: 
'he asked why there was today and. {sic} 
I.c.u., African National Congress, and 
Independent National Congress, which is 
correct and which must be followed, this 
was not answered ••• (20) 
This factor was probably only partially outweighed by the 
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fact that the charismatic Tonjeni had joined the IANC, as 
Runeli, who had done the early organising with him, had 
remained in the ANC(WP). 
Thirdly, and most important of all, was the fact that the 
ANC(WP) organisers in the Midlands took up and articulated 
the demands of the rural proletariat in a way that was 
virtually indistinguishable from the IANC. Although there 
were some attacks on communism, the ANC(WP) reserved its 
harshest words for the white government. It took up the 
popular issues of beer brewing, unemployment, high rents and 
bad conditions in the location, and even, on occasion 
demanded a black republic. {21) 
Thus Faku continued to organise successfully in the area 
during the next year. By May 1930 the police reported that 
the local branch of the ANC had a "supposed membership of 
some 250 native and coloured people", including the members 
of a branch of the ICU which had gone over to the ANC en 
bloc. ( 22) 
But the methods by which the ANC(WP) achieved this success 
had highly contradictory consequences for it. On the one 
hand, it was able to defeat the IANC. But on the other 
hand, the militance of the ANC(WP) meant that eventually it 
would be exposed to the same repression as its rival. Faku 
wrote to the Minister of Justice that he could not 
understand how, 
and that 
now when I am now finished with getting 
the Communist out, the authorities turn 
on me in such a repressive and harsh 
way, (23) 
it would by no means benefit the people 
of the Country in which we live, to be 
out and suppress moderate, and 
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Constitutional propaganda ••• (24) 
But the farmers were more concerned about the political 
practice of the ANC(WP), than about the need to combat a 
"communist threat" that had already been defeated. 
This tension was already in evidence as early as April. The 
provincial secretary of the ANC led a delegation to the 
mayor to discuss rents and unemployment in the location at a 
time when it was reported that there were 348 unemployed 
"coloured people" in the location. (25) The LAB 
immediately held a special meeting where it 
recommended that the council be asked to 
try and find a way of stopping, legally, 
the political meetings held in the 
location by agitators on behalf of 
certain bodies, viz African National 
congress, I.c.u. etc. 
That nothing of this nature be 
allowed in this vicinity again either 
or indirectly, {sic} for the following ~easons: 
1. They have taken advantage of the ignorance 
the location people. 
2. Have divided the inhabitants into different 
bodies and each is dead against the other. 
3. Are trying to blacklist some of the orderly 
men, especially the more prominent ones. 
of 
4. Most of these illiterates who are followers 
have so much interest in these meetings held 
almost every Sunday and Wednesday afternoons 
that they have become lethargies {sic} in the 
line of working for their own lining. {sic} 
S. There is a remarkable drop, in consequence of 
this, in the records of the Location revenue. 
6. Engendering a spirit of hostility between 
their followers and the following: 
Muncipal Authorities and the 
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Advisory Board Members, 
which is worst of all. 
The Board earnestly requests the Authorities, 
if approving of this, to see that it is carried 
through as soon as possible and that these 
political meetings are brought to a stop at an 
early date. {26) 
Faku had already been banned from the Willowmore district at 
the beginning of April, (27) but the District Commandant was 
loath to extend this ban to Graaff-Reinett: 
The holding of these meetings ... has 
not been prejudicial to the good order 
of the Location as far as known to the 
Police and at present I see no reason 
for prohibiting them. (28) 
It was only much later, in January 1932, that matters came 
to a head. Apparently this was after some meetings had 
ended in stone-throwing incidents. (29) A more important 
consideration was probably that the ANC(WP)'s organisation 
in nearby Aberdeen and Willowmore had been becoming 
progressively more militant and it had apparently just 
launched a very successful rent strike in the former town. 
(30) 
To smash the organisation, the authorities proceeded in much 
the same way as they had dealt with the IANC. Faku was 
expelled from the Graaff-Reinett location and then charged 
and convicted of entering the location without a permit. 
The Council also passed additional location regulations 
enabling it to ban meetings if it so desired. (31) The 
ultimate solution of-a banning order was used a while later 
against Faku, the principal organiser. (32) After this it 
seems that organisation in these areas collapsed. 
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I I MIDDELBURG 
After the initial efforts to organise in Graaff-Reinett, the 
organisers of the IANC concentrated their efforts on 
Middelburg where they achieved great success. Most of the 
main organisers of the IANC was active in Middelburg in 
February and March 1931. By the end of March, however, the 
outside organisers had all been banned from the area and the 
local leadership had to survive on its own. 
The remainder of this chapter discusses the early organ-
isation in Middelburg. It examines in some detail the ways 
in which the IANC tried to organise in the area, the 
importance of public meetings, the elements in discourse of 
the IANC and the development of local leadership. 
One of the most interesting aspects was the fact that the 
IANC organised in much greater depth than in the Western 
Province. It seems that at lease some of the lessons had 
been learnt from the experience of repression there. 
The importance of Meetings and the Discourse of the IANC 
.A.s elsewhere the primary method of organisation was through 
public meetings. Tonjeni and Plaatjes arrived from 
Graaff-Reinett in February 1931 and started to organise in 
Middelburg. They initially held a spate of public meetings 
to establish the IANC in the town. Within a month or so, 
the IANC had settled down to the usual pattern of regular 
meetings on Sunday and Wednesday afternoons. These meetings 
were usually attended by between 200 and 500 people, 
although there were much larger crowds of up to 1 000 people 
on several occasions. The people present seemed to have 
been fairly equally divided between African and Coloured 
people, while there were almost always more women than men 
present. Later the extent of the participation by women 
will be examined in greater detail, but a rough indication 
of the overall level of support for the IANC is indicated by 
the statistics for Middelburg's adult black population: 
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Male Female Total 
African 599 409 1 008 
Coloured 728 484 1 212 
Total 1 327 893 2 220 
( 3 3) 
Thus between 10% and 25% of the population regularly 
attended IANC meetings. It is notable that the Middelburg 
location was less than half the size of that of 
Graaff-Reinett. The population also would seem to be less 
settled as, unlike in Graaff-Reinett, there is an imbalance 
in the sex ratio. A possible explanation might be that more 
unemployed people had come to Middelburg. The unemployment 
issue was certainly taken up much more actively than in 
Graaff-Reinett. 
Because of the vital role of public meetings, it is 
important to discuss the meetings and the discourse of the 
IANC, especially the way they were used to mobilise the 
people. 
Tonjeni and Plaatjes started their campaign in Middelburg 
when they held an impromptu meeting in the location on the 
6th of February, a Friday night, attended by about 60 
people. (34) The meeting was opened by singing Nkosi 
Sikelala IAfrika after which Tonjeni spoke, 
saying I cannot call you Ladies and 
Gentlemen as you are worth being so 
called therefore I will say You Slaves 
of Africa. 
He emphasised the need for organisation and unity, common 
themes in all the speeches of the militants and attacked 
tribal divisions: 
Why should we be distinguised as Xhosas, 
Bushmen and Korranas and not Africans in 
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the whole of our country given to us by 
God. 
At a four hour long meeting the next day Tonjeni went on to 
take up local grievances such as the Poll tax, the 
dictatorial powers of the Location Superintendent and the 
lack of a LAB. (35) He again stressed that it was only 
through organisation that these grievances would be overcome 
- that Africa must liberate itself: 
In 1912 a Congress went over to get 
Freedom from King George, King George 
informed them that they must go back to 
s. Africa because he cannot give them 
freedom, but he did not mean us to sit 
down and drink wine. 
When in Port Elizabeth and Umtata the 
Prince of Wales was approached he said 
that your freedom lies in your own 
hands. He meant you to make as Gen. 
Smuts and Hertzog to lead your own 
people. 
The message was brought home by the liberal use of 
metaphors rooted in the everyday experience of the 
people: 
the white man milks you, you have no more 
milk, now it is your chance to kick over 
the bucket ••• 'a chicken does not wait 
for a hen to break the shell, but kick 
itself free. You must do likewise or 
else you die in it'. 
Two things that cannot be bought for 
money is Land and Freedom, the only way 
is to shed blood. 
At times these metaphors became more violent: 
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If a flea, bug or slow walker bites you, 
what do you do, you kill it. Why not 
kill these two leg Flies. 
This is in sharp contrast to the earlier stress on non-
-violent passive resistance. (36) By the next day, more 
than 60 ·men and 100 women, "Natives and coloured", at tended 
the IANC meeting~ At this meeting Tonjeni raised the ire of 
the conservatives when he 
••• went over to communistic ideas and 
explained that the communist party were 
out to break up Native Slavery. He 
appealed to all Coloureds and Natives to 
come together and to stand together and 
raise funds to further the purpose of 
the communist party. (37) 
This led to a heated argum~nt and was the beginning of a 
long conflict between the IANC and conservatives grouped in 
the CAC. This conflict is one of the themes which ts 
discussed at greater length in Chapter 6. 
By the next Saturday the .IANC attracted over 3 50 people to 
its meeting and the next day an even larger meeting was held 
attended by about 1 000 people. (38) At this meeting a 
special 
'African flag' was hoised under the 
singing of the Native National Anthem. 
The Union Jack ••• was then also 
hoisted Tonjeni then proceeded to 
explain the meaning of the flags. He 
said the Red in the Union Jack 
represented the blood that were shed by 
the whites. The blue represents the 
ocean which they crossed to come here 
and rob them (the natives) of their 
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country, this country and the white he 
said indicates the white man. 
He then proceeded to explain the 
colours of the Native flag the red he 
said represented the blood of the 
Natives butchered by the whites, the 
green the grass of Africa, the yellow 
the ripe wheat and gold of Africa, and 
the black, the Non-Europeans of Africa 
It was under this flag {the Union 
Jack - WH} that the Police were sent 
under Capt. Barter by Pirow to butcher 
the Natives at Worcester, but said he, 
referring the Native Flaf {sic}, I am 
pleased to say that it was also under 
this flag that Capt. Barter's head was 
chopped open. (39) 
After listing the many injustices that the black people had· 
suffered under the Union Jack, Tonjeni and Plaatjes 
ceremoniously burnt the flag. Plaatjes 
then referred to the 'African flag' 
and said 'I am pleased I am standing 
under my own flag. The Africans will be 
ruled under it. 
Thereafter the flag remained an important element in the 
discourse of IANC organisation in Middelburg. 
In a speech a few months later, Plaatjes elaborated on some 
of the thinking behind the imagery: 
Dear slaves of Africa I call you so and 
not Ladies and Gentlemen because you are 
slaves in your own country. The 
foreigners are called Ladies and 
Gentlemen but not you, you are worse off 
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than slaves because slaves always had 
plenty to eat. Slaves always had homes. 
These themes - the fact that Africans were "slaves" in the 
land of their birth; that "foreigners" were enjoying all the 
good things; the need for all black people to unite 
irrespective ·of tribal or other divisions; the idea that 
the oppressors would only listen to the oppressed if they 
were organised and strong; the liberal use of metaphors and 
imagery, often religious; and the attacks on the 
conservatives - remained characteristic of the discourse of 
the IANC throughout the time it organised in the Midlands. 
The emergence of Local Leadership 
One of the lessons that was seemingly learnt from the IANC's 
experience in the Western Cape, was the need to train and to 
_rely on local leaders. Already at their first meeting, 
Tonjeni had warned that 
'I can see that here I am going to be 
arrested' . ( 40) 
From the beginning Tonjeni and Plaatjes were subject to 
constant harrassment. They were unable to obtain the 
necessary visitor's permits to stay in the location after 9 
p.m. and were forced to sleep at the outspan outside 
Middelburg for the whole of their stay. Within a week of 
their arrival they were charged with entering the location 
illegally and contravening this regulation. They were fined 
Ss (or 7 days) and 10s (or 14 days) on the 2 charges. Later 
they were again charged, this time for staying in the town 
itself, but charges were dropped, apparently when they 
proved that they were registered voters. Later Plaatjes was 
again charged for being in the location, but was acquitted. 
( 41) 
By the middle of March Tonjeni had to leave Middelburg to 
stand trial in Cape Town, (42) while Ndobe who arrived in 
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Middelburg in the middle of February, had to leave a week 
later. (43) Furthermore orders banning Tonjeni and Ndobe 
from Middelburg, Graaff-Reinett and the surrounding areas 
had already been signed and were served on them shortly 
thereafter. (44) 
The greater awareness of the problems facing the 
organisation when its leadership was subjected to repression 
was translated into an effort to train local leaders and 
speakers. Within a week three local speakers appeared on 
the platform with Tonjeni and Plaatjes, viz. Charles Heeuw, 
James Ntame and Charlie January. A local executive was also 
elected with Ntame as chairman, Andries Louw as secretary 
and January as organiser. (45) 
At the end of March the local leadership was also reinforced 
by the arrival of William Hendricks, also known as Velapi 
Matiyase, who was IANC secretary at Graaff-Reinett. He had 
also organised in Colesburg and Naauwpoort, but thereafter 
spent most of his time in Middelburg. It is not clear 
whether he became the local secretary or not, (46) but his 
help was sorely needed as Plaatjes and January, the most 
active local leaders, were served with banning orders at the 
end of March and this lead to the emergence of some tension 
within the local IANC. It is instructive to look at the 
ensuing crisis in some detail. 
January had already been upset by the violent demonstration 
of the women on 23 March (see below) and he now had second 
thoughts about his involvement in the IANC. At the next 
IANC meeting, he did not sit on the platform and when called 
on to speak he replied that 
'I am not prepared to make a speech and 
I do not want you people to look up to 
me as a leader. I have to leave 
Middelburg, the place of my birth, but I 
am not saying good-bye to you yet. My 
experience is a hard one and I have only 
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myself to blame for it and I want to say 
to you today is, men use your common 
sense and see what happened to me and 
think what what {sic} you are doing 
before you try to go too deep into this 
case ••• 
I have nothing further to say today. 
I may have more to say to you later. 
(47) 
The reason for his reticence is clear from the letter he 
wrote to the District Commandant of Police on the same day. 
He pleaded for the lifting of his order and claimed that he 
had been misled by Tonjeni, Ndobe and Plaatjes, but had now 
seen the light. He now promised his assistance to the 
police in return for his freedom: 
Since the trouble with the women on 
23.3.1931 I on several occasions used my 
influence to stop people to attend these 
open air meetings which I know causes a 
lot of grievance in town and I have also 
gained the confidence of the Chairman 
and Secretary of the association whom I 
can assure you will assisty {sic} me to 
keep away from Middelburg all suspected 
agitators. (48) 
The Commissioner of Police in the Eastern Cape thought that 
if the operation of the Minister's Order 
is suspended for a month it will have 
the effect of getting him to use his 
influence against the Independent 
African National Congress. With this 
view in mind I would recommend the 
suspension of the order for that period, 
and provided his conduct during that 
period is considered satisfactory by the 
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Police, I will then be prepared to 
recommend the cancellation of the order 
• • • ( 49) 
A few days later January made a public break with the IANC. 
At an IANC meeting he first asked for and received a vote of 
confidence in himself and then tried to persuade the 
audience to denounce the IANC in a speech that was 
remarkable chiefly for its subservience towards the rulers 
and paternalism towards the oppressed: 
Many things that had been said at the 
meetings by Plaatjes, Ndobe and Tonjeni 
are right for we all work for the 
advance of the Native and Coloured man, 
but I must tell you that many a thing 
had been said by these men on {sic} 
these meetings here which are very wrong 
••• Not for my own sake because I am 
going away • {sic} Friends for your 
own sake and because it is my duty as a 
leader ••• I tell you these meetings can 
serve no good purpose and must be 
stopped. Many of you get the sack 
through these meetings ••• If any of you 
were bosses and those whom you employ 
always curse you what will you do? ••• 
If you look up to me as a leader, you 
must have no further meetings and if you 
want anything righted go to the proper 
official and ask for it. We are 
sufficiently organised to get everything 
right in a nice manner ••• I dont {sic} 
tell you to do as I say you must use 
your own heads, but remember many of you 
are uneducated (Here an old man shouted 
out, "Never mind the uneducated" at the 
same time disputes commenced at several 
places ••• 
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The crowd became so noisy that January was unable to 
continue and a brief tussle for control of the platform 
ensued. Although the police thought that about half the 
crowd of 300 people supported him, only about a quarter of 
the people left with January when he stalked out of the 
meeting. ( 50) 
The incident also revealed that the leadership of the IANC 
still clung to many of the traditional notions of the role 
of leaders. This was articulated most clearly by January 
when he told a meeting after the march that it 
was a big mistake for those women and 
children to have gone through to Town 
like they did. We have told you before 
that if there is anything that you want 
you must come to us. If you want any 
rights you must go and ask for it. Come 
to us and ask us to go and get it for 
you. You must not go and try to get 
things by force. The position is that 
we leaders get the blame for what you 
have done. (51) 
However, this elitist conception of the role of leadership 
was shared by some of the other speakers on the platform. 
Andries Lauw, the local secretary said: 
We came here to try to develope {sic} 
and to make plans for improvement but 
not to take drastic actions. The Rulers 
must Rule. 
In, was only Plaatjes, the last of the more experienced 
leaders still in Middelburg, who refused to condemn the 
marchers and stressed that the pass laws were to blame for 
' 
the trouble. Nevertheless he pointed out that 
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we always tell you to follow your 
leaders and not go to in front of them. 
Although it is not clear what the immediate effects of the 
bannings and the split were, it seems that the IANC 
continued to organise successfully in Middelburg. By August 
the local press reported that the IANC had at least 300 paid 
up rnembers in Middelburg. In addition, a remarkable number 
of local speakers and leaders emerged, many of them with 
seemingly little previous political involvement. An example 
was John Mana who first spoke at a meeting in May: 
I am shivering when I am called upon to 
speak as already I am warned that if I 
speak at these meetings, I will be 
sacked from my work. (52) 
In the course of the next six months, the police reports 
listed well over 20 local speakers, (53) as well as a number 
of others whom they could not identify. Although the main 
and more articulate speakers like Ndobe and Camba were of 
petty bou~eois origin, it is evident that a number of these 
speakers were of working class origins - thus John Mana was 
a labourer at the Grootfontein school of Agriculture, while 
John Sholoba and somebody.identified only as Charlie, are 
described simply as "local unemployed native.Cs)". (54) Even 
William Hendricks, one of the full-time organisers, was 
described as "an uneducated sort of man and not much of a 
speaker". (55) 
The way in which the IANC survived this, and subsequent 
crisis in the leadership was a tribute to the strength of 
the organisation. It had become a clearly mass based 
organisation and could not simply be destroyed by removing 
the leadership or creating divisions within the leadership. 
It was able to survive the removal of the top leadership 
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despite, or perhaps because of, the tremendous popularity of 
some of the IANC leaders. Tonjeni was probably the most 
popular leader. It was reported at one meeting that, after 
Ndobe and Plaatjes had already spoken, Tonjeni announced 
that he 
did not wish to make a speech, but 
shouts from everywhere that he must 
speak and that they would not go until 
he made a speech, changed his mind. 
(56) 
After he left there were still continual references to him 
in speeches. Some of the new leadership even regarded him 
as a near God: 
I am willing to die for the truth 
brought to us by Tonjeni through God. 
Iw {sic} will die with Tonjeni, I 
recognise him as my king through God. 
Through God is he our king, The Kings of 
Kaffirland are depressing us, they are 
no good • ( 5 7 ) 
He was often called "King Tonjeni", he had been "sent by 
God", and was compared to Mos es or Noah. ( 58) 
This adulation was, however, tempered by the realisation 
that liberation would only come through their own efforts 
that 
Tonjeni, Plaatjes and N'dobi {sic} are 
not rifles. We must stand and organise 
ourselves ••• It is not Tonjeni's 
organisation but yours. These pigs 
oppressing us says it is Tonjeni's 
Today we must ourselves get up and 
organise. (59) 
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Thus the IANC was able to survive despite the repression of 
individual leaders. When one leader was banned, there was 
usually someone else to step into the breach "for the 
leaders of the ANC are as many as ants". (60) 
It was only later in the next year, when the state stepped 
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'THE HARDSHIP HAS INCREASED ON US': 
THE ISSUES TAKEN UP BY THE IANC IN THE MIDLANDS 
This chapter examines the way in which the IANC responded to 
the immediate issues facing its members, notably unemploy-
ment, low wages, passes, bad living conditions as well as 
the domination of "political" organisations by the conser-
vative petty bourgeosie. It also examines the way in which 
the IANC 1 s response to these issues was articulated in its 
discourse. 
In this respect there are several striking differences 
between the organisations in the Western Cape and in the 
Midlands. 
Firstly, there was a much more significant presence of 
Africans in the Midlands than in the Western Cape. In the 
towns they usually formed about half the population. This 
factor made it somewhat easier for the IANC to organise as 
it was still seen as a primarily "African" organisation. It 
is important to emphasize though, that there is no evidence 
whatsoever of any "racial" tension within the IANC. Ih fact 
the unity that it was able to forge between the different 
groups was one of its most important achievements. 
Secondly, the two areas were fundamentally differently 
affected by the Great Depression. In the Western Cape 
farmers were largely able to combat the effects of the 
Depression and there was no serious crisis in agriculture. 
In the Midlands the opposite was the case. Although the 
development of capitalism in agriculture was probably less 
advanced in the Midlands, agriculture was almost totally 
dependent on the world market which was devastated during 
the Depression. The effect was to produce a profound crisis 
in agriculture in the Midlands. 
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The combination of these factors had important effects on 
the possibilities of organisation, as well as on the issues 
that were taken up. 
I FARM LABOUR AND THE CRISIS IN AGRICULTURE 
The Effects of the Depression 
Agriculture in the Eastern Cape was dominated by sheep 
farming, and especially by wool farming. The next most 
important sector was probably the production of mohair, 
while there was also some grain and fruit far ming. ( 1) 
Wool farming had been well established in the area since the 
mid-19th century. Farmers were totally dependent on the 
overseas market as almost the whole of the wool crop was 
exported to Britain for processing. By 1860 wool accounted 
for about 70% of the exports of the Cape Colony, and until 
the early 1880's the value of wool exports rivalled those of 
diamonds. ( 2 ) 
The wool industry had a renewed upsurge during World War One. 
By the end of the war wool was again the single most 
important export excluding gold, accounting for about a 
third of all exports. (3) 
However, the dependence on the world market devastated the 
wool industry during the Depression - the position is 
summarised in the table below: 
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TABLE 1 - WOOL SOLD (4) 
YEAR VALUE SOLD VOLUME AVERAGE PRICE 
£m Index Index d per lb Index 
1924-28 15, 042 100 100 17, 7 100 
1929 16,418 109,1 130,6 14,5 82,0 
1930 . 11, 298 75,1 141, 7 9,2 52, 0 
1931 7,475 49,7 131,8 6,5 36,8 
1932 5,433 36,1 139,6 4,5 25, 5 
1933 6,799 45, 2 156,6 5,0 28,3 
CHANGE -70,6 (1928-32) +19,9 (1929-33) -79,2 (1925-32) 
The price of wool fell dramatically on the world market, 
dropping to half its previous level by 1930, and halving 
again by 1932. Farmers responded characteristically by 
attempting to increase production as much as possible and 
production during the depression was on average nearly 40% 
above pre-Depression levels. The increase in production 
could, however, do no more than ameliorate the effects of 
the price fall and the value of wool sold decreased by 
nearly 65% during the Depression years. 
But even these figures probably do not reflect the full 
impact of the crisis. As the Farmer's Weekly commented in 
1929: 
When wool goes down thirty-three 
percent, does the railway carry it at a 
third less rate? Do the shipping people 
do so? Do the brokers charge a third 
less for pressing, handling, commission, 
etc? Go through the whole string of 
those who live on the industry and see 
if any section, other than the farmer, 
bear any part of the thirty-three per 
cent reduction. Do the workers take 
219 
less pay, or work longer hours? Do the 
cloth merchants sell at a lower figure? 
and finally, do the tailors charge less 
for a suit? The The {sic} answer is: 
'No' every time. (5) 
Die Burger calculated in 1930, when the price of wool had 
fallen by 50% that farmers had suffered a much greater 
decrease, as these "middlemen" were well organised and 
unwilling to reduce their rates. It gave as an example that 
a crop worth £2 500 to the farmer in 1929, was worth less 
than £800 in 1930. (6) 
The situation was further aggravated by the vast increase in 
production. The doubling of production between 1925 and 
1933 lead to a great overgrazing crisis and in the four 
years after 1930, more than 30% of wooled sheep died. (7) 
The Cape was not quite as badly affected as other areas, but 
st(ll suffered losses of more than 25%. 
The crisis was thus more serious for wool farmers than for 
those producing food. Part of the reason for this was that 
wool was not a necessity and purchases of clothes could be 
postponed temporarily. In fact wool was becoming a luxury 
as the cost of production of synthetic fibres was decreasing 
rapidly. Thus the demand for wool tended to decrease, or, 
at least, increase more slowly than general demand. (8) 
The mohair farmers found themselves in very much the same 
position as wool farmers, and in the Eastern Cape they were 
probably often the same people. Almost all mohair wool was 
produced in the Eastern Cape as is sh9wn by the fact that 
about 90% of exports went through the Port Elizabeth 
harbour. ( 9) 
The mohair producers were also totally dependent on the 
world market as almos~ the entire crop was exported. The 
mohair producers were in a stronger position than the wool 
producers as they produced about 20% of the world output, 
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but this advantage was offset by the fact that the mohair 
market was not well established. Even before the Depression 
it was subject to violent fluctuations in price due to 
fashion changes and speculation. (10) The effect of the 
Depression is shown in the table below: 
TABLE 2: MOHAIR EXPORTS (11) 
YEAR VALUE VOLUME AVERAGE PRICE 
£000 Index lb ( 000) Index d per lb Index 
1924-28 850 100 10 950 100 18,9 100 
1929 643 75,6 10 038 91,7 15,4 81, 5 
1930 295 34,7 6 874 62,7 10,3 54,5 
1931 229 26,9 5 443 49,7 10,1 53,4 
1932 96 11,3 6 435 58,8 3,6 19,0 
1933 330 38, 8 15 743 143, 8 5,0 26,5 
%CHANGE -70,6 (1928-32) +101,1 (1925-33) -79,2 ( 1925-32) 
It is clear that the mohair industry was even more badly 
affected than the wool industry. By 1932 the price was less 
than 20% of its previous level, while demand even at the 
lower prices had collapsed to 50% to 60% of previous levels. 
The combined effect on the value of production was 
disastrous: in 1932 production was worth barely one tenth of 
pre-Depression levels. 
Farm labour in the Eastern Cape 
- Clearly then, agriculture in the Eastern Cape was in a 
crisis by 1930. This crisis stemmed primarily from the 
nature and extent of its integration into the world market. 
This chapter will not attempt a detailed analysis of the 
development and the precise nature of capitalist agriculture 
in the area, but wi~l merely attempt to give some indication 
of the extent of the development of the wage form. 
Van der Horst in her study of those areas where African 
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labour was used extensively, concluded that the 
amount of land allotted to Native 
labourers for growing crops ••• appears 
to be least in the eastern Cape 
Province, where it is often less than 1 
morgen. ( 12) 
Another contemporary study of the Border region 
concluded that labour tenancy as a system was disappearing 
rapidly. In fact not one labour tenant was found in the 
process of selecting a sample. (13) Similarly Hunter found 
labour tenants on only one of the 29 farms she studied in 
the Eastern Cape. (14) 
The limited extent of subsistence production on white farms 
in the area is further illustrated by the following table 
prepared by the Native Farm Labour Committee in 1935/36. 




Number of l'vlaize corn 1 / 
fa mi ii es (200 lb. (wolb. \'\'oolled 
Area (Iooos) bags) bags) Caak Goats sh~.-p 
N.\'\'. Natal l ;~ 1'5 0·3 3·9 :;:·8 
K Natal 1:; ::?·l O'i -·n 
J ·' 
5'5 
S.E. Transvo.al n- 3·:, o·G .:,·i 3·8 0·2 _, 
N.\'1'. Trans,·aal 8 3·U 1·8 4·4 1·2 
(Water berg) 
W. Trans\·aal 5 Io·6 ::?') 2·1 0·2 0·5 
(Lichtenburg) 
~orthem O.F.S. I5 q·-•I '.!'5 ,,.03 o·9 
Central O.F.S. 16 6·I 2·3 ,,.g 
Southern 0.f.S. 2 0·06 O·i 0·7 3·1 
Eastern Cape: II 1·6 0·2 3·7 1·1 0·002 
(coastal) 
N.E. Cape 
(Elliot, etc.) 5 0·003 1·6 0·2 3·0 
Inland Cape 
(Cradock., etc.) 6 1·6 1·4 o·B 
Griqualand West 
(Hay, etc.) 6 o·6 0·4 o·B 5'9 I ·4. 
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There w~s no grain producEfon for subsistenc~ purposes, 
while ownership of stock was extremely limited -
substantially less than any other ~rovince, except for parts 
of the OFS. 
Although the labou·r tenancy system had disappeared for all 
practical purposes, the wage form was not dominant. Haines . . . 
·found that the average wage in kind was substantially higher 
than the cash wage - 27s 6d as against 13s lOd per month. 
He argu·es that wages in kind tend to immobilise labour and 
that it retards the full development of capitalist relations 
of production. However, he stresses that payment in kind 
was decreasing in the Cape and that it is 
likely that in the Cape competition is 
freer ••• than in the rest of the Union. 
Farmers must compete with employers in 
small towns for their seasonal labour 
supplies. ( 16) 
There was, however, a significant sector of the rural 
proletariat for whom the wage form was much more highly 
developed. The sheep shearers formed a relatively skilled 
seasonal labour force that lived in the towns and· the 
reserves. During the season they travelled from farm to · 
farm to shear. Thus they had a great measure of 
independence, which was increased. by the skilled nature of 
their work. (17) 
The independence and strength of the shearers had enabled 
them to win relatively high wages. At· this time their 
wages were about 12s to 15s per 100 sheep, ( 18) which works 
out to about 4s to Ss per day for a skilled worker. 
Although they usually also received some food, it is an 
indication of the extent of their proletarianisation that 
they had to buy the bulk of their food from the farmer at 
shop prices. ( 19) 
The position of the shearers were threatened somewhat by the 
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class/fraction, becoming increasingly aware of its 
collective class interests and willing to organise to 
achieve these interests (of course not only in this period). 
This process was neither smooth nor without contradictions 
as will become clear· later. But there was certainly an 
awareness of the need for unity and a conscious concern not 
only with individual reproduction, but even with the 
extended reproduction of agricultural capital as a whole. 
This is evident, albeit in a limited and confused way, in 
the presidential address by Major Hunt at the congress of 
the South African Agricultural Union: 
When we consider the manifold 
difficulties which confront our industry 
in our own society: when we cast our 
eyes overseas and contemplate what has 
happened in Russia, where the private 
ownership of land has disappeared, and 
what is happening in Spain, where 
landowners are being deprived of their 
estates if obtained by heir {sic} 
ancestors under Crown Grant: when we 
consider the terrible economic 
conditions of the world at large, we 
must realise the criminal folly of 
allowing narrow minded racial and party 
political strife to divide us. (22) 
The membership of farmer's associations increased drama-
tically during the period, (23) as did the membership of. 
co-operatives. The number of shareholders in the mohair 
co-operatives virtually doubled from 8 145 in 1927/28 to 
13 976 in 1931/32. (24) The percentage of the total wool 
clip handled by the 2 major co-operatives increased rapidly 
and by 1931/32 was estimated at 38%. 
The organisation of the farmers revolved around two aims. 
Firstly, to increase the price farmers received for their 
wool, and secondly to decrease the cost of production. 
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Although the organisation.proceeded fairly well, the farmers 
were hampered by several objective conditions in their 
efforts to increase the price they received. Firstly, as 
was pointed out earlier, the local woolbuyers and the 
international shipping companies were so well organised that 
they were well able to resist efforts to reduce their rates. 
(25) The co~operatives were able to win some concessions, 
such as reducing selling commission from 2.5% to 1.5%, 
curbing malpractices in broking, and offering a more 
efficient service to their members. (26) They were not, 
however, able to win major reductions to costs. 
Secondly, the world market was dominated by Australia where 
farmers produced wool more efficiently than their South 
African counterparts. (27) The South African farmers, who 
produced almost exclusively for the world market, were 
consequently unable to exert any significant influence on 
the world price. 
These factors were aggravated when Australia went off the 
gold standard in March and Britain in September 1931. Wool 
farmers selling at 20d/lb in Britain would now receive only 
5.5d per lb in South Africa as against the 9d per lb in 
Australia. ( 28) 
The structural inability of the wool farmers to influence 
the price level of their product, forced them to turn to the 
state for assistance. Like much of the rest of agriculture, 
the wool farmers were able to extract fairly substantial 
concessions from the state. In 1931 railage on wool was 
reduced by one third and wool farmers received advances from 
the Land Bank. Soon afterwards a direct subsidy of 10% was 
introduced on wool and mohair exports and this was increased 
to 25% and 20% respectively in 1932. ( 29) 
But these measures, dramatic as they were in terms of 
contemporary economic theory were of little help. Most of 
the farmers' efforts to increase the price they received 
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went into a desperate, concerted campaign of protest against 
the government decision to stay on the gold standard. -~· 
- -~--- ~-~ ~ -~ - - - -- ~ - ·-- .- ~- -- --·---~ -- - ----·· ~- ·~--~------ -
Unlike other sectors of agriculture, the position of the 
wool 1 ',farmers became so desparate that they came out in open 
opposition to the government position. Even the official 
party organs of the National Party in the area lent the 
farmers tacit or even open support. Die Middellandsche 
Afrikaander summed up the desparate disbelief of the farmers 
who could not understand how the Australian farmers could 
now get even more for their wool, while the English paid 
less - it simply had to be nonsense. (30) By that time the 
Australian pound was worth less than 10s and the British 
pound about 14s. 
It would seem that the Midlands was one of the main centres 
of the agitation against the gold standard, (31) but it 
achieved little success. The gold standard was only 
abandoned late in December 1932 when some of the other, and 
more important, fractions of capital came out in support of 
this move. ( 32) 
The more immediate benefits of organisation were thus found 
only to a limited extent in an increased price paid to the 
farmers. The major effort of the farmers went into a 
sustained offensive to reduce costs and especially wages. 
Wages had become particularly important as the farmers 
characteristically responded to a decrease in price by 
increasing production. ( 3 3) Increasing production 
meant increasing labour requirements and it was feared that 
the increased demand for labour would lead to higher wages. 
( 34) 
One way in which wage costs could be reduced was by 
increasing the intensity of labour, as was pointed out by a 
lecturer at an agricultural school: 
The reduction in costs may come about by 
a better organisation of labour, by so 
planning it that time is not lost in 
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beginning the days's duties: that there 
is no waste of time and effort in moving 
from one job to another, that two units 
are not despatched when one can do the 
job in a unit of time: that three boys 
{sic} are not assigned to a plough where 
one and an umfaan can equally manage: 
that an extra boy is not assigned to 
transport jobs, and is carried around as 
an ornament. (35) 
But as Mr Trollip pointed out in a lecture to the Schoombie 
Farmers Association, farmers were also concerned about other 
developments which were tending to increase the wages. He 
pointed out that 
the civilised world had run for ages on 
the basis of masters and servants -
servants with the masters to care for, 
feed and pay them. Slavery had been 
rightly abolished, but what about 
servants? Were they trying to abolish 
or blot themselves out? Is there no 
longer any honour in being a good 
servant - no dignity of labour? ••• {It 
was a change in} one of South Africa's 
greatest assets, in that, with a few 
exceptions, the native now asks for 
piece or day work. Happy is the master 
today who secures a servant whose mind 
is not poisoned against the good old-
fashioned ways of work. 'Either they 
want higher wages, or each wants a 
specified job, shorter hours, better 
food, etc: and when all their likes and 
dislikes have been met, one only 
receives inefficient service and very 
little thanks in return'. 
Fortunately the Government had 
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recently passed certain Acts (i.e. 
Riotous Assemblies and Masters and 
Servants ? - WH) but, said the speaker, 
he was afraid it was too late. The 
disturbers of peace are here and are 
likely to remain. ( 36) 
This lecture demonstrates some of the contradictions in the 
development of capitalist agriculture in South Africa. The 
wool farmers were operating in a social formation dominated 
by the capitalist mode of production which was rapidly 
dissolving the remnants of precapitalist relations of 
production in the countryside, especially in the "white" 
areas. The farmers were increasingly forced, and unable, to 
compete with industry for the available "free" labour. (37) 
As a result many capitalist farmers still hankered after the 
coercive control over labour that was characteristic of the 
pre-capitalist mode, and there were often demands to limit 
the "freedom" of the workers. For example at the 1931 
annual congress of the Cape Provincial Agricultural 
Association 
it was agreed that it would be made 
compulsory for all white and coloured 
{unemployed - WH} labourers to show a 
dismissal notice from their {previous -
WH} employers to the police or 
prospective employers on demand ••. In 
the event of the labourers concerned 
being unable to find employment within 
one month, they should be compelled to 
apply to the police to find work for 
them. ( 38) 
They would be punished if they failed to do this. There 
was, however, no further mention of such drastic steps and 
it would seem that these were not required. In any event 
the new Native Service Contract Act of 1932 fulfilled many 
of the demands of the farmers. ( 39) 
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Most of the activity, however, centred around efforts to 
reduce the general level of wages and organising farmers to 
adhere to these agreed levels even when they suffered from a 
shortage of labour. A beginning was made when, in May 1930, 
the Pearston Boerevereniging decided to keep wages for 
shearers to the same level as the rest of the district, viz. 
a wage of 12s 6d per 100 sheep, a "slagding" per 1 000, plus 
coffee in the morning and afternoon. (40) 
Organising the farmers was, however, neither smooth nor easy 
as agricultural capitalism was relatively competitive at 
that stage and there was often a contradiction between the 
individual and collective interests of the farmers. 
Organisation was further hampered by mutual suspicion 
between the different farmers associations. Many 
woolgrowers were particularly unhappy with the CPAA which 
"seemed to be governed by the Western Province." ( 41) 
The experience of the Somerset East Farmers Association is 
instructive. In July it accepted the same maximum wages as 
in Pearston and publicised the decision in the press. (42) 
But at a poorly attended meeting 3 months later, the 
chairperson 
spreek sy teleurstelling uit dat die 
lede die besluit van die Vereeniging 
gebreek het. Hyself was ook onder the 
omstandighede daartoe verplig. Dit lyk 
asof die skeerders beter georganiseer is 
as die boere. (43) 
It seems that most farmers were still forced to pay 15s to 
get their sheep shorn. Soon thereafter Die Burger reported 
that a "stormy meeting was held to try again to determine 
shearing wages". Many differing levels were suggested and 
some farmers were unwilling to accept any maximum wage at 
all. Eventually, a wage identical to that in Pearston was 
accepted, although many doubted that it would be effective. 
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(44) 
One speaker pointed out that many farmers wanted to supply 
free food: 
{Hy} se die vergadering behoort alleen 
die loon ~n nie die kos vas te stel nie. 
Die boere het baiekeer mielies of 
onverkoopbare skaap waarvan hulle graag 
wil ontslae raak en hy kan nie sien 
waarom dit nie vir die skeerders gegee 
kan word nie. (45) 
Others gave free transport to the shearers. Even the 
chairperson of the PFA had his doubts: 
Die ornstandighede verskil te veel om 'n 
loon vas te stel. Die groot saak is tog 
maar om jou skaap geskeer te kry. 
It was reported that the Albert Boerevereniging had similar 
problems and for several months they were unable to agree on 
a proposed wage. (46) Eventually it was decided to shelve 
the proposed maximum wage 
aangesien die meeste boere weier om 
hulle in die saak te laat voorskrywe en 
eenparigheid nie behaal kon word nie. 
(47) 
Some- "progress" was made, however, in lowering wages even 
further. In March 1931, the executive of the Jansenville 
Boerevereniging decided 
om by boere aan te dring om nie so hoog 
as ld 'per bok te betaal nie. ( 48) 
Soon afterwards a much bigger meeting was held where this 
wage was confirmed, the sheep shearing wage further reduced 
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and many other wages agreed upon. The demands of the 
farmers were set out in the following letter which appeared 
in many Eastern Cape newspapers: (49) 
Neem tog die volgende op in u blad vir 
informasie vir u lesers. 
'Op 'n konferensie gehou te Richmond 
op 25 April 1931 waarop die 
Boere-verenigings van Middelburg, 
Hanover, De Aar, Britstown, 
Victoria-Wes, Murraysburg en Richmond 
afgevaardigdes gehad bet, is die 
volgende besluit eenparig aangeneem, en 
alle boere word gevra om die besluit aan 
te neem en uit te voer ter bevordering 
van kooperasie 
- lone vir skaapskeer 10s 
per 100 vlokskape; 12s 6d per 100 
stoetooie; 2 looitjies vir vlokramme 
teen 10s per 100; 3 looitjies vir 
stoetramme teen 12s 6d per 100; 8s 4d 
per 100 vir- angorabokke. 
KOS {i.e. the price to be charged for 
food supplied to the workers - WH} 
10s per slagskaap; 3s 6d vir 
boermeel, 2s 6d vir mieliemeel, en 2s 
vir mielies per emmer. Koffie ens. 
Winkelprys. 
GRAANSNY - 2s per 100 
gerwe, alle graan, in gerwe gelewer 
DORSMASJIEN - Koring 2s; gars ens ls 
6d per sak kafsny. 
Koring 12s 6d, gars ens. ls 
per sak vir lank strooi. Kos dieselfde 
as by skapeskeer. Opsit van masjien 
60s. Geen geld vooruit gee aan 
skeerders nie, ens 
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BOERE KO-OPENAAR ! {sic} 
Vir die Richmond (Kaap) Boerevereniging 
C.A. Visser 
Sekretaris 
Soon afterwards the Mortimer Farmers Association reported 
that 
the committee appointed to investigate 
the question of day boys reported that 
they had approached all those employing 
such and had asked them to reduce the 
wage to 1/6 per day. The Lucerne 
Co-operative had already fallen into 
line. The Committee had also written to 
influential people throughout the Valley 
asking them to co-operate in this matter 
and had met with a great measure of 
success. ( 50) 
Several months later these attempts were still continuing, 
but there are indications that they had not been totally 
successful. Towards the end of October the Midlands Farmers 
Association felt it necessary to announce 
that after publication of this notice, 
the maximum rate of paying shearers be 
reduced to 10s per 100; (51) 
implying that this had not yet been achieved. The Cradock 
Joint Council estimated that farm wages had been reduced by 
5 - 25% during 1931. (52) This shows both the success and 
partial failure of the farmers to impose their new wage 
levels. The "problem" was that these reductions were 
strenuously resisted by the workers, often led by the IANC. 
This is clear from a speech made by the Mayor of Middelburg 
who told a deputation of unemployed blacks that the wages 
they were demanding 
233 
onbillik is - 12/6 per 100 en dan nog 
boonop kos ••• Die boere mense {sic} 
soek skeerders en vra waar is die mense 
wat werk soek. (53) 'If you are hungry 
and want work, you should be prepared to 
work for a smaller wage than in 
prosperous times, and if you refuse to 
do that it does not seem as if you are 
starving 1 ' ( 54) 
Much of the activity of the IANC was directed at low wages 
and against unemployment. 
detail below. 
This is discussed in greater 
The Response of the popular classes. 
How then did the organisational effort of the IANC interact 
with the crisis in agriculture - a crisis characterised by 
the fact that many farmers dismissed some of their workers 
and attempted to reduce the wages of the others? On the one 
hand, as had happened in the Western Cape_, the presence of 
the IANC intensified the crisis. It gave a more articulated 
form to the revolt of the agricultural proletariat against 
these conditions. Die Middellander summed up the situation 
as follows: 
Daar heers in die laaste tyd 'n gees 
onder die naturelle wat ver van gesond 
is en hierdie gees is in hulle 
aangewakker deur die agente van die IANC 
was nou al maande lank onder die 
naturelle in hierdie streke arbei. Hul 
is besiel met 'n gees van vyandigheid 
teenoor die blankes en die boerestand 
veral 1 ondervind meer las van hul 
naturelle bediendes dan ooit tevore die 
geval was. In baie gevalle is hul 
onwillig om te werk, nors en in sekere 
gevalle selfs brutaal en verlaat hul 
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diens indien hulle nie in alles hul sin 
kan kry nie en kom dan bier in die 
lokasie le. ( 55) 
On the other hand, the IANC was itself strengthened by the 
conditions produced by the crisis. There were many 
complaints about 
die duisende naturelle wat na die 
lokasies trek en daar gaan leegle. (56) 
At Somerset East the local ratepayer's association even held 
a special meeting to discuss the "leegleers in die dorp en 
die lokasie". They agreed 
dat die toestand onuithoudbaar is en dat 
die boere baie swaarkry daaronder. Die 
plaasvolk stroom die lokasie in en die 
boere sit sender hulp. (57) 
The IANC was especially strong in the towns where the 
unemployed congregated, many of them unwilling to go back to 
the farms at starvation wages. Here it took up the 
grievances of the unemployed, especially the demand for work 
in the towns. Before we look at that in more detail, it is 
important to note that the other issues taken up by the IANC 
also affected the unemployed farm workers severely. The 
location permits were a particular source of grievance as 
they were often unable to obtain permission to sleep in the 
location, or else they were unable to afford the high fees. 
Like the IANC leaders; they were forced to sleep at the 
outspan outside the town. (58} July Bacela described how 
the hardship has increased on us. The 
white people has encamped the roads with 
netting and after that they put the 
people qut of work to live between these 
nettings along the roads. You have 
nowhere to {sic} to go but to town then 
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they come and ask you for money {for 
lodger's permits - WH} where are you to 
get the money from. (59) 
Demonstrations were the principal means used to mobilise the 
unemployed and to bring their plight to the attention of the 
authorities. Almost immediately after his arrival in 
Middelburg, Tonjeni led a demonstration to the office of the 
Mayor, to protest against the widespread unemployment, as 
well as the har-_.assment of Tonjeni and Plaatjies under the 
Location Regulations. (60) The Mayor promised that he 
would try to find work for the unemployed. The IANC was not 
convinced 
as he cannot possibly find work for 500 
people in Middelburg all at once. (61) 
Eventually the interview developed into a slanging match in 
which the mayor 
••• told them that they are being 
mislead {sic} and that in the case of 
any trouble he had enough men to go to 
the Location and kill the lot of them. 
(62) 
A few weeks later the IANC organised a second demonstration, 
this time led by Charlie January. (63) In August another 
big crowd of unemployed marched on the Mayor's office, to 
demand work as 
many of them could find no work and were 
starving, and unable to pay their house 
rent and poll tax. (64) 
The mayor replied that though he sympathised with them, 
times were hard and even the white man was suffering: 
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He also told them a few plain truths and 
said that the farmers needed shearers, 
but because of the unreasonable demands 
of the natives {'12/6 per 100 en dan nog 
boonop kos' according to the Die 
· Middellander (65)} they were unable to 
employ them. 'If', said Mr Minnaar, 
'you are hungry and want work, you 
should be prepared to work for a smaller 
wage than in prosperous times, and if 
you refuse to do that it does not seem 
as if you are starving!' The Mayor also 
told them that when they were in 
trouble, they wanted the white man to 
help them, yet they never tired of 
blackguarding the white man twice a week 
at their meetings in the location, and 
that unless they refrained from that 
practice he would not be prepared to do 
· anything further for them. 
Hendricks who led the demonstration replied that they 
'werk wil he hier op Middelburg en op 
geen ander plek nie'. (66) 
Eventually under pressure from the crowd the Mayor advised 
all those wanting work to give their names to the Vigilance 
Committee, perhaps in an attempt to strengthen the authority 
of that body. However, 
Upon mentioning the name of this 
Committee some of the natives exclaimed 
that the council had bought the 
Vigilance Committee for a shilling and 
that they would not have anything to do 
with the committee. 
The mayor then refused to continue the meeting and the crowd 
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eventually dispersed. Two days later a list of 200 names 
was handed in, it is not clear whether to the Vigilance 
Committee or the LAB. (67) However, the mayor refused to 
accept the list as no addresses were given. Eventually a 
new list of 40 names was submitted. In the meantime about 
300 farmers had been circularised and a total of 61 job 
offers had been received. 
As we have seen, however, the unemployed were in the towns 
precisely because they refused to submit to the reduced 
wages on the farms, and no more than 5 people accepted jobs. 
(68) The wages and conditions offered were probably much 
the same as those offered to the Cradock unemployed a month 
later, viz 
Accommodation, wood and water; 
!Os, 1 lb sugar, 1 lb coffee and a roll of tobacco 
per month; 
2 lb mealies and 1 lb meal per day; 
and a quarter sheep every 8 days. (69) 
In March the next year, another demonstration took place 
when a "crowd of non....:Europeans" marched to the Mayor's 
office to demand work and food. This time the mayor was 
less conciliatory. He merely promised to do his best, and 
then ordered the crowd to disperse. This they refused to do 
and eventually the police had to be called in to disperse 
the crowd. Die Middellander complained that the blacks in 
the location were still' "brutaal" and that even the 
townspeople had difficulty in finding labour. The workers 
were becoming increasingly arrogant with a "onafhanklike 
houding" and a "gees van opstandigheid" which made things 
difficult for their bosses. (70) 
The widespread unemployment created a number of problems for 
the organisation. It made it easier for the farmers to 
victimise members of the IANC and other workers who resisted 
the wage cuts. Thus it was reported that 
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One of our farmers who for years past 
always employed a number of natives on 
his farm, recently found it necessary to 
dismiss several of them, as since they 
began attending the meetings, they 
became sulky, dissatisfied and unwilling 
to work. Some of these natives have 
been on the farms for years and today 
they possess a number of stock as well 
as money We fear that that will be 
the fate of many more natives on farms 
who lent their ears to these agitators. 
(71) 
In this particular case African workers were replaced by 
coloured workers, but there are no indications as to whether 
this was a widespread strategy by the farmers, and how the 
IANC responded to this action. One can merely reiterate the 
earlier statement that there is little or no evidence of any 
"racial" divisions within the IANC. 
Victimisation by individual employers remained a problem and 
IANC speakers frequently complained that 
or that 
you cannot get work through having a 
green card in your possession (72) 
Many of you get the sack through these 
meetings. ( 73) 
Nevertheless, it seems that the resistance to working on the 
farms was so great that the farmers were consistently short 
of labour and this prevented them from taking any concerted 
action against IANC members. 
l 
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II PASSES AND PASSIVE RESISTANCE 
The abolition of passes was always one of the main demands 
of the IANC program. At times there was a fairly clear 
political understanding that this and other similarly 
limited demands were not simply ends in themselves. Thus 
Umsebenzi argued that the campaign against the poll tax 
will be a campaign not merely against 
the Poll Tax {and other passes - WH} 
though that tax is important, being the 
basis of the whole forced labour system 
today);{sic} for it will develop into 
mass political strikes and far-reaching 
upheavals of the downtrodden slaves to 
abolish the whole system of white 
imperialism and colour-bar justice in 
this country. (74) 
There were regular pass raids in the locations to enforce 
the pass laws. In one such raid in the Graaf f-Reinett 
location no less than 40 people were arrested, while in a 
raid in Middelburg 16 people were arrested. (75) 
Thus it is not surprising that it was one of the first 
issues to be taken up by the IANC at Middelburg. At one of 
the first meetings, Tonjeni 
started on explaining the Pass Laws in 
South Africa. He said there were 17 
kinds of passes. He named each kind and 
explained each, and then challenged any 
man to come forward to dispute what he 
had said, as he said, the day before one 
Ngobko {sic} had told them that the 
people in the Cape do not carry passes. 
He told the gathering that the Location 
Superintendant had the cheek to warn him 
for {sic} Court for being the Location 
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without permission. (76) 
At a later meeting at Tarkastad Tonjeni listed 11 of the 
passes that African people had to carry: 
Identification pass in Natal; Station Pass, 
required to get a ticket at the station; Poll Tax 
Pass (called a Receipt); Six day Special, when 
looking for work; Monthly Pass, to be carried by 
monthly labourers; Daily Labourers Pass; Day's 
special; Night's Special, required when in 
streets after 9 pm; Trek Pass; Location P ass 
{sic} (Site permit); Lodger's Permit; Passof 
children over 18 years. in house; • ••• {in 
original - WH} even if you have ten of these 
passes and you haven't got the eleventh one, the 
Police arrest you and you go to gaol'. (77) 
The IANC was commited to continue organising the anti-pass 
demonstrations on Dingaan's day started in 1930 (78) and a 
week later Tonjeni 
told the gathering that the Wars on the 
Pass Laws are being continued and that 
on 16th December, 1931 (Coming Dingaan's 
Day) Natives all over South Africa are 
going to demonstrate and burn all passes 
and Tax receipts, and, said he, 'I 
appeal to the Native Police not to shoot 
us on that day, but to rather turn their 
rifles against the oppressors, like 
Manie Maritz did during the Great War. 
(79) 
There were initially plans for demonstrations and pass 
burnings in Middelburg on Friday 6 March, declared by the 
Comintern as International Unemployment Day. (80) These 
plans were cancelled at the last moment, apparently as there 
had been little organisation in the rest of the country. 
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( 81) 
In Middelburg it was especially the lodger's permits that 
caused resentment. All visitors or lodgers, including 
children over the age of 18, had to pay ls for a permit and 
renew it every week. The major complaints were the 
exorbitant cost of the permits and the frequent raids that 
were necessary to enforce them. As in Graaff-Reinett, a 
·continual grievance was the sexual har ·assment of women 
during these raids: (82) 
the Police came and searched your 
house every Saturday and arrest you for 
petty offences like being in the 
Location without a lodgers permit. It 
looks to me as if the Police often come 
and look for girls and then if they hear 
a row simply go and arrest. (83) 
Speakers also complained that the police 
come and pull off the blankets from you 
and your wives~ (84) 
Thus it is not surprising that it was the anger of the women 
against pass raids that caused the first spontaneous 
outburst of mass action and precipitated a crisis in the 
local leadership. On Monday 23 March, the police launched a 
big raid in the location "to collect lodgers' permits". 
(85) The police arrested 16 men without permits but then 
they 
were attacked by native women and 
stoned, some received nasty bruises. 
The native women and children then 
marched in procession to the police 
barracks, shouting, singing and using 
obscene language in some cases. At the 
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police barracks they halted and demanded 
to see the Commandant. Here the stone 
throwing was continued and later on the 
doors of the barracks were bombarded 
with stones. After much persuasion on 
the part of Captain Gould the natives 
left again for the location. 
In the wake of the march, the town was in uproar and Die 
Middellander demanded "fermer" action against the IANC. 
Although only women and children marched, 
dra {dit} dan seker ook in die volste 
mate die goedkeuring weg van 'n groot 
gedeelte van die manlike naturelle ••• 
{Daar is} 'n seker {sic} gedeelte van 
die naturelle ••• wat hul nie 
vereenselwig met die sienswyse van die 
opstokers, maar hulle skyn magteloos te 
staan teenoor die oorwig van die 
volgelinge van Tonjeni en Ko. ( 86) 
It was clear that the conservative petty-bourgeoisie had 
lost "control" over the location residents and that it would 
be some time before they would regain it again. Thus the 
authorities decided that firmer measures were necessary to 
keep the location under control. Firstly, two of the women 
in the march had already been arrested and fined £10 each. 
Now another 22 women were charged with public violence. At 
the trial extra police were brought in from outside to 
prevent. any trouble. The defendants were all convicted and 
' 
sentenced to 3 months imprisonment or £5, suspended for 1 
year. (87) It was also decided that the town's police 
would reinforce the location police on Wednesdays and 
Sundays when the IANC meetings were held. 
The town council also passed additional location regulations 
to control the holding of meetings, and to ~mpose a curfew 
between 9 o'clock at night and 6 o'clock in the morning. 
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·Apparently the Department of Native Affairs refused to 
accept these regulations and they were referred back to the 
council. Unfortunately no reasons were reported for this 
action, but it is another indication that there was a lack 
of a co-ordinated strategy by the state to deal with the 
IANC. (88) The regulations were eventually altered only 
much later. (89) Interestingly a similar situation emerges 
from Julie Wells's work on pass resistance in the 
Potchefstroom location. There a similar difference of 
opinion existed between the NAD and the local council. (90) 
Closely related to the pass issue, were the issues of poll 
tax and rent. As Jim Ngqakai pointed out when he urged 
people to attend a demonstration at the magistrate's office: 
We are all out of work and we must go to 
the magistrate or the Commandant and ask 
for work. We cannot pay our rents and 
has {sic} hardly anthing to eat. on 
what are we going to live? If you do 
not pay your house rent the Magistrate 
sends yo~ a summons. Go to him and tell 
him that you have no money to pay your 
tax and house rent. Go to him tomorrow, 
so when you go and break into stores 
then you know that you had been to him. 
(91) 
The IANC continually attacked the poll tax: 
There is a Poll Tax the Blackmans {sic} 
hell. This you have to pay whether you 
are out of work and if you go to a 
Magistrate to complain that seeing that 
the time for paying Poll Tax is near you 
find it better to report that you are 
out of work and unable to pay, he will 
tell you that you are lazy. (92) 
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Speakers were particularly aggrieved at the discriminatory 
nature of the tax 
••• why should I pay a Tax in my own 
country and the Foreigner the white 
people only pays an income tax if their 
income amounts to £300 a year. (93) 
They continually demanded that poll tax be abolished and 
that rents be reduced as people were simply unable to afford 
them. From the beginning Tonjeni warned that the IANC 
will call upon you one of these days as 
in Cape Town not to pay rent. We will 
fight against it unless demands {for 
lower rents? - WH} are met with. (94) 
Rents in the Graaff-Reinett location w~'re 4s 6d per month 
even though the occupants had to build their own houses. 
(95} 
The IANC leaders always stressed that housing was a right; 
that 
no person or no council has the right to 
drive poverty-stricken workers out of 
their own homes. (96) 
It was not long before the IANC started to organise a 
passive resistance campaign against both the poll tax and 
rents. The town clerk reported that 
daar altyd maar min hure agterstallig 
was, maar sodra die agitators Tonjenie 
{sic} en Plaatjie {sic} ender die 
naturelle gekom bet, bet die hure vinnig 
agterstallig geraak. 
Thus in May 1931, no fewer than 90 summonses were issued 
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within a week. (97) There is, however, no evidence that 
the council proceeded to evict any tenants in 1931, except 
for James Ntame, who was one of the most prominent IANC 
members at the time. (98) It seems that the authorities 
were wary of provoking a violent reaction by large-scale 
evictions. Thus it was reported, for instance, that the 
magistrate refused to convict pensioners for failing to pay 
their rent. (99) 
Part of the reason for this lack of repression was probably 
the fact that the rents campaign was never a very concerted 
one, and did not invoke an absolute refusal to pay rent. 
Most people were probably still paying some rent, but were 
becoming further and further in arrears. It was only later 
in 1932 as part of a general increase in repression that the 
council felt able to clamp down on tenants refusing to pay 
rent. (100) 
The IANC also consistently attacked the poll tax: 
The white man is leading you to misery. 
When you tell them that you are starving 
they turn round and say 'You bloody 
nigger, you must pay your Poll Tax • 
(101) 
Thus Tonjeni 
urged the natives to refuse to pay poll 
tax like himself and the women must 
assist their husbands in the fight. 
(102) 
At a later meeting Eddie Ndaba told the crowd that 
We must unite and not pay this poll tax. 
I will never again pay poll tax. Pirow 
can pay it for me. (From the crowd -
'Let them come to the location for the 
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poll tax'). Any policeman who come to-
me for poll tax will have to be 
prepared. Pirow can go to hell with his 
poll tax. We must not pay it. (From 
the crowd - 'We won't pay it') 
This campaign was remarkably successful as the table below 
shows: 
TABLE 4: COLLECTION OF POLL TAX IN MIDDELBURG (103) 
Year Collections Index (1928-30 =100) 
1926 757 82,4 
1927 501 54,5 
1928 932 101,5 
1929 918 99,9 
1930 906 98,6 
1931 442 48,1 
1932 555 60,4 
The low level of collection in 1927 might have been the 
result of ICU organisation. At any rate, it is clear that 
there was a big drop in tax collections after the IANC 
started to organise in the area. The local magistrate 
appears to be correct in his assessment that 
the depression was respsi ble {sic} to a 
certain extent but the main cause was 
agitation by the African Independent 
Congress {sic}. (104) 
As in the case of the rents campaign, the poll tax was not 
too strictly enforced, even though it was reported that 
the police have been taking energetic 
steps to round up defaulters. (105) 
People convicted of failing to pay their tax were often not 
even fined on condition that they pay their arrears within 
- ----------------------------------------
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two weeks. (106) The rather lax enforcement was at least 
partly due to the keen awareness of the farmers that the tax 
had a direct effect on the cost of reproducing labour power 
and consequently on wages. (107) Many farmers saw it as "an 
undesired tax on the employer". Many farmers spoke out 
against the poll tax and advocated its abolition, at least 
for the duration of the Depression. (108) Thus many workers 
were probably aided by their employers when they tried to 
evade the tax. 
A last, somewhat confused element in the passive resistance 
campaign of the IANC was health. The IANC was extremely 
cynical about all welfare work done by whites, as it was 
only done "to swell the slave market." (109) 
Although it seems that health never became a very big issue, 
it is likely that the effects of the passive resistance to 
the white man's laws spilled over into this area. Certainly 
the Medical Officer of Health devoted considerable attention 
to the IANC in his annual report for 1931. He reported that 
infant mortality in the location was more than 40% in 
1930/31 compared to about 25% previously, while the rate for 
whites was only about 6% to 7%. He argued that the 
increase in 1931 is due to the 
communism which was introduced in the 
location during the second half of 1930. 
(110) 
There is, however, considerable room for doubt. The MOH's 
main grounds for making this assertion was the fact that 
women had to attend two three hour meetings each week and 
were thus less able to look after their children and visit 
the clinic. He totally ignored the effects that the 
Depression and unemployment had on the health of the people. 
Certainly elsewhere in the Midlands the same pattern 
occurred. For example, in cradock infant mortality, 
"normally" between 40% and 50%, shot up to 75. 3% in 1930/1, 
while in Graaf f-Reinet t it was over 100% in 1930/ 1. ( 111) 
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Perhaps the location nurse at Cradock was closer to the 
truth when she reversed the causality and argued that 
Extreme poverty is suitable soil for 
native agitators and the sight of 
starving children drives parents to any 
lengths. ( 112) 
Although the IANC on occasion attacked the 
conditions of the Lavetories and Baths 
in the Location condemning the Health 
Officer as a man who does not know his 
work, (113) 
there is no evidence of any concerted campaign against the 
health authorities. In fact it 1s rather ironic that the 
secretary of the IANC was himself the victim of an 
infectious disease. This le.d' ·to an angry demonstration 
when the location superintendent disinfected the house and 
locked all the IANC's papers into the house. Die 
Middellander reported that the police had to be called in to 
rescue the location superintendent from the crowd. ( 114) 
III ORGANISING WOMEN 
One of the most significant features of the IANC was the 
attention that was given to the organisation of women. 
Other popular organisations at the time, excluded women, 
either explicitly like the ANC or tacitly like the ICU. 
(115) The IANC actively encouraged women to join and to 
become active in the organisation. 
Women must join the organisation, they 
are as much exploited as men. Women 
have to go early to work and scrub 
floors. See them carry heavy bundles. 
Washing gives colds and ironing 
consumption. (116) 
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The IANC allowed women to join on the same basis as men and 
this was a tremendous advance for the time. But it does not 
seem to have been coupled with much notion of the 
specificity of the oppression of women, and of the need for 
women to be liberated in their own right. Although the 
women had regular meetings in their own, (117) the issues 
raised were much the same as at other IANC meetings. The 
emphasis was simply shifted to those issues that affected 
women more directly. 
The only specifically women's issue that was raised 
regularly at meetings, was the question of sexual assaults 
on women during pass raids as well as the plight of those 
women who were forced by economic conditions to become 
prostitutes. (118) The other feature of women's 
organisation was that it was mostly about issues of national 
oppression - rather than class or sex oppression. Although 
there is not enough evidence to substantiate this argument 
fully, it seems that women were very involved in the 
campaigns against passes and rents which did not affect the 
working class only. There was much less involvement of 
women in the campaign against unemployment, which was 
essentially a working class issue. 
It is unclear what the significance of these differences 
were in practice, but it probably reinforced the tendency 
within the IANC to give more prominence to national demands., 
As seen earlier, very little emphasis had been placed on the 
socialist demands that were implicit in the Black Republic 
programme. 
There were however, issues on which the women took action or 
were asked to take action as women. The most dramatic of 
these was the anti-pass demonstration in March (119) where 
the women took the initiative. Another incident took place 
at nearby Naauwpoort 
when the Location Superintendent could 
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not stop him {Plaatjes - WH} or Tonjeni 
from holding a meeting a black Policeman 
ran and called his bosses and they came 
rushing up to us as if they were dealing 
with monkeys, and the women rushed at 
them and we had trouble to save their 
lives. (120) 
There were often appeals to women to act as they were 
regarded as more fearless than the men. Thus at the same 
meeting Tonjeni urged the woment to lure the black policemen 
into a trap, (121) while at a later meeting Ndaba appealed 
to you women to see that when Hendricks 
comes here no man is to arrest him, 
unless they can give a reason why 
Hendricks cannot stay here any more. I 
know you women can do a thing while men 
are still thinking. (122) 
In addition, the women probably enjoyed some tactical 
advantage over the men, as in any direct action the police 
was probably less inclined to use indiscriminate force 
against them. This did not always hold true, though, and 
women also had to bear the brunt of some of the severest 
repression. The following is a description of an incident 
at Cradock which was not reported in the press, 
On 2/8/1931 our womenfolk were brutally 
assaulted andtorn {sic} by the Pirow 
dogs who were in private clothes, 40 
boer constables and 50 detectives. 
Three of our men who were dragging a 
wagon on which was our flagwere {sic} 
brutally assaulted and they are spitting 
blood through these dirty white people 
they who assault native females. No 
blackman would assault a whitewoman. 
~ -
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These whites have children amongst us. 
(123) 
Throughout the organisation in Middelburg women, in the 
words of the police, remained "well to the fore" (124) in 
the IANC. However, although women were more often than not 
in the majority at meetings, the top leadership remained 
almost exclusively male. Nevertheless, some efforts were 
made by the top leadership to advance the position of women 
in leadership positions. In August it was announced that 
••• from instructions received from 
Capetown Wednesday {sic} we have to give 
the sisters a chance to speak, moreover, 
there is going to be a female conference 
during this month in Johannesburg called 
by the female branch of the IANC of 
Johannesburg. I cannot say on what date 
but we will have to send delegates 
there. (125) 
The conference was in fact called by the newly formed 
women's department of the CPSA in connection with the 
campaign against passes for women in Johannesburg. ( 126) 
It is not clear whether the delegates ever attended the 
conference but after this women spoke on the IANC platform 
fairly regularly, especially Sarah Jonas, Sarah Uitlander 
and Pop Miles. (127) 
The important role the women played, as well as the 
limitations of their role is clear from a report drawn up by 
the local District Commandant. On his list of the "known 
agitators" who should be banned from the area, there were 
four women amongst the 17 names. (128) 
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IV THE CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION 
The ANC and CAC in the early 1930's 
one of the crucial issues confronting the IANC in the 
Midlands area was the existence of the local affiliate of 
the ANC, viz. the Cape African Congress. The relationship 
between the CAC and the organisers from the ANC(WP) had 
already been soured by a bitter dispute about areas of 
jurisdiction, as CAC considered itself as representing the 
whole of the Cape Province. This dispute dragged on for 
many years (129) and probably had its origans in Thaele's 
initial militancy (see previous chapter). Even after he 
made a conservative turn in 1930, the dispute continued and 
was only settled by the intervention of the ANC in 1936. 
(130) 
These problems were aggravated when the ANC(WP) and later 
the IANC started to organise in the backyard of the CAC in 
1930. Before we look at the CAC though, it is ne~essary to 
look more closely at the state of the ANC as a whole in the 
early 1930's. The situation is perhaps best summarised by 
Mahabane, secretary-general of the ANC, when he admitted in 
1930 that the ANC as a whole "is at present is {sic} in a 
state of lamentable disorganisation". (131) This was 
mostly the result of a reassertion of its strength by the 
right wing at the 1930 congress in Bloemfontein and the 
extremely conservative policies followed by its central 
leadership. For example, after his election as president 
general in 1930 Seme, declared that 
Die blankes is ans vriende. Ons strewe 
na vryheid en die blankes is die ware 
boodskappers van hierdie vryheid. (132) 
It was reported that at the congress 
moes by aanhoudend tussenby kom om 
drastiese besluite teen die Regering te 
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keer en die Kommunistiese groep ender 
die afgevaardigdes te gebied om die orde 
te handhaaf. Hy versoek die Regering om 
geen onderdrukkende maatreels teen die 
naturelle te neem nie. Hy sal alles in 
sy vermoe doen om hulle in bedwang te 
hou. 
The main demand put forward during 1930 and at the 1931 
congress of the ANC was the appropriately petty bourgeois 
one that the Africans should have the "vryheid" to obtain 
trading facilities in their own areas so that they could 
develop on their own. (133) The lack of any popular 
demands was aggravated by the fact that, as Seme reported, 
'Die vorige kongres bet my opdrag gegee 
om te reorganiseer en die opstandige 
leiers bet ek uit die bestuur uitgesluit 
••• Ek wil 'n span he wat gewillig is om 
saam met my te werk.' (134) 
Consequently it is hardly surprising to find even the 
official organs of the National Party singing the praises of 
the ANC leadership. Seme, for example, was described as 
die waardige leier van die naturelle in 
die Unie ••• {and as} 'n buitengewone 
gematigde nature! uiters besadig en 
{by} oefen 'n kalmerende invloed op sy 
volgelinge uit. (135) 
The "lamentable disorganistion" of the ANC is illustrated by 
the fact that when delegates arrived in Bloemfontein for the 
1931 Congress, they were unable to find the local branch as 
it had ceased to exist. (136). The accounts of historians 
confirm these contemporary accounts (137) and it would not 
be an e~aggeration to say that the ANC hardly existed as a 
national organisation. Even some of the conservatives 
agreed with this ·verdict. Selope Thema wrote at the 
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beginning of 1932 that 
Since 1912 and during my nineteen years 
of service in the cause of Bantu 
freedom, I have never witnessed such 
inactivity and apathy on the part of our 
leaders as now. (138) 
Sol Plaatje, another noted conservative agreed with Thema. 
The CAC, on the other hand, at least seems to have been 
fairly well organised in the sense that it was a 
well-entrenched "bureaucracy" in the Eastern Cape. Its 
members dominated local bodies like the Location Advisory 
Boards (LAB) and the Vigilance Committees (VC), the petty 
bourgeois organisations such as the Cape African Voters 
Association, the various teachers and ministers association, 
as well as the Cradock Joint Council. 
The class interests and methods of this group was 
personified in the ubiquitous figure of the Reverend James 
Calata. He was already an important figure in the CAC. 
(139) He had joined the ANC in 1930 and in the same year he 
was elected as the president of the CAC. In 1936 he became 
secretary-general of the ANC. Although he was one of the 
signatories to the 1949 Programme of Action, he already had 
severe reservations about the new militant direction of the 
ANC and resigned both as secretary-general and as president 
of CAC. He continued to serve on the executive of the ANC 
till 1956. {140) All this he seemed to have achieved 
without any substantial change from his position in 1932. 
In Calata's presidential address to the Midlands African 
Teachers Conference at Cookhouse in 1931, he declared that 
At Middelburg and cradock the seed of 
Communism has been sown: but thanks to 
education, the intelligent Bantu have 
denounced it in no uncertain terms. 
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Howevei, it had got hold of the ignorant 
masses and is threatening the churches 
••• I do not mean that we must not 
agitate for our rights. Let us by all 
means agitate and agitate; but 
agitation can produce beneficial results 
only when it is done constitutionally. 
(141) 
The attitude is argued even more strongly by the Middelburg 
(black) churches who wrote that 
The Bible teaches us to be loyal and 
submissive to those who administrate the 
affairs of the country on behalf of the 
Government. (142) 
The natural result of this strategy was that any 
acknowledgement by the ruling class of its "moderation" was 
welcomed by the CAC and encouraged it further on the road of 
"constitutional opposition", while giving it an illusion of 
success. Thus, when the mayor of Cradock opened the 1930 
CAC congress, he welcomed the delegates and praised their 
moderation. But, said the MNKF, 
The question presses itself on one 
whether this type of leader is receiving 
the type of support he deserves {from 
the white community - WH} (143) 
As- discussed earlier, when the IANC started to make inroads 
into the traditional stronghold of the ANC in the Eastern 
Cape, even the official organs of the National Party did not 
hesitate to support the conservatives in the ANC when it 
seemed that they might lose control. In his reply to the 
mayor, professor Jabavu 
remembered the time when the Congress 
used to be regarded as a dangerous 
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thing. Today the same congress was 
regarded as a moderate body, and had to 
fight with its back to the wall against 
Bolshevism. (144) 
The bourgeois press were not slow to recognise the value of 
the CAC in controlling black opposition and supported it 
actively in its ''fight" against the militants. Thus the 
Midlands News and Karroo Farmer gave much publicity to the 
CAC. It reported fully on the 1930 congress of the CAC and 
praised the speeches which were 
in striking contrast to the fire-eating 
speeches made by the Communists and 
other agitators ••• {Although there was 
some plain-speaking} the delegates' 
utterances were tempered with a feeling 
of responsibility and a desire to say 
and do nothing that would bring their 
cause into disrepute. (145) 
Thus the scene was set for a bitter struggle between the CAC 
and the IANC. The battleground would be overwhelmingly 
political/ideological jurisdiction. 
The Conflict between the IANC and CAC 
The conservatives were very well organised in Middelburg, 
although their relationship with the local town council was 
not as happy as it could have been. Although there was a VC 
and a LAB, it appears that the latter did not really 
function, and it was only revived later under the threat of 
IANC mi 1 i tancy. 
From the beginning the IANC clashed with both African and 
coloured conservatives at their meetings. At this second 
meeting, Tonjeni was asked whether, 
if we join the A.P.O. are we wrong? 
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Yes Abdurahman is a coward. At this the 
meeting became slightly rowdy and some 
people leaving {sic} the spot. (146) 
At the next meeting the IANC came under a concerted attack 
from the conservatives, especially Piet Ngoboko, when 
Tonjeni 
went over to communistic ideas and 
explained that the communist party were 
out to break up Native Slavery. He 
appealed to all Coloureds and Natives to 
come together and to stand together and 
raise funds to further the purpose of 
the communist party. (147) 
After this relations with the conservatives deteriorated 
still further. Die Middelander reported that 
The natives seemed to have been stirred 
up to a high pitch and are divided into 
two camps. (148) 
Supporters of the IANC refused to allow the conservatives to 
speak at their meetings and Rev. Sishuba narrowly escaped 
assault when he tried to question the speakers at a meeting. 
Especially members of the LAB and VC were 
in very bad odour with Tonjeni's 
followers and are regarded as traitors 
to the natives. (149) 
At a meeting of 700 people on Sunday, 22 February, Tonjeni 
said he was pleased to see that so many 
people were interested. He said the 
'Goodboy' Mapekele {sic} of Bloemfontein 
openly declared himself in favour of the 
present Pass Laws and that he, 
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(Mapekele) like Rev. Sishuba (Agitator 
135) and one Ngoboko (a Middelburg 
native), who say that the existing pass 
laws are good, are traitors to their own 
blood, traitors who are responsible for 
the taxes and traitors who hang on to 
the tails of the whites and who are 
satisfied with the crumbes {sic} of the 
white man's table and continued thus 
'Sec 29 of the Natives Administration 
Act prohibit me to say anything which 
would pronote {sic} feelings of 
hostility between white and black 
people, but not between black and black 
and I therefore tell you to hate black 
traitors, traitors ought to be burned 
alive. (150) 
The IANC was not willing to negotiate and compromise like 
the ANC leaders, and they constantly advocated a policy of 
direct opposition to oppressive laws. They were 
particularly scornful of the ANC's 
Policy of 'Natives only' and pointed out 
that Coloured people are prohibited of 
{sic} becoming Officers of the party of 
the 'Goodboys'. (151) 
In the meantime the organisations of the conservatives were 
in total disarray. In the wake of the women's 
demonstration, the town council alleged that the LAB had 
never brought any grievances to its attention. Piet 
Ngoboka, secretary of the VC issued a heated denial, saying 
that the LAB had sent a letter outlining their grievances to 
the council in August 1930, and it had resigned en bloc when 
there was no response. Even the local press was 
particularly perturbed about the fact that the conservatives 
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skyn magteloos te staan teenoor die 
oorwig van die volgelinge van Tonjenie 
en Ko. (152) 
The town council now decided to take active steps in an 
effort to help the VC and the LAB to regain some of their 
lost credibility with the inhabitants of the location. New 
LAB elections were called for the end of May, but they were 
ignored by the IANC. In the elections Eddie Ndaba, Herman 
Minnaar and Isaac Buy were elected, while Ngoboka was 
nominated by the council as its representative. (153) 
The new LAB was supposed to concern itself with the 
grievances of the VC, but it seemed to have achieved very 
little and was unable to play any significant role until 
much later when the IANC had been suppressed. Even the 
efforts of the council to force the IANC to deal only with 
the LAB appears to have failed. (154) 
Part of the reason for this collapse probably stems from the 
fact that Eddie Ndaba, one of the LAB members defected to 
the IANC soon after his election and became one of its most 
prominent organisers. Soon afterwards Minnaar apparently 
also joined the IANC as he spoke at one of its meetings 
(155) and the council's strategy seems to have collapsed at 
that point. It was only in the course of 1932 that the 
council again tried to strengthen the LAB by giving it 
(unspecified) additional powers. (156) 
The weakness and the fear of the conservatives were 
graphically demonstrated by two events. Firstly, when 
elections were held for the LAB in 1932 there were no 
nominations. Eventually the council had to nominate 3 
well-known conservatives to the LAB. They requested that a 
meeting be held in the location to elect the other three 
members, but this meeting never took place. (157) 
Secondly, the conservatives sometimes felt unable to oppose 
the IANC directly on matters of policy. Rather they 
260 
concentrated their attacks on the particular tactics it was 
using. Thus Ngoboka wrote in Die Middellander 
I am not against the Organisation, but 
the fact remains that policy is too high 
for the uncivil and uneducated 
non-Europeans. We as a black population 
expect and wish to be led by civil men, 
law-abiding men like Sishuba, 
Nyovume and Minnaar How many a time 
have the above mentioned respectable men 
succeeded in settling the grievances of 
the location inhabitants by approaching 
the local authorities respectfully ••• 
Surely when we approach one of these 
gentlemen {the Mayor or District 
Commandant of Police - WH} with our 
grievances, they are sure to listen and 
try acceede {sic} to our wishes. What 
more could be expect? (158) 
But the disagreements with the conservatives went deeper 
than differences over tactics - it reflected a fundamental 
difference in the class basis of the CAC and IANC. Clues as 
to these differences have already emerged in the analysis 
above. The CAC leaders repeatedly referred to themselves as 
"responsible men". They differentiated themselves sharply 
from the mass of the population - "the ignorant masses" or 
the "uncivil and uneducated non-Europeans". (159) Although 
there were a number of petty bourgeois leaders in the IANC, 
they were probably outnumbered by the leaders from a working 
class background. Certainly the organisation as a whole 
represented the rural proletariat and there was a profound 
distru•t of the petty bourgeoisie, and sometimes even a 
./l' 
conscious realisation that their class interests were 
fundamentally different from those of the rural proletariat: 
It is through the educated native that 
we get hell today. They want to be 
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foremans on the farms and so on, just to 
get positions and depress us. (160) 
This distrust, combined with the long and bitter struggle 
waged against the "good boys", ruled out any possibility of 
an alliance, or even co-operation, between the IANC and the 
petty bourgeoisie. 
Most of the venom of the IANC was reserved for the urban 
petty bourgeoisie. It is a notable and somewhat surprising, 
feature of the discourse of the IANC that the traditional 
petty bourgeoisie was hardly even mentioned. There is no 
evidence of the complex interaction between the urban and 
traditional leadership that was such a distinctive feature 
of the Independent ICU in nearby East London and, to a 
lesser extent, of the ICU in Natal and Transvaal. (161) 
When the traditional leaders were mentioned, it was only to 
dis miss them as "sellouts". 
You should not wait for your Chiefs to 
say the word. They are all getting bags 
of money from the Government, what do 
you expect from them? They are only 
engine drivers of the Government. (162) 
A detailed discussion of the rupture between the IANC and 
the traditional leaders is beyond the scope of this work, 
but one can / suggest some possibilities: 
Firstly the material conditions in the Midlands were very 
different from the other areas, where the interaction had 
been based on a real coincidence of interests between the 
traditional and urban leadership. 
Secondly, the IANC leadership had had a relatively radical 
political education and they tended to despise traditional 
conservatism represented. by the chiefs. In the Eastern cape 
most of the chiefs that had some kind of political 
involvement, probably supported the CAC or even more 
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conservative bodies. (163) 
Ministers and the Church 
Closely related to the struggle against conservatives, was a 
struggle against the conventional church. 
The ambivalent position of the IANC is summed up in Runeli's 
report on the organisation in Graaff-Reinett: 
You will always find the Church fighting 
against the freeing of the people ••• 
{especially} the Rooi Baadjies. (1.64) 
But, he added that the AME and the Ethiopian or "Poqo" 
churches supported and worked with the IANC. 
Quite often the church and religion was condemned outright. 
Thus people like Plaat jes and Hendricks often stated that 
they were not believers and there were regular attacks on 
the church. (165) At one meeting Tonjeni described how at 
Naauwpoort 
they were chased out of a house by one 
Native Minister called Belwana ••• He 
said that he told the gathering all this 
in order that they should be on their 
guard against the Native Ministers of 
Religion whom he referred to as traitors 
who would sell their own people to the 
whitemen ••• 
{Plaatjes} then pointed out to the 
gathering that all along while they were 
attending Church and being preached to 
the whiteman stole your gold and 
diamonds from out underneath you 
You must watch the Black Ministers, they 
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are all bloodsuckers like the whites. 
They, the shepherds, say 'Bass {sic} you 
can shear, I'll collect the pennies'. 
(166) 
They attacked the hypocrisy of the churches, especially the 
white churches, who 
told you to look up to God and while you 
are doing that they stole your country 
and that is why I don't even close my 
eyes when I pray. (167) 
Speakers from the IANC stressed the secular nature of their 
struggle for liberation. They rejected the churches who 
told the black people that even though they are poor on 
earth, 
you will go to heaven when you die. 
They themselves, however, said he, will 
rather go the best Doctor in Europe or 
do anything else than to die and go to 
heaven. 
Therefore, said he, let us rather also 
have. something on earth and go to hell. 
(168) 
The point was made again and again. At a later meeting 
Hendricks emphasised that 
die koninkryk van die verlossing is aan 
kom. Nie die koninkryk van die Hemel 
nie. (169) 
while Tonjeni said that 
you have been told to look up to Heaven 
above, but we should make it right here 
on earth. (170) 
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The IANC did not, however, completely escape the very 
pervasive influence of the church at that time. Even those 
leaders that constantly attacked the church, seldom if ever 
proposed that the IANC as a whole should be against 
religion. They also regularly drew on biblical imagery to 
drive home their points. Thus Ndobe 
told the gathering ••• how Noah built 
the Ark and how people then laughed at 
Noah and said he was a drunken fool or a 
lunatic and refused to join him until it 
was too late, and continued that those 
who still hesitate to join his 
organisation will find themselves in the 
same position as the people in the time 
of Noah. (171) 
Another popular biblical parallel was 
the story of Mose, {sic} Pharoah and the 
Israelites •. Moses would not agree to 
the Israelites being exploited and he 
performed miracles, one of which was 
blood shed in Egypt. We are faced with 
a Pharoah. (172) 
Mostly it was the IANC itself that was cast in the role of 
Moses, but on occasion some of the more popular leaders were 
regarded as "Moses's". (173) 
This religious imagery became much more common after the 
Reverend Douglas Camba a minister in the Church of Christ (a 
breakaway? Baptist church) joined the IANC in July. He soon 
became a regular speaker on the platform and preached 
something of a "black Theology". 
If I have my own way I would have no 
Black man in any English Church, I would 
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say get into a Pondo Church, but there 
is no Pondo (Entirely native) church. 
(174) 
The IANC, though, continued to be virulently against the 
established churches. The effectiveness of this campaign 
can be_ gauged from the fact that it was reported that 
churches in Middelburg were deserted in 1931, and only 
started to fill up again once the IANC had been crushed by 
the increased repression. (175) The success of this 
campaign is remarkable when one bears in mind the 
pervasiveness of religious ideology amongst African people, 
especially in the Eastern Cape where the missionaries had a 
disproportionate influence. (176) 
The tamnannies 
If the leaders of the IANC despised the conservatives, there 
are few words to describe their feelings towards the black 
policemen, Koma and CinJimbo. They at tended all IANC 
meetings to take notes, as well as following the leaders 
around to check that they left the location at 9 o'clock. 
On several occasions they arrested the IANC leaders, 
sometimes unjustly. (177) They were also partly 
responsible for enforcing the unpopular location 
regulations. 
Tonjeni launched the first public attack on the police after 
Plaatjes was charged for allegedly being the location after 
nine. 
There is Cinjimbo, he knows that his own 
people are suffering yet he goes and 
tell a deliberate lie in Court against 
my friend Plaatje {sic} My friends 
these men are dangerous You women 
can easily get these two men, they are 
very fond of liquor you can easily get 
them, and they go to certain houses in 
the Location ••• 'My friends, these men 
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are traitors, I will say nothing about 
the white Police as they are known to be 
enemies but men like Cinjimbo and Koma 
are more dangerous and I appeal to you 
to get them for me ••• I leave the 
Location at five to nine each evening 
and if I see Koma or Cinjimbo I will 
shout 'Here is Koma' or 'Here is 
Cinjimbo' and you must all come out. 
(178) 
As the police became more involved in repression, verbal 
attacks on traitors became a common theme at meetings: 
••• the oppressor must be killed. I 
appeal to you my friends these 
Tamnannies (Informers} must be killed, 
in the war the English used to have them 
dig their own graves, blindfold them and 
then tell them to pray with their backs 
to the grave and then shot them. (179) 
Thus they were often grouped with the conservative petty 
bourgeoisie: 
They may have a good education but he 
{sic} is nothing but a baboon and he has 
no sense. You may pray under him but he 
will arrest so as to become a good boy. 
These black detectives and our Ministers 
are the most oppressors to our people. 
(180) 
These traitors were classed with the conservatives 
••• like Pokomela and Calota {sic} of 
cradock ••• who ought to be killed for 
carrying lies to the Europeans. I know 
that even here now there are tamnanies 
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(reporters or informers of the 
Europeans). At this stage Nqwameshe and 
others intervened saying they want to 
assault these tamnanies. Shouting out, 
here is Koma tool Why leave him? here 
is a Pirow dog and informer to the white 
people. Why not assault him first: ••• 
(181) 
These verbal attacks were undoubtedly popular with the rank 
and file members who were very bitter about the injustices 
they suffered at the hands of these men. on at least one 
occasion it seems that the superintendent was physically 
attacked, but Ndaba apparently intervened to help him: 
Brider the superintendent is a dog and 
you must chase him out of here It is 
a pity I stopped you the other day when 
you wanted to give him a hiding and I 
also include the inspector (From the 
crowd 'we will still wring their necks 
for them'). (182) 
Equally popular was the frequent abuse that was heaped upon 
authority. In an admittedly extreme example, Andries Louw 
attacked 
die 'Bloody fool' van 'n Superintendent, 
die 'Bloody fool' Brider ••• Hy en die 
'Bloody fool' van 'n Poliesieman Billy 
hulle doen net wat hulle wil, en se 
{sic} die 'Council se {sic} hulle moet 
dit doen ••• of die 'Bloody Council' of 
the 'Bloody fool' Brider lieg'. (183) 
The police reported that they 
noticed that the applause was always 
much more prolonged when one of the 
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Speakers referred in scathing terms to 
Generals Hertzog and Smuts and the 
Minister of Justice, also when the 
Superintendent and the Town Council was 
referred to in the same terms. (184) 
This was not merely mindless abuse, although it did reflect 
the deep-seated bitterness of the IANC members. It was also 
a positive effort to break down the servility that had been 
drummed into the oppressed masses over many years, to show 
them that their "masters" were just ordinary people who 
could be abused and challenged. Frantz Fanon has already 
eloquently argued the importance of breaking down the 
servility of the "colonised" before any liberation struggle 
can be successful. (185) 
In the South African context Helen Bradford has also argued 
that 
The growth of awareness that white 
authority could be overtly and 
successfully challenged - whether 
through legal victories or through ICU 
officials booming out accusations while 
the Boers sat silently in their cars -
was potentially extremely serious. 
(186) 
As in the case of the ICU, these speeches were a major 
element in the growth of widespread insubordination - or 
"insolence" as it was arrogantly described in the discourse 
of the ruling class. It is very difficult to give any 
precise content to this term, but it encompassed a variety 
of activities ranging from not looking "happy" to refusing 
to accept lower wages. For instance, Die Middellander 
complained in 1932 that labourers were "brutaal", that 
housewives were unable to find labour and when they found 
workers, they turned out to be arrogant. (187) In general 
it complained that the "gees van opstandigheid" and 
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"onafhanklike houding" of the workers made life very 
difficult for their bosses. 
The Courier reported another case where 5 shearers - all 
"good shearers" - were sentenced to £3 or 14 days for 
deliberately injuring about 400 sheep while shearing them. 
(188) In yet another case it was reported that 
"kwaaddoeners" went round Middelburg during the night and 
opened the taps in all the gardens, apparently in protest 
against the shortage of water and poor sanitation facilities 
in the location. (189) 
V A COMPARISON WITH THE ICU IN EAST LONDON 
In conclusion, it is worthwhile to discuss briefly the work 
of Beinart and Bundy on the discourse of the Independent ICU 
in East London. (190) 
There are many parallels between the discourse of the IANC 
and that of the IICU, but it is the differences that are 
especially noteworthy. The greatest difference was that 
th~re ~as little or no appeals to traditionalism by the 
IANC. This was partly because of the fact that the 
traditional culture was much more remote in the Midlands. 
Although the towns were smaller than East London, the 
population was definitely more settled and homogeneous than 
the "fragmented, varigated population of East London". 
(191) There were few migrant workers and it is clear that 
tribal values and structures were much less important than 
they were in East London. 
In addition, one of the major characteristics of the IANC 
was that it organised both coloured and African people. 
Consequently, it could of necessity not appeal too much to 
narrow cultural traditions. Furthermore, there was also a 
profound distrust of the role of the traditional political 
authorities, and here there was never any attempt to 
co-operate with them, as the IICU did in East London. (192) 
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Many themes were common to the discourse of both the IANC 
and IICU, such as the need for organisational loyalty and 
discipline, the need for class solidarity but especially for 
national solidarity, the use of often violent religious 
imagery, the need for independent black churches, and the 
appeals to a a relatively recent history of resistance. 
But even where there were common themes, there was usually a 
marked difference in emphasis. Although religious imagery 
permeated the discourse of both organisations and both 
virulently condemned the established churches, the IICU did 
not condemn religion outright (193) as the IANC often did. 
In general it is also true that the need for national, 
rather than class solidarity was stressed by the IANC. As 
in the case of the IICU there were, for example, frequent 
references to the successful nationalist struggle of the 
Afrikaners under Hertzog, and it was often held up as an 
example worth emulating.· ( 194) But within the IANC there 
was far more stress on the particular issues affecting the 
popular classes, rather than on broad nationalist demands. 
Thus, while the similarities between organisation in East 
London and the Midlands were striking, the differences in 
emphasis and approach serve to indicate the specificity of 
the organisation in the Midlands. 
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REPRESSION AND RESISTANCE : 
ORGANISATION IN CRADOCK AND THE DECLINE OF 
THE IANC IN THE MIDLANDS 
The previous chapter examined some of the major themes that 
arose out of the activities of the IANC in the Midlands. It 
concentrated on developments in Middelburg, although it also 
drew on some material from other centres. 
Once the IANC was well established in Middelburg, however, 
it made continued efforts to organise elsewhere in the 
Midlands. These efforts were directed especially at 
Cradock, the only other large town in the Midlands, but the 
organisers from Middelburg also travelled to Naauwpoort, 
Tarkastad, Hofmeyr and other towns. (1) 
The first part of this chapter concentrates on the 
development of organisation in Cradock up to 1931. The rest 
of the chapter discusses developments in the Midlands after 
September 1931 when the authorities adopted an increasingly 
hard line towards the IANC. 
I THE START OF ORGANISATION IN CRADOCK 
This section concentrates on the development of the 
organisation at Cradock. Events there were to precipitate a 
vastly increased level of repression in the Midlands area. 
Furthermore, Cradock is also of particular interest for the 
light it throws on the role of the petty bourgeoisie. 
The population of the Cradock Location was nearly 5 000 
people, about half of them African people. (2) The 
conservative petty bourgeoisie were particularly well 
organised in Cradock. In addition to the usual LAB and 
Vigilance Committee there was the Non-European Association, 
while Cradock was one of the few places in the country to 
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boast a Joint Council of Europeans and non-Europeans. (3) 
The local paper had reported as early as June 1930 that it 
appeared 
that agitators {were} at work amongst 
the non-Europeans over a wide area 
in an apparent reference to Tonjeni's visit to 
Graaff-Reinett. (4) It is not clear whether he organised 
in Cradock itself, but there was certainly no concerted 
attempt to organise there until much later. Nevertheless 
the CAC had started organising against possible "invasions" 
by the militants soon after the CAC Congress in June 1930. 
A "mass meeting" was held in the location to prepare the 
ground. 
At this meeting 16 men and seven women 
joined the Cape Congress, the majority 
of whom were members of the local 
Vigilance Association it being made 
clear by those joinging that there must 
be no Communist propaganda in Cradock. 
( 5) 
The VC with AK Pokomela as chairman and John Sitela as 
secretary was revitalised and used as the major instrument 
of the conservatives in their struggle against the IANC. It 
was decided that the VC would affiliate directly to the CAC 
and that public and committee meetings would be held every 
two weeks. (6) Attempts were made to recruit more members 
and 50 people joined the VC in the months after the cape 
Congress. 
The VC was helped in its struggle by the Non-European 
Association of the Rev. James Calata and Lucas Afrika, the 
LAB (Sitela, Afrika and others) and the local Joint council. 
The conservatives decided that they 
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should use all the influence they had 
with the younger generation, who had not 
their character, who did not share their 
beliefs and whose methods were not wise 
in all things. They t.rusted they would 
not listen to those with Communistic 
ideas and that they would have nothing 
to do with the men who came from Russia 
{They} had only one object and that 
was to promote harmony and good feeling 
between the Europeans and the residents 
of the location. (7) 
When the IANC started to organise in Middelburg and 
Tarkastad, the VC reaffirmed 
that they had no sympathy with the 
Communist agitators and have no belief 
in their doctrine. They do not desire 
their coming into the location. (8) 
When Tonjeni and Plaatjes visited Cradock a while later, 
they were unable to hold any meetings and they were refused 
per miss ion to enter the location. The mayor convened a 
special meeting to discuss the issue. In attendance were 
the LAB, the VC of the CAC, the JC, "a few leading 
inhabitants of the Cradock location", the mayor, the town 
clerk and the district commandant of police. A motion, 
moved by Calata, was unanimously adopted, that 
the local Municipal council and the 
Police be kindly but urgently requested 
not to permit any agitators whether 
Non-Europeans or native, to enter the 
Location for in their opinion they have 
always been treated by the authorities 
in a very reasonable manner and should 
they at any time have any grievances 
they are quite capable of looking after 
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themselves without the assistance of 
agitators. (9) 
Unfortunately for the Council, it turned out that they did 
not have the authority to ban meetings. Tonjeni and 
Plaatjes were able to return to the Midlands by June. They 
immediately started to organise in Cradock as this was the 
only major town from which they had not been banned. By 
this time the conservatives had been organising in 
preparation for the arrival of the IANC for nearly a year. 
The IANC started to organise in Cradock when they held two 
meetings outside the location. Their fame had obviously 
spread before them, because when Tonjeni, Plaatjes and 
Hendricks (from Middelburg) arrived on Saturday, 6 June, 
they addressed a massive meeting of 500 to 800 people in the 
.afternoon - about a third of the crowd were "coloured 
people". (10) The meeting was held on a football ground 
outside the location to avoid problems with permits. 
Tonjeni opened the meeting, speaking in English which he 
himself translated into Xhosa and Plaatjes translated into 
Afrikaans. In his speech he raised many of the standard 
IANC demands. He urged the crowd to adopt passive 
resistance methods, and in particular to refuse to pay their 
poll tax as 
'We are not represented ••• I never paid 
the poll tax. I have been' summonsed 
three times. My idea is to resist this 
-
damnable law and all coloured people 
must do it ••• the government listens 
only to a few rich people. The 
Government would never say to them 'Here 
is your country: they would never do 
it' ••• ' {He} went on to urge the need of 
a united front ••• 'there must be no 
Hottentots, Coloured or Natives or 
Indians. You must all be United, You 
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should not wait for your chiefs to say 
the word. They are all getting bags of 
money from the Government, what do you 
expect from them? They are only the 
engine drivers of the Government.' 
'Long have you been slaves, and the 
time is ripe for your emancipation' ••• 
{and he} quoted a man named Makana as 
saying let us drive the White man into 
the sea, 'But I say let us drive these 
dirty laws into the sea ••• We are not 
out to claim a district: we want the 
whole continent', he concluded. 
According to the police, the meeting eventually ended fairly 
quietly, but the next afternoon an even bigger meeting was 
held attended by 1 000 blacks and 30 whites. Tonjeni again 
spoke and said that 
the Natives were paying for passes and 
the poll tax to feed the old Boers, 
{'oud stryders' from the Boer War - WH} 
and that they were sacked from the 
railway to give the Boers work and that 
the White people told them to look up to 
God whilst they were stealing their 
country. (11) 
The meeting was much livelier than the previous one and, 
according to the superintertdent, Wilken 
Judging from the applause they {the 
crowd - WH} seemed to like the speeches. 
He heard some young Natives saying 'Now 
we'll show the white people! whilst one 
young Native girl called out, 'Nou sal 
ons hulle opdonder'. 
Despite a warning from the police that they needed a permit 
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.Tonjeni, Plaatjes and Velapi went into the location after 
the meeting "to have a cup of tea" as Tonjeni did not "think 
the police will be so foolish as to arrest me". The police, 
however, arrested them: 
Daar was groat opgewondenheid toe die 
beskuldigdes na die poliesie kantoor 
geneem is en bet honderde kaf fers en 
gekleurdes Tonjeni en sy makkers na die 
'charge office' gevolg. (12) 
A crowd of about 500 people gathered outside the police 
office and 
A strong force of police was necessary 
to disperse an excited crowd. (13) 
The full weight of the repressive apparatus of the state was 
now brought to bear. Hundreds of black people gathered 
again at the magistrate's court the next day to hear the 
IANC leaders charged with contravening the Location 
regulations and with inciting hostility under the Native 
Administration Act. (14) Tonjeni and Plaatjes were each 
sentenced to two months hard labour on each of two charges 
and Hendricks who had acted as interpreter, to one month 
suspended for a year. (15) Tonjeni was also charged with 
inciting others not to pay poll tax and fined one pound (or 
seven days). ( 16) 
At the request of the local police and magistrate, Tonjeni, 
Ndobe and Plaatjes were banned from the whole Midlands area 
- Cradock, Middelburg, Graaff-Reinett and the surrounding 
towns - soon afterwards. (17) 
But this was not enough to crush the new branch at Cradock. 
Although there is little information on organisation in the 
area, it appears from the Middelburg evidence, that 
organisers from Middelburg regularly visited Cradock to 
organise there. 
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As mentioned above, Willem Hendricks had accompanied 
Plaatjes and Tonjeni on their original trip to Cradock while 
it seems that Andries Louw also went along. (18) Tonjeni 
and Ndobe also continued to organise in cradock for the 
duration of the trial, although they were apparently based 
in Middelburg. (19) For example, they arrived back in 
Cradock on 19 June, disguised in red blankets, and managed 
to get permits from the location superintendent. The next 
day they held a big meeting, attended by about 500 people 
and on the 24th they held another meeting. When Hendricks 
was evicted from the Middelburg location in mid-July, he 
again organised in Cradock and Naauwpoort and Graaff-Reinett 
before returning to Middelburg at the end of the month. 
(20) 
Soon after he left Ntame and Camba were organising in 
Cradock. They immediately ran into problems with the local 
police: Douglas Camba tells the story: 
The District Commandant at Cradock 
called us to his off ice and asked us 
what do we speak at our meetings, he 
addressed us as 'My friends'. We told 
him that we are not his friends. We 
said you had a man at our meeting 
yesterday and you can send one again, he 
said where are you from? we {sic} told 
him that we came from Middelburg. He 
asked me what payment I get for 
preaching Tonjeni's policy, we refused 
to speak - but we told him that we are 
holding a meeting this afternoon, he 
said you must speak nicely to the people 
and do not warm their blood, he had four 
other whites with him. I said when you 
cook a fire under the pot and you expect 
it to boil, do you not? He then took 
off his coat and chased us out. (21) 
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When pure intimidation failed, the police tried to resort to 
more subtle methods: 
The Sergeant asked how much this man 
(Ntame) gets, whether he gets £3. He 
offered Ntame £5 to drop Tonjeni's 
policy, Ntame said I refuse even a 
{illegible word} to drop Tonjeni's 
Policy. 
The organisers had to use a good measure of cunning to get 
into the location: 
I then went to the location, I hid Ntame 
as he is known to the Superintendent, 
when I got to the Superintendent he 
asked me if I were not one of Tonjeni's 
men, I told him that I did not belong to 
Tonjeni's sect. He said we have decided 
to arrest all Tonjeni's people and you 
will be arrested too. I said I am going 
to church I have a congregation here and 
I have a right to enter the location, he 
said I am Superintendent of the location 
and if I refuse then you cannot enter 
have you got a preacher's card? I said 
yes, he said go in but do not hold any 
meetings. I went in the location and 
preached but I preached for the 
Organisation, I said that Satan was 
better than the Government because he 
wants both white and black but Pirow 
sends only blacks to hell and that is 
why I say unite. 
It seems that the IANC branch in Cradock was fairly 
successful. By December the Joint Council reported that: 
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twice a week mass meetings are held on 
the outskirts of the location which are 
largely attended. The success of this 
movement points to the necessity of more 
educational and social workers in the 
location. (22) 
II INCREASED REPRESSION IN CRADOCK AND MIDDELBURG 
In the meantime, the police in Cradock were becoming 
increasingly concerned about the organisation: by September 
it was reported that as a 
result of the Native propaganda in the 
Native Locations at Cradock the police 
have recently experienced some 
difficulty in carrying out their arduous 
duties in a certain part thereof. (23) 
Soon thereafter the police decided that firm action was 
necessary to re-establish their authority. On the evening 
of 8 September a "strong police patrol" of six mounted 
police, 15 foot police and 5 civilians went to the Rooi Laer 
part of the location after a previous patrol had been 
"obstructed during the tax check". ( 24) The police 
supposedly had orders 
to refrain from anything like 
provocative action, ••• {but within} two 
minutes they arrested one of the 
ringleaders {This was} bitterly 
resented by the natives, many of whom 
immediately became excited, and quickly 
appeared on the scene, armed with sticks 
to prevent any further arrests. Lining 
themselves up against the houses they 
defied the foot men, consequently it was 




During the charge seven people were arrested from the crowd 
of about 200. 
The native women lost complete control 
of themselves, and rained sticks stones 
and tins at {sic} the police • 
Their commander, "not knowing the strength of the attack", 
decided to retreat. 
All the time stones were falling around 
them and it became so bad that fearing 
some of the foot men might be injured, 
he ordered a second charge of the 
mounted men. 
This time they managed to disperse the crowd and the police 
could complete their withdrawal. 
Such a state of affairs could not, of course, be tolerated. 
The authorities were determined to stamp out any resistance 
to "established order" and the following day an even 
stronger patrol raided the location to arrest the "rioters". 
Thirteen people were arrested for public violence and twenty 
for tax offences, while three gave themselves up 
voluntarily. All 11 men and six women who were charged with .. 
public violence were found guilty and received sentences of 
between two weeks and six months. ( 25) 
The authorities now sought to drive home their advantage and 
to attempt to drive the IANC out of Cradock altogether. The 
location regulations were tightened up at the request of the 
police in an attempt to exclude all "agitators" from the 
location. (26) Under the new regulations, inter alia, 
"visitors" would not be allowed to stay in the location for 
more than 3 hours without a permit. This measure was used 
against IANC organisers, as well as the unemployed in the 
location who had flocked to join the IANC. The IANC 
organised a petition to protest against the new regulations, 
' 291 
but the Mayor was firm in his assertion that 
We cannot allow loafing in the Location 
and the regulation must be put into 
force. { 27) 
A month later the public prosecutor was reported to be about 
to institute prosecutions against a number of unemployed 
people. (28) 
The violence in Cradock precipated a similar clampdown in 
Middelburg. At the end of September the police started to 
prepare a case against several of the IANC leaders, 
allegedly for making inciting remarks at a meeting. (29) 
It is not clear whether this case ever took place. 
At about the same time Jacob Windvoel was summonsed to 
appear in court, apparently about some problem with the IANC 
office in the location. The concerted campaign of 
repression took further shape when the magistrate ordered 
Hendricks' removal to his "home", the Graaff-Reinett 
location, in terms of the Urban Areas Act of 1923. (30) 
Apparently this was allowed as Hendricks had been convicted 
under the hostility clause of the Native Administration Act 
in July. (31) This was in fact no more than a legalistic 
manoeuvre because it had been decided to ban Hendricks under 
the Riotous Assemblies Act should his appeal against his 
conviction succeed. 
Early in November the amended location regulations came into 
force. They required anybody who wished to hold a meeting 
in the locati'W1, to obtain prior permission from the 
Location Superintendent and the District Commandant of 
Police, either of whom had the power to change the date or 
venue of a meeting, 
cancel it. ( 33) 
although they were unable to ban or 
The IANC did not take this w~ve of repression lying down, it 
was determined to fight the state every inch of the way. 
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When Windvoel was apparently ordered to hand over the keys 
to the IANC office, Ndaba urged a meeting to protest: 
You have given orders to the chairman 
not to hand over the key and now he is 
summoned for it. Do you think it is 
right? It shows they were after your 
books. On Wednesday you must go with 
the chairman. The magistrate must know 
that if he convicts this man (Windvoel) 
there will be bloodshed and it will be 
on the head of the magistrate. (From 
the crowd - 'blood must be spilt on 
Wednesday') (and then some of the women 
shouted 'Why don't they arrest us. They 
kay do {sic} not belong to windvoel but 
to us. They are afraid of us' ) • ( 34) 
When Hendricks was ordered to leave the location, the IANC 
decided to defy the order. Four hundred residents organised 
themselves into pickets to guard the location gates and 
prevented the police from entering the location. (35) The 
local press reported that: 
'die Maandagaand was die lokasie feitlik 
beleer deur die naturelle om te verbied 
dat die polisie daar sou inkom om hul 
held te arresteer' • (36) 
It seems that the police were unable to enforce the banning, 
until Hendricks eventually left three days later "op sy eie 
dooie gemak". By this stage the location was in a state of 
revolt and it was becoming increasingly difficult to govern. 
The superintendent and the conservatives were often 
surrounded and threatened by IANC supporters. Further 
Met di'e polisie word ook opelik {sic} 
die spot gedryf en die Tonjeni 
volgelinge verklaar opelik dat die 
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polisie {sic} bang is om die lokasie 
binne te kom en hulle biermakery te 
stop. (37) 
It was in this explosive atmosphere that the new location 
regulations were introduced in early November. (38) 
Douglas Camba launched a bitter attack on the regulations at 
the next meeting: 
Die boer vra niemand om vergaderings te 
hou. Ons moet dit doen want ons is 
swart. Alles wat ons hier praat is 
waar. Hierdie ding is nie gedoen vir 
die boer nie maar alleenlik vir die 
kaffir. Jy moet nou gaan vra 'asseblief 
baas mag ek 'n vergadering hou' ••• As 
ons die Superintendent of die Kommandant 
gaan vra om vergaderings te hou, sal 
hulle weier As jullie {sic} nie 
georganiseer is nie sal die papier 
jullie win ••• Dit is nie my organisasie 
nie. Dit is jullie organisasie. Die 
leeuw en did tier le {sic} op die pad na 
Afrika, en hulle brul nou, en die wie 
bang is sal nie daar kan verby nie. 
Other speakers also emphasised that 
Those who say we must not hold meetings 
must go with us to our office and hand 
in their tickets from today up to 
Sunday. ( 39) 
Thus the IANC resolved to defy the regulations and to refuse 
to apply for the necessary permission. In retrospect this 
did not seem a particularly wise tactic as it exposed a 
great number of the formal and informal leadership to police 
repression, with little or no chance of waging a successful 
struggle against the regulations. There was also no 
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possibility of mass resistance to the regulations, as it 
would only involve speakers at the meetings. The 
authorities in any event, did not have the discretion to 
stop meetings altogether, but could merely change the venue 
and/or time. 
Thus the IANC arranged their usual meeting the next Sunday 
without applying for permission. After the meeting the 
seven speakers were arrested and charged. Again the IANC 
resolved to fight back. A big demonstration was organised 
outside the court building on the day of the trial. When 
the trial started at 10 o'clock the court was filled with 
IANC supporters. By the time it eventually finished at 
eight o'clock in the evening: 
het 'n greet aantal naturelle voor die 
magistraats kantoor vergader, in baie 
gevalle goed gewapen met allerhande 
soorte gevaarlike wapens en 'n 
oorverdowende lawaai opgeskop, singende 
wat hul noem hul volkslied. (40) 
The District Commandant of Police reported that 
The hearing of the case being continued 
so late gave an opportunity for a number 
of natives to gather in the vicinity of 
the court in addition to a full court of 
natives who remained present for the 
hearing of the case. It was evident 
that they were in sympathy with the 
accused {sic} and I arranged for all 
available members of the Force to be 
within the precincts of the Court 
Buildings. After the sentence the Court 
was cleared and I then became aware of 
the intentions of the crowd who defied 
the Police to take the prisoners to Gaol 
saying they also were at the meeting and 
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would go to Gaol with them - In the 
forefront were all irresponsible young -
native girls and boys - though females 
predominated, they shouted, screamed and 
sang alternatively. on the outskirts of 
the crowd were the male native adults in 
groups, a few stones were thrown on the 
court House roof in front of which a 
number of europeans had congregated and 
a few of these were armed with revolvers 
and were impatient ••• 
It was out of the question to make 
any effort to remove the prisoners to 
Gaol and whilst I was tempted to 
disperse the mob with the Police I had 
on hand, I realised that if I did I 
could not control the {white - WH} 
civilian element and a serious clash 
would then have been unavoidable. (41) 
Thus the prisoners were allowed to pay fines of 10s each and 
were released to join the crowd: 
ender gejuig en geskel op die blankes 
bet hul vertrek na die lokasie. (42) 
The police did not attempt to control the crowd of several 
hundred people who stoned several houses on their way back 
to the location. 
In Benede Coetzee straat het feitlik 
geen enkele huis vrygespring nie. In 
die lokasie aangekom, het hulle ook 'n 
kerk en die pastorie bestorm en die 
naturellepredikant moes veiligheid by 
die poliesie {sic} gaan soek. (43) 
In the wake of the march, the "public" feeling in Middelburg 
was enraged at the lack of police action. A public meeting 
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was called the next evening in the town hall, which 
was crowded and while there was a number 
of middle aged and older residents 
present, the meeting was principally 
composed of younger people, all eager 
for retaliation on Location ••• 
Judging from the attitude and remarks 
of the younger men, many of whom were 
armed, the most of them with sticks, the 
wish to come to blows with Natives, was 
father to the thought that Coloured 
inhabitan {sic} intended general 
violence. ( 44) 
The Deputy Commissioner of Police in the Eastern Cape was 
summoned to the meeting and managed to pacify the crowd. In 
private the Deputy Commissioner expressed his 
dissatisfaction that 
It remains a fact however that 
Middelburg for some two years appears to 
have been a hatching ground for Native 
agitators and it has, unfortunately, 
been allowed to go on until recently 
when action has been instituted against 
several of the leaders of the Native 
Congress. ( 45) 
The local police, possibly to prove their zeal to the Deputy 
Commissioner, were also deter mined to break the power of the 
IANC: 
The native and coloured element here 
require a sharp lesson to put a final 
end to their riotious propensities and a 
display of Force under discipline is 
required to put an end once and for all 
to their present insolent and defiant 
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attitude. 
I suggest a complete round up of the 
Municipal Location with a house to house 
search for concealed weapons accompanied 
by a Minister's Order banning certain 
known agitators from this Police 
District. The persons I propose should 
be the subject of a Minister's Order 
are: 
. MALES 
1. July Bacela 2. Willie Johnson 
3. Jim Ngqakayi 4. Eddie Ndaba 
5. Douglas Camba 6. Jim Klaase 
7. David Nkabi a. Stephanus Qobo 
9. John Mana 10. John Tiger 
11. James Louw 12. James Ntame 
13. Jack Ntsikane 
FEMALES 
1. Poppie Miles 2. Sara Uithaler 
3. Sara Jones 4. Elizabeth Ngenze 
(46} 
However, even the Deputy Commissioner thought that this was 
excessive, and recommended that only Ndabe and Camba be 
banned from addressing public meetings in the Middelburg 
district. 
Plans for this repression got underway immediately - police 
reinforcements were secretly rushed in from Cradock and kept 
in hiding in the police barracks as a special r~serve. 
The IANC planned to hold another meeting in defiance of the 
new regulations the next day. On the morning of the 
meeting, the leaders of the IANC were summoned to the police 
office and threatened with summary arrest if they proceeded 
with the meeting. Furthermore, no further Sunday meetings 
would be allowed, and they were told to have fewer meetings 
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during the week. (47) 
The police also arrested four leaders of the IANC on charges 
in connection with the demonstration and they received heavy 
gaol sentences from the magistrate. (48) Three weeks later 
the Minister of Justice banned all meetings in the location, 
other than religious and sports meetings. The bannings, the 
arrest of leaders, and especially the banning of meetings, 
dealt the IANC a severe blow. It was severely disorganised, 
to the extent that it was not able to mount any significant 
demonstration on Dingaan's Day. (49) 
At the same time repression was also stepped up on other 
fronts. The town council decided to take firmer action 
against people who refused to pay rent. The mayor stated 
that they had tried to avoid a confrontation, but 
daar sou nou geen verdere onderhandeling 
plaasvind om 'n botsing te vermy 
Accordingly, the council started to evict people who were 
behind with their rent. (50) Die Middellander recognised 
that undifferentiated evictions might also weaken further 
the tenuous ideological hold of the conservatives, as the 
"innocent" (i.e. those who did not support the 
"oproermakers", but were still in arrears with their rent) 
would also suffer, 
want nou dat die Raad sy tande vir die 
oproermakers gewys bet, nou kan daar nie 
onderskei gemaak word tussen 
skuldenaars. 
Thus by a combination of police repression aimed at the 
leadership and evictions by the council aimed at the mass of 
members, the authorities were able to bludgeon the IANC into 
silence, if not acquiesence. 
The conservative petty bourgeoisie also joined in this 
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attack - e.g. in a combined letter to the press the local 
churches attacked the IANC for being against religion, and 
urged their members to fight against the IANC. ( 51) Their 
somewhat incoherent letter to Die Middellander seemed to 
condemn the IANC mainly on the grounds that black people do 
not have enough guns to fight the white man, and thus the 
IANC would 
leave them to the exposure of a strong 
nation like white people to devour them 
like a vulture falling on his prey. 
However, they also forcefully argued that 
the Bible teaches us to be loyal and 
submissive to those who administer the 
affairs of the country on behalf of the 
government. 
The council attempted to strengthen the hand of the 
conservatives by changing the Location regulations to give 
the LAB unspecified additional powers. (52) 
All these measures had some success. It was reported that 
the churches were slowly recovering their position after 
having been deserted during the previous year. (53) The 
Church of Christ had also rejoined the other churches after 
Camba was banned from the town. (54) 
However, the IANC was not yet defeated. It was able to 
organise against the LAB so.effectively that nobody was even 
prepared to stand in the elections in February. (55) The 
nominated members of the LAB eventually asked the council to 
call a public meeting in the location to elect the other 
members, but from the evidence it appears that this meeting 
never took place. 
Other organisational activity also continued, albeit at a 
much lower level than before. In March 1932 the IANC again 
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organised a march of unemployed workers to demand jobs from 
the mayor. (56) He promised to do his best, but the crowd 
refused to disperse and eventually the police were called to 
disperse the crowd. 
In Cradock it seems that a similar process of repression and 
resistance developed. There matters came to a head at the 
end of January 1932 when a strike was called. Although 
details are sketchy and sometimes contradictory, the 
Middellandsche Afrikaander reported that, on Sunday 
morning, 
toe kaf fer meide en mans na hul werk in 
die dorp wou kom is hul teengestaan deur 
andere en ••• baie huise was Saterdag en 
Sondag sander hulle bediendes daar hul 
deur een seksie van die kaf fers verbied 
is om na hul werk te gaan. Hulle word 
voorgestaan en geslaan as hul nie na hul 
hutte teruggegaan bet nie. (57) 
The "strikers" seem to have been mostly younger people from 
the Rooi Laer and Cape Sheep areas while their opponents 
were mostly from the Tulu part of the location. (58) 
Fighting soon broke out between the two groups. After the 
police were initially powerless to intervene, they 
eventually acted to disperse the crowd and arrested a number 
of the militants. But skirmishes between the two groups 
continued throughout the night and it was only two days 
later that the location quietened down. 
Initially the press sought to dismiss the affair as merely 
an annual bout of "faction fighting". However, as will 
become clear, there was a clear perception that the causes 
went far deeper than this. The events in Cradock are 
chiefly of interest, though, because it demonstrates that 
the ruling class did not rely on repression alone to 
preserve its hegemony. In Cradock there was also a 
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conscious effort by the ruling class to preserve its 
hegemony through ideological means. The Midlands News and 
Karoo Farmer commented that 
If this sort of thing is to be prevented 
in the future, there must be engendered 
far sounder public opinion in the 
location and more evidence of a desire 
to work with the authorities. (59) 
The ideological hegemony of the tuling class had been 
accepted in the past, but now a crisis had developed: 
It is generally admitted that the 
Communist doctrines which have now been 
preached locally for some time past are 
responsible for not a little of the 
increased lawlessness. (60) 
The chief of police endorsed this view and linked it 
directly to the weakness of the petty bourgeoisie: 
In 1929 the Rev Mr Calata worked with 
the location superintendent and with the 
police, and to a certain extent, he was 
a link with the people, and kept them 
from faction fights. {sic} But the 
complaint is that since these meetings 
started this control has been lost. 
(61) 
Much thought was given to the question of how "this control" 
could be re-established. The magistrate's view was somewhat 
crude: He expressed his regret that 
for the first conviction for this 
of fence there was a maximum fine of £2 
or 14 days imprisonment, with spare 
diet. And the fine must be according to 
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the ability to pay. (62) 
Furthermore, only offenders under the age of 17 years could 
be whipped. But the magistrate also realised that more than 
brute force was necessary: 
What is needed is the force of public 
opinion in the location, otherwise these 
children are going to take control of 
the location. 
This call was taken up and echoed by other elements of the 
local ruling class. The Midlands News and Karroo Farmer 
edit or ialised that "there must be engendered far sounder 
public opinion in the location". (63) 
A concerted campaign was now launched to restore the 
ideological hegemony of the dominant classes, a campaign in 
which the conservative petty bourgeoisie played a crucial 
role. Nobody personifies this role more than Rev. Calata. 
We have already seen that the police regarded him as a "link 
with the people", as a "means of control". The police now 
intervened directly to attempt to restore this control by 
trying to strengthen the conservative petty bourgeoisie. 
Mass meetings were·organised in the location at which the 
chief of police and Calata addressed the inhabitants and 
appealed for order and responsibility. The police also 
appointed four "responsible men" in each of the six 
sections of the location to report any disturbances to them. 
(64) 
The authorities, however, did not rely only on ideological 
means to re-establish their control. 
Fifty-six young people, 22 males and 34 females, were 
arrested and spent the night in gaol singing "their 
communist songs". ( 65) They were charged with public 
violence and sentenced to 14 days imprisonment or a fine of 
£1. (66) The next day another 40 people were also arrested 
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and received similar sentences. 
A campaign of victimisation was also launched against the 
local IANC leadership. Bles Mahali was charged with holding 
a meeting on the "coloured" recreation ground on 22 January 
without written permission, and convicted. (67} A week 
later Mahali was again charged for a meeting on 31 January. 
This time George Carnies, the local chairman was also 
charged, and they were sentenced to a £2 fine or 7 days 
imprisonment. After this, there is little evidence of 
concerted organisation in cradock. on May Day the IANC was 
able to organise a march of 600 unemployed under banners 
proclaiming "We want food", "Cradock Unemployed" and "Down 
with the Native Service Contract Bill". (68) The crowd 
marched round the town and then went to the mayor demanding 
work or food. 
The police tried to disperse the crowd, but were initially 
driven off and the mayor was forced to go into hiding. 
Eventually the crowd was dispersed and _16 people were 
arrested. This seems to have been the last of the big 
public mobilisations in Cradock, although some form of 
organisation continued to exist at least until 1934. (69) 
In Middelburg the activities of the IANC also seemed to have 
been contained by the mass of repressive measures adopted at 
the end of 1931. (70) In early June 1932, however, the ban 
on public meetings expired and Eddie Ndaba's banning order 
ran out. 
The IANC immediately started to organise publicly again. 
Meetings were held on the 1st and 5th June. (71) Ndaba 
also returned to Middelburg and addressed smallish meetings 
of about 100 people on the 12th and 15th. (72) Before the 
latter meeting, he was called in by the police, and warned 
not to proceed with the meeting. (73) However, he decided 
to ignore the warning and at the meeting it was resolved to 
continue with meetings without asking for permission. (74) 
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The next day the police acted. Six of the IANC leaders -
Ndaba, Qobo, Huigh, Ntame, Tiger and Johnson were charged 
with addressing the meeting on 12 June and the first three 
were also charged for the meeting on 15 June. (15) Ndaba 
and Qobo were sentenced to £4 or 40 days, Huigh to £2 or 20 
days and Ntame to £1 or 10 days. 
The fines were not paid, but when the police attempted to 
remove the prisoners to gaol, they were attacked by a crowd 
of about 50 people who attempted to free the prisoners. 
( 76) "Die polies ie is lelik toegetakel". Several civilians 
rushed to the aid of the police 
en 'n verwoede geveg het plaasgevind 
waarin kieries, klippe, bakstene, ens. 
gebruik was. 
Eventually, the attackers were beaten back and .fled. 
Apparently it had been decided before the time to free the 
IANC leaders if they were convicted. (77) Four members of 
the IANC, were arrested and sentenced to between 9 and 12 
months in gaol. Ntame was convicted of inciting the 
attempted rescue and sentenced to a further 2 months. Three 
other people were still being sought by the police. The 
final act of repression was to ban Ndaba to Cape Town for a 
year when he was released from gaol. (78) 
III THE DECLINE OF ORGANISATION 
These events appear to have been the last major attempt at 
mass mobilisation in the Midlands by the IANC. Thereafter, 
there is little evidence of the large public meetings, 
demonstrations and passive resistance that characterised the 
initial period of organisation. 
Some form of organisation did, however, survive for the next 
few years, albeit in a somewhat muted form. Only a brief 
outline of later developments will be presented as the 
available evidence is very patchy. The most important 
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source is Urnsebenzi, the CPSA newspaper. In the course of 
1933 and 1934 it devoted an inordinate amount of attention 
to developments in the Midlands and it had a number of 
correspondents in the area. 
The most prominent correspondents were Jim Mti (79) from 
Tarkastad and Simon Batwa, the secretq.ry of the CP at 
Cradock. Of the earlier IANC leaders only Willem Hendricks 
is mentioned. He was still active in Graaff-Reinett, 
although there was no formal organisation there. (80) 
The precise nature of the relationship between the IANC and 
the CP is not at all clear. Certainly, the CP claimed to 
have branches in the Midlands - in fact in 1933 Cradock and 
Tarkastad were reported to be the only functioning branches 
outside Cape Town and Johannesburg. (81) These branches 
were almost certainly a legacy from the IANC and were 
probably the remains of the IANC branches. 
The conversion of IANC branches to CP branches unfortunately 
happened at a time when the South African CP had been almost 
totally "bolshevised" in accordance with the Stalinist 
conception of organisation then prevalent in the Comintern. 
(82) Thus, the local organisers of the CP spent much of 
their energy in futile attempts to apply the correct 
"bolshevik" methods in the rural areas. Branches of the 
Young Communist League, the African Federation of Trade 
Unions and Ikaka Labasebenzi - the Workers' Defence - were 
all formed with an almost total disregard of the actual 
organisational needs in the area. (83) 
Unfortunately, the reports in Umsebenzi are in the 
vernacular and had often been badly written and/or 
translated. Thus, it is often difficult to make much sense 
of them. Most of the reports are very general in nature 
and, where details of organisation are given, they are often 
unclear or contradictory. The very absence of information 
about the day to day functioning of branches probably 
indicates that they were fairly inactive. This tentative 
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conclusion i_s supported by the lack of evidence of attempts 
at mass mobilisation. 
Many of the issues discussed earlier were still of 
considerable importance - low wages, unemployment, passes 
and attacks on religion all feature prominently in the 
Umsebenzi reports - but there is little indication of any 
organised response to these issues. (84) 
It appears that the more militant forms of organisation in 
the area eventually faded away, but it did leave something 
of a legacy. Although it was Calata's CAC that survived in 
Cradock, the legacy of the more militant form of organ-
isation in the IANC probably had some influence on the fact 
that the Cradock branch was to become one of the stronger 
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In conclusion it is necessary to draw together some of the 
many strands that have emerged from this study. Three 
broad themes are discussed in this chapter. Firstly, the 
relationship between the petty bourgeoisie and popular 
struggles are re-examined in the light of the history of the 
ANC(WP) and IANC. Secondly, an attempt is made to evaluate 
the effectiveness and weaknesses of the strategies and 
organisational methods of the militants in the ANC(WP) and 
IANC. Thirdly, an overall assessment is made of the 
significance of the organisation in relation to the broader 
struggle for liberation in South Africa. 
The Petty Bourgeoisie and Popular Struggles 
In Chapter 1 it was argued that the most useful conception 
of the ANC is one that stresses the existence of different 
tendencies within the ANC. It is singularly unhelpful to 
conceive of the ANC as simply an organisation of the 
conservative petty bourgeoisie that has no interest in mass 
struggle and in national liberation. It is equally 
unhelpful to analyse the ANC in terms that imply an 
uninterrupted and continued resistance to the racial state -
tendency which is particularly evident in some of the 
literature that emanates from the exiled liberation movement 
or its ideologues. 
For much of the period up to World War II the ANC was indeed 
dominated either by the tendency which eschewed popular mass 
struggle, or by the tendency which was only prepared to lend 
tacit support to such struggles. It is important, though, 
to stress the existence of a third tendency within the ANC 
which advocated active participation in popular struggle. 
This tendency emerged for the first time in the post-war 





In terms of this conception, it is clear that the militant 
tendency emerged in the ANC relatively early, and it was 
even able to attain dominance in certain branches which 
became actively involved in organising and broadening mass 
struggles. 
This fairly rapid development from the ANC's earlier elitist 
nature followed, at least partially, from the very 
imperatives of constituting the national movement formaliy. 
When mass struggle erupted, as they did in the post-war 
period, the petty bourgeois leadership of the organisation 
faced the unenviable choice of either participating in such 
struggles, or being left behind. Of course, neither of 
these courses followed in a predetermined fashion. Bonner 
has shown how within the TNC the petty bourgeoisie polarised 
into two camps advocating the different courses. From 
Bradford's work it is clear that in the 1920's the upper 
layers of the petty bourgeoisie in the ANC by and large 
refrained ~rom participation in mass struggles. 
Consequently the leadership of the national movement shifted 
decisively towards the ICU. (1) A similar process occurred 
in the Cape after the militants were expelled from the ANC. 
Before examining the position of the petty bourgeoisie in 
greater detail, it is necessary to stress the limitations of 
the militants within the ANC. In neither the struggles on 
the Rand nor in the Western Cape, were the militants able to 
challenge the hegemony of the conservatives and moderates at 
a national level. They were only able to attain dominance 
within specific areas, and even then this dominance was only 
of short duration. 
Willan, Bonner and Bradford all attempt to correct one of 
the serious lacunae in South African historiography, viz the 
lack of any serious analysis of the relationship between the 
African petty bourgeoisie and popular struggles. Marxist 
historians have often tended to submerge working class and 
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petty bourgeois struggles into one undifferentiated 
nationalist struggle, thus obscuring the fact that these 
struggles were often underpinned by very different class 
interests. (2) 
From his study of the-petty bourgeoisie in Kimberley, Willan 
argues forcefully that there is no automatic identity of 
interests between the different classes in the nationalist 
movement. He describes a situation where the petty 
bourgeoisie's leadership of the ANC is threatened by the 
emergence of mass popular struggles (3). Plaatje, one of 
the most prominent ~NC leaders in the country, responded to 
this threat by entering into an extremely close alliance 
with part of the ruling class. The alliance operated at a 
number of levels, but was manifested especially in concerted 
action to counter the influence of the militants. Willan 
shows just how susceptible the petty bourgeoisie are to a 
strategy of co-optation by capital and the state, and argues 
that this susceptibility is a direct result of fact that the 
African petty bourgeoisie had its own specific political and 
ideological class interests. 
Bonner and Bradford are more concerned with those situations 
in which the petty bo1,1rgeci$ie became actively involved in 
popular struggle. Both identify a tendency amongst the 
lower layers of the petty bourgeoisie to identify 
"downward". This they attribute to the relative closeness 
to the working class, and the precarious nature of the class 
position of these layers due to the specific trajectory of 
capitalist development in South Africa. (4) Bonner in fact 
argues that this tendency is a characteristic response by 
the petty bourgeoisie in a colonial situation, but an 
exploration of that issue is beyond the scope of this work. 
Both Bonner and Bradford do, however, emphasise the 
fractured nature of the response of the petty bourgeoisie: 
Bonner argues that in the course of the struggles on the 
Rand, 
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The ideology of one wing of the petty 
bourgeoisie was.clearly disarticulated 
and re-articulated to that of the 
working class. A middle section 
vacillated continually and experienced 
an identity crisis ••• and the more 
established affluent and reactionary 
section sustained, with occasional 
deviations, an ideology articulated with 
that of the ruling class. (5) 
In Bradford's analysis of the rural ICU, the line of 
cleavage seemed to correspond even more clearly to the 
relative class positions of the two sections of the petty 
bourgeoisie: 
the great bulk of ICU organisers were 
being squeezed out of, or at best 
clinging to, their petty bourgeois class 
positions. In this they differed 
markedly from ••• large-scale traders, 
successful building contractors, cane 
farmers, rackrenting landlords, school 
principals, lawyers and the like: 
nearly all such men and women held aloof 
from Union leadership positions. (6) 
What is clear from the above is the multi-faceted nature of 
the petty bourgeoisie's response to the various upsurges in 
the popular struggles after World War I. It is never 
possible simply to read off the political actions of a class 
from its class position in a mechanistic fashion. This is 
doubly so in the case of the petty bourgeoisie which in 
Marxist theory is characterised as a class which stands 
between the two major contradictory classes in capitalist 
society, and which at a political level oscillates between 
them. ( 7) 
The various responses were shaped by the complex interplay 
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of a number of factors, such as class determination, the 
structural security of their position, shared experiences of 
"national" oppression, the balance of forces in the class 
struggle, and the pervasiveness of the dominant ideology. 
Class determination was often the major, or even dominant, 
factor as was the case in Kimberley, but even there one can 
argue that the ~sponse would have been different had there 
. J.,•' 
been greater pressure on the petty bourgeoisie from local 
popular struggles. In other cases, though, it is impossible 
to speak of a coherent response by the petty bourgeoisie as 
a class. Class determination still played a role to the 
extent that there was a distinctly different response from 
the upper and lower levels of the petty bourgeoisie, but the 
decisive factors were often the other factors mentioned 
above. 
At the most general level one can state that the same lines 
of cleavage developed in the Cape, but clearly some 
important qualifications are necessary, both in the case of 
the Western Cape and of the Midlands. 
In the Western Cape the African petty bourgeoisie was not as 
significant a social force as it was elsewhere in the 
country. In fact it hardly existed in the Western Cape 
rural areas, although Cape Town itself was a possible 
exception with a significant, albeit small, African petty 
bourgeoisie. 
The Cape Town petty bourgeoisie was subject.to some of the 
wild swings that Bonner describes. Although Cape Town has 
not been the focus of this study and the evidence presented 
is somewhat scanty in consequence, orie can safely conclude 
that a major section of this petty bourgeoisie was drawn 
into support for the popular struggles. But there was 
little active participation as most of the struggles took 
place in the rural areas. 
In the course of 1930, the African petty bourgeosie "drew 
back from the brink" as their counterparts had done in the 
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struggles on the Rand. In Cape Town, the petty bourgeoisie 
did , not merely withdraw from the mass struggles and at tempt 
to reach an accommodation with the state, but went even 
further to join the state in a campaign to crush the 
militants within the ANC(WP) and the IANC. The militants 
were expelled from the ANC (WP), they were denounced from 
public platforms and were blamed for the violence that 
occurred. (8} In Cape Town itself, Thaele sought to 
emphasize the distance between the petty bourgeoisie 
leadership and popular struggles when he described how 
I have personallyx {sic} warned all 
speakers to be very moderate in their 
speeches and if any member is found to 
be going to extremes, he is immediately 
pulled up and the matter is reported to 
the Committee. If such a member 
disregards the warning he is suspended 
and if necessary his expulsion would 
follow. (9} 
For many months afterwards the leaders of the ANC(WP) spent 
much of their time and energy in fighting the influence . 
of the militants. They even travelled as far afield as 
Graaff-Reinett to counter the influence of the militants 
who were organising in the area. (10) 
,-- ... 
As regards the coloured petty bourgeoisie, the situation was 
very different. It was a significant force not only in Cape 
Town, but also in· many of the small rural towns in the form 
of teachers, ministers, small craftsmen and even traders. 
Although there were individual exceptions, the coloured 
petty bourgeoisie were not drawn into the ANC(WP). As the 
Worcester magistrate remarked on several occasions, it was 
the "low coloured" who joined the ANC(WP). (11) 
One of the reasons for this is that the coloured petty 
bourgeoisie was certainly less oppressed and more prosperous 
than its African counterpart. At no time during the early 
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twentieth century was it subject to the onslaught faced by 
its African counterpart and state policy remained broadly 
incorporationist even after 1924. In fact it even 
benefitted to some extent from the Nationalist Party's 
civilised labour policy. (12). Furthermore, there were 
already political organisations attempting to cater for the 
coloured petty bourgeoisie, namely the APO and the Afrikaner 
Nationale Bond, the coloured wing of the Nationalist Party. 
Thus, the ANC(WP) ended up organising very much against the 
established parties. It is also likely that there was an 
element of racism in the antipathy towards the ANC(WP) - the 
more priviledged layers of the coloured petty bourgeoisie 
often tended to aspire to, and identify with, the values of 
the ruling classes. (13) The identification of the ANC 
with African nationalism and its predominantly African 
leadership gave rise to the accusation that, for the ANC, 
"god is die kaf fer". Many of the "respectable" coloured· 
people were reluctant to identify with those who were 
perceived to be below their social standing. (14) 
Thus, in the case of Worcester, for example, the coloured 
petty bourgeoisie came out in open opposition to the 
ANC(WP). They even organised a meeting in an attempt to 
counter the ANC(WP) and reassert their own leadership of the 
"coloured" community. (15) 
Consequently the process of interaction between mass 
struggles and the petty bourgeoisie - both African and 
coloured - is somewhat dissimilar from that described by 
Bonner. In the case of the Rand the petty bourgeoisie 
tended to go along with the mass struggles, even if this was 
sometimes with obvious reluctance. There was never an open 
and organised opposition to these struggles. The position 
in the Western Cape bears more similarity to that in 
Kimberley, where the petty bourgeois leadership consciously 
organised against the perceived threat to its leadership and 
ended up in open alliance with the ruling class. 
There were important differences between the situation in 
the Midlands and that in the West. 
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In Chapter 6 it was pointed out that there was a relatively 
strong African petty bourgeoisie in the Midlands, which was 
well organised in a number of local bodies like Location 
Advisory Boards, Vigilance Committees, the CAC and even a 
Joint Council in Cradock. Thus when the IANC started to 
organise in the area it was doing so in direct opposition to 
the established CAC, and the ensuing conflict was even 
sharper than in the Western Cape. The petty bourgeoisie in 
the CAC had no compunction in making an alliance with the 
ruling class. In fact it welcomed the opportunity to prove 
its moderation, as Prof. Jabavu stressed in a keynote 
address to the 1930 CAC conference: 
He remembered the time when the Congress 
used to be regarded as a dangerous 
thing. Today the same congress was 
regarded as a moderate body, and had to 
fight with its back to the wall against 
Bolshevism. (16) 
In the CAC's fight against the militants in the IANC which 
threatened its undisputed leadership, it could rely on the 
support of most organs of the ruling class, most notably 
from the press where even the official mouthpiece of the 
National Party gave the CAC unreserved support. (17) 
Leaders of the CAC, such as Calata, even went as far 
as to work out joint strategies for maintaining "law 
and order" with the police, and to appear on public 
platforms with the police to appeal for calm and denounce 
-- the IANC. ( 18) 
Despite the formidable alliance ranged against it, the IANC 
was successsful in winning over the vast majority of the 
population to its position. The bourgeois press reflected 
on the increasing isolation of the moderate leaders and 
concluded that they had lost "control" over the location. 
{19) The IANC even won over some important members of the 
petty bourgeois leadership, notably Eddie Ndaba in 
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Middelburg. (20) 
Overall then, the developments in the Midlands correspond 
even more clearly than the Western Cape to the process that 
Willan describes in Kimberley. Unlike the situation in the 
Western Cape, there was no initial period of participation 
in the popular struggles by the CAC. on the contrary, its 
members organised strenuously against the threat to its 
leadership presented by the IANC and it was in the forefront 
of attacks on the IANC. Although the CAC was in 
considerable disarray, it was never defeated and it 
continued to provide a rallying point for the conservative 
petty bourgeoisie. There is no evidence to suggest that a 
significant section of the petty bourgeoisie joined the 
IANC, and the continued verbal attacks by the IANC 
leadership on the "educated" would seem to indicate the 
contrary. 
Strategy, organisational methods and ideology 
In any analysis of the strategy of an organisation by the 
militants in the ANC(WP) and the IANC it is important to 
stress the limits of such an analysis. Most of our 
knowledge of the organ is at ion comes fr om "outsider" sources 
such as newspaper and police reports. These naturally 
tended to focus on the more spectacular aspects of the 
organisation such as public meetings, confrontations, 
demonstrations and marches. Although there is some evidence 
about the internal workings of the organisation, few details 
are given even in the few "insider" sources such as 
Umsebenzi, the CPSA newspaper. Though the available 
evidence was taken into account in the analysis below, it is 
possible that the extent of an "agitational" approach in the 
organisation is overstressed. 
Below it is argued that the militant's approach was 
essentially agitational - basically they sought to "agitate" 
the rural popular classes sufficiently to rise up and throw 
off the yoke of oppression. As Tonjeni expressed it: "The 
L 
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anger of the people must be kind led". ( 21) The main method 
of mobilisation was through public meetings which were 
usually held twice a week. Typically the leaders, and often 
even individual members, would stand up and enumerate the 
many injustices suffered by the black people focussing on 
local issues. Their constant message was that it was time 
for black people to take action to win their freedom, and 
that as a first step they should join the IANC. 
Once popular anger had increased sufficiently, the 
organisation would then try to draw the masses into some 
form of concerted action. The major method means of 
mobilising people for action was through demonstrations and 
defiance of unpopular laws. In this area the IANC had 
rather mixed success. On the one hand, none of the bigger 
campaigns were ever successful. In particular, despite 
repeated proposals and agitation, it was unable to organise 
a general and concerted pass burning campaign on Dingaan's 
day. There were a number of reasons for this. Firstly, it 
was always fairly clear that such a campaign was not being 
taken up all over the country and that it would only be a 
limited success, and this tended to demotivate branches. 
Secondly, and more importantly, it was easier to organise 
against the specific manifestations of the pass system, than 
against passes in general. The coloured people were not 
directly affected by passes, while for Africans there was 
never a single pass system in the cape: the 'pass system' 
consisted of a series of disparate measures ranging from 
poll tax receipts to lodger's permits. In fact, Tonjeni on 
occasion listed no fewer than 17 kinds of passes. (22) 
Much more successful were the attemptsso mobilise at a local 
level. In the Western Cape this was done so effectively 
around the unpopular liquor laws, low wages and the attempts 
by the farmers to intimidate the IANC, that the location in 
Worcester became virtually ungovernable for a time. In the 
phrase of the press, the IANC enjoyed 'absolute authority' 
in the location. (23) 
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In the Midlands local mobilisation also proved to be 
particularly effective, especially in Middelburg. There was 
large-scale defiance of the local authorities over a whole 
range of issues. (24) Rents rapidly fell into arrears, the 
poll taxes remained unpaid, and lodger's permits were 
ignored. More direct means of mobilisation were used 
regularly, for example marches and demonstrations to protest 
against unemployment, high rents and evictions. Sometimes 
these demonstrations bordered on the insurrectionary as when 
a crowd attempted to rescue their leaders from police 
custody, or when pickets from the IANC prevented the police 
from removing Hendricks from the location for over a week. 
Of course the approach of the IANC was not purely 
agitational. At least some time was spent in house to house 
organisation in all the areas where it established itself. 
There is some evidence of ongoing organisational activity 
such as branch meetings. Even public meetings fulfilled 
some more mundane organ is at ional functions. It was a 
regular and convenient way to draw together a large portion 
of the members of the organisation and facilitated regular 
feedback from the leadership and the obtaining of mandates. 
Overall, though, it is clear that the IANC was characterised 
by an agitational approach. While this enabled it to 
mobilise the popular classes very effectively, it also had 
some drawbacks. The most important was the heavy reliance 
that was placed on high profile leaders and the way in which 
this shaped the response of the IANC to repression. 
It is clear that the farmers always regarded the IANC as a 
grave threat to their interests. In the Western and 
Southern Cape there were frequent indirect and even direct 
attacks on the organisation. Soon farmers were resorting to 
brute force to break the organisation, but they were almost 
totally unsuccessful. The increasing pressure from the 
farmers and the escalating level of violence forced the 
state to abandon its init.ial relative neutrality in favour 
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of a more interventionist approach. (25) 
The lower level of direct attacks by the Midlands farmers 
can probably be attributed to the fact that by that stage 
the state was already committed to interventionism. 
The IANC was able to resist the attacks of the farmers 
successfully, and in fact used it as a further issue around 
which they organised and mobilised people. As long as the 
state's intervention remained purely intimidatory, it did 
not present a grave threat to the organisation, even when 
five people were killed and 18 injured in a fight with the 
Worcester police. 
Once the state shifted to the more subtle strategy of 
isolating the leadership from its base, (26) the 
shortcomings of the agitational approach were painfully 
exposed and the IANC was never able to find effective 
measures to counter the state. When meetings were banned, 
the IANC merely tried to circumvent (in the Western Cape) or 
defy (in the Midlands) the ban. It was not able to find 
other means of mobilising the popular classes in the rural 
areas. 
The absence of the top leadership through bannings or 
gaoling was an even greater blow in the Western Cape. The 
tactics chosen to cope with the ban on meetings aggravated 
the situation as it was the leaders who were prosecuted for 
their part in organising the meetings, or addressing them. 
The problem stemmed from the fact that the top leaders 
played a crucial and ongoing role in the organisation of 
most branches and there was not enough attention given to 
the development of local leadership. For example in 
Worcester, Tonjeni remained by far the most popular figure 
and he was the only person who had "absolute authority" over 
the residents in the location. Thus when Tonjeni, Ndobe and 
Plaatjes - the most able of the local leaders - were banned, 
it was a heavy blow from which the IANC never recovered in 
the Western Cape. 
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In the Southern Cape the pattern was largely similar, but in 
the Midlands the IANC was able to overcome these problems to 
a greater extent. This was, at least partially, due to a 
conscious realisation by the top leadership that they would 
only be allowed to organise for a relatively short time 
before they would be banned. (27) Thus there was a 
determined effort to build up a local leadership, that was 
able to continue and develop the organisation for a 
considerable time when the top leaders were forced to leave 
the area. 
A further important element in the strategy and 
organisational methods of the IANC was the almost total 
absence of a millenarian message. The discourse of the IANC 
was remarkable for its emphasis on the need for the 
oppressed masses to struggle for their own liberation. The 
only exception was the Western Cape. There the Garveyists 
in the ANC(WP) often adopted millenarian positions, but 
Lodge overstates the case when he speculates, that 
the millenarian accent of Garveyism 
would have reverberated strongly in the 
Western Cape. (28) 
As argued earlier, the IANC won the support of the rural 
popular classes largely by organising around those issues 
that directly affected them. 
The non-millenarian flavour of the IANC's discourse 
represents an almost complete break with previous populist 
movements in the rural areas which almost always had a 
heavily millenarian flavour, notably the ICU and the 
Wellingtonites. (29) This difference can be partly 
explained by the very different backgrounds of the leaders 
of the various movements. The leadership of previous 
movements had almost always come from an essentially 
conservative background which was shaped decisively by a 
mixture of traditionalist values, religion and mission 
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education. (30) These leaders usually regarded themselves 
as a cut above the rank and file members, and were not 
inclined to believe that action by the masses could bring 
about significant change. Thus they were particularly 
susceptible to millenarian ideologies which stressed that 
God, the Americans or even the leaders themselves would play 
a d ec is i v e r o 1 e . ( 31 ) 
The IANC leaders, on the other hand, had received an 
important part of their political education from the CPSA in 
Cape Town and its newspaper Umsebenzi and they were often 
against religion, at least insofar it was practised by the 
white churches. Furthermore, the IANC owed its very 
existence to its differences with the conservative 
petty-bourgeoisie and it was thus unlikely to ape its 
practices in these respects. 
However important this factor might have been, the crucial 
determinant of the difference in ideology was the very 
different class bases of the organisations. As Bradford has 
pointed out, the millenarian ideology in the ICU was 
strongest precisely in those regions where proletarian-
isation was least advanced. (32) It was the squatter 
peasantry that embraced millenarian ideologies with 
particular fervour. The squatter peasantry was particularly 
threatened by the path along which capitalist agriculture 
was developing in South Africa and millenarian ideologies 
which promised to reverse the development along that path, 
found a great resonance amongst the peasantry. (33) 
Interestingly enough, the IANC in Middelburg had to deal to 
some extent with the deep disillusionment that follows the 
collapse of a millenarian movement, as the ICU had organised 
in the area earlier. Already at their second meeting, the 
ANC leaders were closely questioned about the ICU and 
Kadalie. Tonjeni denounced Kadalie as a traitor and was 
then asked whether the IANC also collected money. He 
replied, 
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Yes but do not take it away I leave it 
with you in your Town {sic} If we get 
into trouble do we use this money? No 
not for drunkeness but for Agitation and 
throwing away of passes and kicking 
against these bad laws. (34) 
The IANC which organised primarily in areas where 
proletarianisation was relatively far advanced, did not come 
under the same pressure to articulate the millenarian 
illusions of the peasantry. Although the land question was 
important and was raised regularly by the IANC, the day to 
day organisation revolved around much more specific issues. 
The IANC took up issues like liquor raids, unemployment, 
passes and high rents - all related to the direct experience 
of the rural popular classes. Even when all the 
experienced, outside leaders of the IANC were forced to 
leave Middelburg after less than two months of organising, 
this lack of millenarianism persisted and the IANC discourse 
remained firmly rooted in the realities of rural existence. 
Despite the personal popularity of Tonjeni and the many 
remarks that he had been sent by God, the IANC always 
stressed that liberation will come only if 
you organise. If you want anything 
you must work for it and seek for it. 
Freedom will not come if you do not seek 
it. (35) 
There was the occasional promise that freedom was imminent, 
that 
We have our foot on Africa and it is for 
u_s to lift just that one foot and 
Africa will be ours. Whether the hoer 
likes it or not, next year the sheep on 
their farms will belong to us. They 
will have to shear for us. (36) 
or that 
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••• the Boers will still have to say 
"Baas" to you and you will keep them 
under your feet like they are keeping 
you under their feet, and if they do not 
do their work you will ~ick their backs 
as they kick yours. Organise and get 
freedom it may be in this year. We also 
want to wear good clothes and high 
collars. (37) 
But generally the IANC stressed that the struggle would be a 
long and hard one. Tonjeni often warned that a country can 
only be "won through blood". The whites 
tell you to get property, but {sic} 
property and thus become landowners, but 
I tell you money cannot buy land, land 
can only be bought with blood. If you 
buy land you only the holder of the 
deeds and not the landowners and if you 
are in arrear with your Poll Tax the 
Govt Robbers can take back the land, or 
if another Nation come and take South 
Africa you lose your land because that 
nation then bought it with their blood. 
Gen. Hertzog and Smuts cannot show a 
receipt for South Africa, they did not 
buy it with money, they can only show 
you rifles and say it was bought with 
blood. (38) 
Often there was even a realisation that freedom might not 
come even in their own lifetime, that 
even if he {the speaker - WH} will not 
see it the children present will. 
(39) 
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The emphasis on fighting for the sake of one's children and 
grand-children was repeated again and again: 
To shed blood means the freedom of our 
children or grandchildren. I may be 
imprisoned for a year but my blood will 
be the freedom of my children or grand-
children. (40) 
Although the political practice of the IANC must be sharply 
differentiated from the millenarian visions of some earlier 
populist movements, its agitational approach did create 
problems which can be related to a "eris is of expectations". 
The constant agitation and mobilisation and the terms in 
which the struggle was couched, created the expectation of 
increasing struggles, of a looming and decisive 
conflagration. A strategy of mass mobilisation requires a 
constant impetus, the level of mobilisation must be 
constantly increased. To some extent the masses themselves 
provided this impetus by, for example, initiating attacks on 
the police. But such initiatives also dramatically 
increased the level of repression by the state and brought 
new problems in its wake. An even more severe problem, 
though, was the fact that this increasing level of mass 
mobilisation was not mirrored elsewhere in the country. 
Although the IANC usually organised a whole region, it 
quickly became clear that very little was happening in the 
rest of the country and that liberation was still very far 
away. Under such conditions, i.e increased repression 
combined with a measure of despondency about the lack of 
activity elsewhere, it became increasingly difficult to 
maintain a high level of mobilisation and as a result 
enthusiasm and eventually organisation slowly declined. 
Significance 
Having examined the various aspects of organisation by the 
militants in the ANC(WP) and the IANC, one can now attempt 
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to make an overall assessment of its significance. 
At the most obvious level, it is clear that the militants 
"failed" in that they were quite unable to organise the 
national revolution that they professed to be their task. 
Organisation was limited to a relatively small part of the 
country, and even in these areas it was not strong enough to 
lead successful local revolts. 
The obvious failure of the IANC must not, however, be 
allowed to obscure its very real achievements. In many 
areas of the Western and Southern Cape it was the first time 
that any concerted organisation took place. As Ross has 
pointed out, other coloured political movements have, until 
recently 
centred around the educated and upwardly 
mobile, who have tended to distance 
themselves from the mass of rural 
labourers. (41) 
The characterisation is probably somewhat harsh on the ICU 
which certainly did not centre around the 'educated and 
upwardly mobile', but otherwise it is correct. However, 
even the ICU ignored the rural labourers in the Western 
Cape. Thus for the majority of the rural popular classes in 
the Southern and Western Cape, the IANC represented their 
first experience of collective action and of the potential 
collective strength of the rural popular classes. 
Although there is little evidence concerning the legacy that 
the IANC left in the consciousness of the rural popular 
classes, the ease with which ·the Food and Canning Workers 
Union was later able to organise in the Western Cape rural 
areas suggests that at least some awareness of the value of 
organisation had been developed. There is also some fairly 
direct continui~y in some areas. For example, the Worcester 
and Cradock branches of the ANC continued to function 
throughout most the thirties and forties and were amongst 
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the strongest ANC branches in the fifties. Obviously there 
was a continuing interaction between these branches and the 
militants that remained from the IANC organisation, but the 
exact dynamics of this process is not clear. 
Probably the most significant feature of the IANC was the 
extent to which it challenged some of the conventional 
wisdoms of the national movement, and organised in new and 
progressive ways. In the first place the IANC organised 
non-racially. Although its membership was exclusively 
black, it was prepared to work with white militants in the 
CPSA. But more importantly, it organised all the oppressed 
into a single organisation, building on a tradition of 
non-racial organistion in the Cape, for example by the ICU 
and the ANC(WP). The militants in the ANC(WP) extended this 
tradition significantly when they ventured into the rural 
areas and transformed the ANC(WP) into a predominantly 
coloured organisation. 
The non-racial nature of its organisation is even more 
impressive when one compares it with other ANC branches, 
where the only contact with coloured people was at 
leadership level. Even this was limited to attendance of 
the annual Non-European Conferences called by the APO. (42) 
At times the rhetoric of the ANC even bordered on the 
racist, for example the speech given by Dr Xurna - a 
prominent ANC figure - to students at Fort Hare in 1930: 
As we intent to build bridges between 
white and black, we can di '$'._·miss the 
case of the coloured man by stating that 
the missionaries fought and secured some 
of the rights for the Hottentots until 
the Coloured man of today is, in 
principle, accepted as a White man 
politically, industrially, economically 
and educationally. 
The Indian in South Africa does not 
fall within ·the purview of our 
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discussion, because, according to the 
Rt. Hon S. Sastri, the Indian cannot 
make common cause with the African 
without alienating the right of 
intervention on their behalf on the part 
of the Government of India. (43) 
Once the IANC started to organise in the Midlands, it had to 
confront such attitudes directly. It publicly attacked the 
ANC's 
Policy of 'Natives only' and pointed out 
that Coloured people are prohibited of 
{sic} becoming Officers of the party of 
the 'Goodboys'. (44) 
The success of the IANC in this respect was a reflection of, 
and was in turn reflected in, the fact that it never 
organised around narrowly nationalistic lines. In its 
discourse there was an almost total absence of 
traditionalist elements, of appeals to traditional 
authorities and a traditional past. The only and relatively 
minor, exception was the fairly regular invocation of a 
tradition of resistance. ( 45). 
Chapter 6 suggested some of the.reasons why the IANC 
differed from most contemporary political organisations, 
such as the very specific political background of the 
leadership, the different class basis of the IANC and a lack 
of any substantial common interest with the traditional 
leadership. As for the coloured people, there has never 
been a nationalist movement, largely due to the diffuse and 
artificial nature of this group. Most authorities agree 
that there was very little material base for any kind of 
nationalism as 
no 'Coloured' man or woman would ever 
claim that the 'Coloured' group was 
anything_but a legal category imposed by 
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the oppressors from above. (46) 
Interestingly the IANC did draw on one neglected element in 
the consciousness of the Cape rural population, viz slavery. 
Ross argues that the other political movements in the Cape 
always tended to deny the slave past. (47) The IANC broke 
decisively with this tradition and slavery was a constant 
theme in its discourse. The IANC militants tried to relate 
the slave past to the contemporary position of black people: 
they emphasised that the black people were still 'slaves in 
the country of their birth'. They told the rural masses 
that in some ways they, especially the unemployed, were 
worse off than slaves - at least the slaves had housing and 
food. This theme is repeated in both the IANC constitution 
and in the Afrikaans version of Mayibuye, whfch became the 
most popular song in the Cape rural areas: 
Ons bruin mense, seuns van slawe, 
Vra one eie land terug, 
Wat gesteel is van ons vaders 
Toe hul in die donker sug. 
Gee dit t 1 rug nou1 
Gee dit t'rug nou1 
Weg met al die slawery 
Pirow kan ons nie ophou nie: 
Afrika sal vryheid kry 
(48) 
Another area in which the IANC went well beyond the existing 
conceptions of popular organisation was in the area of 
women. Unlike other organisations, such as the ANC and ICU, 
the IANC allowed and encouraged women to become full members 
of the organisation. Although women by no means played an 
equal role in the leadership, their participation was 
extremely significant. In Worcester, for example, women 
were reported to be "the most loyal supporters" of the 
ANC(WP) and they were often in the forefront, even when 
direct action was taken. (49) In the Midlands the' 
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situation was similar, except that women played an even more 
active role. For example, women often predominated at 
public meetings, they also held regular meetings on their 
own, and at one stage there was even a conscious effort to 
foster women's leadership. (50) Nevertheless, women still 
did not play an equal role at leadership level as is 
illustrated by the fact that there were only four women 
amongst the 17 IANC leaders recommended for banning by the 
Middelburg police. (51) 
A further, and somewhat surprising, area in which the IANC 
found itself well to the left of other popular 
organisat i.ons, was that of religion. None of the popular 
organisations like the ICU or ANC had ever been against 
religion as such (52). There had sometimes been virulent 
attacks against the established (white) churches, but these 
had always been from the standpoint of support for the 
independent churches. 
The ANC(WP) started off from very similar premises. In the 
Western and Southern Cape it tended to attack the 
established churches and advocate joining independent 
churches. But by the time the IANC began to organise in the 
Midlands, the organisation was characterised by a stridently 
anti-religious discourse. The church was constantly 
condemned, the leaders even declared themselves to be 
atheists, and black ministers were accused of being 
"bloodsuckers like the whites". (53) These attacks on 
religion were only slightly softened by the fairly regular 
use of religious imagery, and the fact that one of the 
regular IANC speakers in Middelburg was a minister from an 
independent church. (54) 
These attacks on religion were particularly significant, as 
it has become something of a commonplace of the left that no 
popular organisation can succeed without an accommodation 
with the churches. (55) Yet the IANC in Middelburg isolated 
the churches almost totally, and for over a year the 
churches were virtually empty. The success of this 
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anti-religious campaign demonstrates the need to re-evaluate 
such truisms. 
Finally, there is a more general question that needs to be 
raised, namely the fact that the liberation movement in 
South Africa has traditionally paid only scant attention to 
rural organisation, both in theory and in practice. As 
Bundy argues, 
from the 1920's to the late 1950's the 
various organs of the national 
liberation movement linked only fitfully 
and unsystematically with a wide range 
of localised rural movements. (56) 
The various liberation movements have tended, with a few 
notable exceptions, to concentrate on urban areas where they 
saw the working class as the main revolutionary force. Even 
on those rare occasions, however, that the issue of rural 
organisation was tackled practically or theoretically, the 
liberation movement proved singularly unable to bridge the 
gap between urban and rural struggles. (57) In the few 
cases where links were established between the broader 
liberation movement and rural struggles, the latter tended 
to remain isolated and localised and there was little 
integration with urban struggles. 
It is in this context that the rural organisation undertaken 
by the militants in the IANC and ANC(WP) must be analysed. 
At a theoretical level the somewhat reluctant adoption of 
the Black Republic program, despite its theoretical 
inadequacies, (58) at least posed the problem of 
organisation in the rural areas. But, as argued above, in 
Cape Town it was the practical effects that were more 
important than the theoretical insights. (59) The program 
reflected in large measure the practical commitment of the 
Cape Town militants to rural organisation, and its adoption 
reinforced this commitment and placed it within a more 
coherent political framework. 
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The militants were able to overcome the isolation of 
disparate rural struggles to a certain extent. The ANC(WP) 
and IANC functioned as fairly coherent political 
organisations with meetings of branch representatives and 
regular contact between branches at leadership level. 
Sometimes, this contact extended down to a mass level in 
solidarity actions, for example when lorries of ANC members 
from other branches attended a meeting at Robertson in an 
attempt to counter the intimidation by the local farmers. 
( 60) 
A further interesting feature of organisation in the Cape 
was the fact that the militants often organised in "urban" 
ways. There was a great emphasis on marches, demon-
strations, pass burnings and even strikes as means of 
achieving their goals. Many of the issues around which they 
organised were not specifically rural either: issues like 
wages, ·unemployment, passes and location controls were also 
burnning issues in the urban areas. But this did not mean 
that the militants had completely overcome the divide 
between urban and rural struggles. In fact, as argued in 
Chapter 4, the IANC became increasingly isolated from the 
struggles in the major towns as its focus shifted further 
east. Its "urban" approach reflects rather the political 
education of the main leaders and, more importantly, the 
fact that they were organising in those areas where 
proletarianisation was well advanced. Thus there were 
relatively large populations in the rural centres who had 
broken their ties with the land. Though many of them still 
·worked as seasonal workers on the farms, the problems they 
faced were primarily those that affected their day to day 
existence in town. 
Of course, the above arguement does not imply that the 
militants did not focus at all on the traditional "rural" 
issues such as access to land and cattle, and opposition to 
various improvement schemes. Although some of these issues 
were obviously totally inappropriate in the areas where they 
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organised, there were, for example, fairly regular calls for 
a return of the land to the African people. But these 
demands were subordinate to the demands that affected the 
rural popular classes more directly . 
To conclude, it is clear that the militants in the ANC(WP) 
and the IANC made significant progress in resolving some of 
the problems of rural organisation, and in overcoming the 
divisions between rural and urban struggles. But these 
problems continued to exist and were at least partially 
responsible for the eventual demise of the IANC. Despite 
its ultimate "failure", it is clear that the history of the 
rural organisation in the Cape can help to increase our 
understanding of the dynamics of rural struggles. It is 
hoped that this study has made some contribution to 
increasing our knowledge in an area that is vital to the 
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